Introduction
This package adds a patch to Plone to ensure that call catalog queries are ‘rooted’ to the current navigation root (as defined by the INavigationRoot interface). When installed, all catalog queries will have an implicit path parameter that limits search results to within the current navigation root, unless a path or UID parameter is explicitly provided. This avoids “leakage” of search results, portlet listings and the like. If a UID parameter is present, known content can be explicitly searched.
In this context, the navigation root must be:
A folderish object
That provides the INavigationRoot marker interface
And is a “component site” in the Zope 3 Component Architecture sense
The ‘collective.lineage’ product provides a user friendly way to create such types.
The navigation root will be kept as a thread local variable, in the same way that the component site is accessible via the global getSite() function. To get hold of the current traversed-over navigation root, you can use:
from collective.rooter import getNavigationRoot current_root = getNavigationRoot()
The root may be None if no INavigationRoot has been traversed over.
Changelog
1.0 (2015-07-15)
If UID is given in the catalog search keywords, don’t apply the INavigationRoot path. This allows for explicit queries for known objects in other areas of the portal. Obsoletes pull-request #1. [thet]
PEP 8. [thet]
1.0b1 (2009-03-29)
Initial release. [optilude]
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