Integrated security scheme for curve25519.
Project description
EDISS - Curve25519 Security Scheme
Repository: https://gitee.com/origamizyt/ediss.git
Like ECIES (Elliptic-curve integrated encryption scheme), EDISS (Edwards-curve integrated security scheme) provides public interfaces for key agreement, message authentication, digital signature and symmetric encryption using curve25519.
Installation
This module is available via pip:
$ pip install ediss
You can also clone the repository and install yourself:
$ git clone https://gitee.com/origamizyt/ediss.git
$ cd ediss
$ python setup.py install
If you want to use the source code, you should download the cryptography module as a dependency.
$ pip install cryptography
Basic Usage
For the most basic usage, the public apis are defined in the EdsScheme
class. Use the generate
static method to initialize schemes with generated keys. Use the privateKey
and publicKey
attributes to access keys.
>>> from ediss import EdsScheme
>>> es1 = EdsScheme.generate()
>>> es2 = EdsScheme.generate()
For private and public keys, you can create an key export using the exportKey
, exportJson
and exportBinary
method. Each of them receives an optional password as the material to derive the key used for wrapping.
>>> es1.privateKey.exportKey() # no wrapping
{'salt': None, 'x25519': b'...', 'ed25519': b'...'}
>>> es1.publicKey.exportJson()
'{"salt": null, "x25519": "...", "ed25519": "..."}'
>>> es2.publicKey.exportBinary()
b'...'
>>> es2.privateKey.exportKey(b'password') # PBKDF2 + AES
{'salt': b'...', 'x25519': b'...', 'ed25519': b'...'}
NOTE: The key export is incompatible with other serialization formats, such as DER or PEM.
To receive public keys from peer, use the corresponding receiveKey
, receiveJson
, and receiveBinary
methods. If you specified password during key export, you need to specify it as a parameter during receiving too.
>>> es2.receiveBinary(es1.exportBinary())
>>> es1.receiveJson(es2.exportJson(b'MyPassword'), b'MyPassword')
NOTE: You cannot receive public key more than once. Attempts to call receiving methods twice will raise the
RemoteKeyExists
error.
After receiving the remote keys, the signature and encipherment methods should now be available.
NOTE: To be more accurate, the
sign
anddecrypt
method is always available, as they only uses the private key.
Use the sharedSecret
property to acquire the negotiated secret between two schemes:
>>> es1.sharedSecret == es2.sharedSecret
True
You can use the shared secret to perform HMAC or other symmetric operations. To sign a message, simply use the sign
method. Call verify
on the other side to verify the message. The generated signature is 64 bytes long.
>>> data = b'my secret message'
>>> signature = es1.sign(data)
>>> es2.verify(data, signature)
True
>>> es2.verify(data, b'We are under attack!')
False
To encrypt the message, use the encrypt
method and decrypt via the decrypt
method. The enciphered length is the original length + 80.
>>> message = es2.encrypt(b'dark secrets')
>>> es1.decrypt(message)
b'dark secrets'
>>> from ediss import Error
>>> try:
... es1.decrypt(b'We are under attack!')
... except Error as e:
... print('malformed!')
...
malformed!
NOTE: Actually, the method raises a
ediss.cipher.MalformedCiphertext
error, which is a subclass ofediss.Error
.
More Usage
Local scheme
To use EDISS locally rather than remotely, use the LocalScheme
class.
>>> from ediss import LocalScheme
>>> s = LocalScheme.generate()
The public apis are the same as EdsScheme
without key receiving methods. The only difference is that the verify
and decrypt
method now works on signature and ciphertext generated by yourself rather than the other side.
To load schemes from private key exports, use the fromPrivateKey
, fromPrivateJson
and fromPrivateBinary
static methods.
>>> s2 = LocalScheme.fromPrivateKey(s.privateKey.exportKey())
>>> s.privateKey.exportBinary() == s2.privateKey.exportBinary()
True
NOTE: If you want to store the scheme in your local disk, make sure you encrypt the keys properly.
Incremental signers / verifiers
If your data is too large to sign in one chunk, you can use the getSigner
method to acquire an incremental signer.
>>> from ediss import EdsScheme
>>> e = EdsScheme.generate()
>>> s = e.getSigner()
>>> s.update(b'A chunk of data')
>>> s.update(b'Another chunk of data')
>>> signature = s.finalize()
Incremental verifiers are also available:
>>> e2 = EdsScheme.generate()
>>> e2.receiveKey(e.exportKey())
>>> v = e2.getVerifier()
>>> v.update(b'A chunk of data')
>>> v.update(b'Another chunk of data')
>>> v.finalize(signature)
True
These two methods also work on LocalScheme
.
Socket patching
As most users take advantage of this module to secure their socket connections, there's an special submodule called ediss.patch
for you to conveniently wrap your socket with the security scheme.
Their are four patch approaches as listed below:
Method Name | Method Description |
---|---|
PmHmac | Use shared secret to generate mac code, send along with message |
PmSign | Use ed25519 to generate digital signature, send along with message |
PmCiph | Use shared secret to encrypt the message |
PmFull | PmSign combined with PmCiph |
To patch your socket, simply pass it as an argument to SocketPatch
. Specify one method as the second argument. Call the negotiate
method to perform key agreement:
Client:
>>> from ediss.patch import *
>>> import socket
>>> s = socket.socket()
>>> # initialize the socket
>>> s = SocketPatch(s, PatchMethod.PmSign)
>>> s.negotiate(True)
Server:
>>> from ediss.patch import *
>>> import socket
>>> s = socket.socket()
>>> # initializes the socket
>>> c = SocketPatch(s.accept()[0], PatchMethod.PmSign)
>>> c.negotiate(False)
NOTE: You certainly can specify true for server and false for client, as long as they are different.
Now you can use the send
and recv
method with patch enabled. Make sure you catches the PacketDropped
exception when unauthorized packet is received.
s.send(b'some data to be signed')
try:
d = s.recv(1024)
print(d)
except PacketDropped:
print('received unauthorized packet')
Only send
and recv
are patched. Other attribute acquisition requests are directly propagated to the socket object itself.
Mechanism
The curve25519 consists of two different deriviations - x25519 and ed25519. Each of the private and public keys contains two components - the x25519 key and ed25519 key. The x25519 key is used for key agreement, symmetric encryption, while the ed25519 key is used for EdDSA (Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm).
Key agreement
The x25519 diffie-hellman is similar with ECDH (Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman), when two parties calculates the same shared secret according to the base point and their private keys. After agreeing with the same key, the module then derives a new key using the CONCATKDF-SHA512
algorithm specified in the NIST document.
Message Encipherment
As curve25519 does not provide a encryption scheme, the module uses AES-256-GCM
to encrypt the message. The symmetric key is derived using HKDF-SHA512
with the shared secret. As the shared secret generated by the keys is a constant value, it does not provide enough forward secrecy. To solve this, the module uses ephemeral keys, which means every time when a message is encrypted, a new random key is generated and performed DH with remote key. Then the public bytes of the ephemeral key is sent with the message and negotiates with the remote private key to produce the same shared secret. As the HKDF-SHA512
algorithm uses a random salt, the message has two random elements, making it difficult to crack. The encrypted message is 80 bytes longer than the plain text.
EphemeralKey | HKDFSalt | GcmNonce | Ciphertext | GcmTag | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
32 bytes | 16 bytes | 16 bytes | N bytes | 16 bytes | 80+N bytes |
NOTE: This mechanism does NOT prevent you from MITM attacks. You need to certificate your server.
Digital Signature
The ed25519 curve provides a signature scheme called EdDSA (Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm). The module signs the SHA-384 result of the message, producing a signature of 64 bytes. To crack the signature you'll need to find an efficient way to solve the DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem) on curve25519.
Backend
This module uses the pyca/cryptography module as backend. It is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers.
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