High-performance (D)DoS vulnerability testing toolkit. Various L4/7 attack vectors. Async networking.

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License: MIT License (MIT)

Author: Oleksii Kachaiev

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Requires: Python >=3.8

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Project description

FiberFox ๐ŸฆŠ

High-performance (D)DoS vulnerability testing toolkit. Implements various L4/7 attack vectors. Async approach to networking helps to lower CPU/RAM requirements while performing even complex network interactions.

NOTE๐Ÿ”ฅ The toolkit doesn't have capabilities needed for proper performance testing of the target servers or networks. The goal is to understand level of protection, by performing attacks specially designed to abuse common pitfalls and to bypass common protection measures.

WARNINGโ— Do not test infrastructure (servers, websites, network devices, etc) without owner's consent. Package default settings are tuned to avoid large impact when running tests.

Inspired by MHDDoS project.

analysis

Install

From PyPI:

$ pip install fiberfox

From sources:

$ git clone https://github.com/kachayev/fiberfox.git
$ cd fiberfox
$ python setup.py install

Build Docker image:

$ git clone https://github.com/kachayev/fiberfox.git
$ cd fiberfox
$ docker build -t fiberfox .

Usage

Example:

$ fiberfox \
    --targets tcp://127.0.0.1:8080 http://127.0.0.1:8081 \
    --concurrency 512 \
    --rpc 1024 \
    --strategy STRESS \
    --duration-seconds 3600 \
    --proxies-config ./proxies.txt

Features:

  • --concurrency (or -c) defines number of async coroutines to run. Fiber doesn't create a new OS thread so you can run a lot of them with small overhead. For TCP attack vectors, number of fibers rougly corresponds to the max number of open TCP connections. For UDP attacks, running too many fibers typically makes performance worse.
  • Muliple targets are supported. Each fiber picks up target by cycling over the list of them. If fiber session is too long (e.g. when using attack vectors like SLOW or CONNECTIONS, make sure to setup more fibers than you have targets).
  • Connections could be established using HTTP/SOCK4/SOCK5 proxies. Available proxies could be setup from the static configuration file or dynamically resolved from proxy providers. The tool automatically detects "dead" proxies and removes them from the pool.

More documentation about flags:

$ python fiberfox --help
usage: fiberfox [-h] [--targets [TARGETS ...]] [--targets-config TARGETS_CONFIG] [-c CONCURRENCY] [-s {UDP,TCP,STRESS,BYPASS,CONNECTION,SLOW,CFBUAM,AVB,GET}] [--rpc RPC] [--packet-size PACKET_SIZE]
               [-d DURATION_SECONDS] [--proxies [PROXIES ...]] [--proxies-config PROXIES_CONFIG] [--proxy-providers-config PROXY_PROVIDERS_CONFIG] [--log-level {DEBUG,INFO,ERROR,WARN}]
               [--connection-timeout-seconds CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS]

options:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  --targets [TARGETS ...]
                        List of targets, separated by spaces (if many)
  --targets-config TARGETS_CONFIG
                        File with the list of targets (target per line). Both local and remote files are supported.
  -c CONCURRENCY, --concurrency CONCURRENCY
                        Total number of fibers (for TCP attacks means max number of open connections)
  -s {UDP,TCP,STRESS,BYPASS,CONNECTION,SLOW,CFBUAM,AVB,GET}, --strategy {UDP,TCP,STRESS,BYPASS,CONNECTION,SLOW,CFBUAM,AVB,GET}
                        Flood strategy to utilize
  --rpc RPC             Number of requests to be sent to each connection
  --packet-size PACKET_SIZE
                        Packet size (in bytes)
  -d DURATION_SECONDS, --duration-seconds DURATION_SECONDS
                        How long to keep sending packets, in seconds
  --proxies [PROXIES ...]
                        List of proxy servers, separated by spaces (if many)
  --proxies-config PROXIES_CONFIG
                        File with a list of proxy servers (newline-delimted). Both local and remote files are supported.
  --proxy-providers-config PROXY_PROVIDERS_CONFIG
                        Configuration file with proxy providers (following MHDDoS configuration file format). Both local and remote files are supported.
  --log-level {DEBUG,INFO,ERROR,WARN}
                        Log level (defaults to INFO)
  --connection-timeout-seconds CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
                        Proxy connection timeout in seconds (default: 10s)

Attack Vectors

Attack vector is defined by --strategy option when execution the script.

Note: the package is under active development, more methods will be added soon.

L4

L4 attacks are designed to target transport layers thus are mainly used to overload network. Requires minimum knowledge of the target.

Strategy Layer Transport Design Notes
UDP L4 UDP Simple flood: sends randomly generated UDP packets to the target Automatically throttles fiber on receiving NO_BUFFER_AVAILABLE from the network device. To prevent this from happening do not configure more than 2 fibers per target when testing UDP flood attack.
TCP L4 TCP Simple flood: sends RPC randomly generated TCP packets into open TCP connection. Supports configuration for the size of the package and number of packages to be sent into each open connection.
CONNECTION L4 TCP Opens TCP connections and keeps it alives as long as possible. To be effective, this type of attack requires higher number of fibers than usual. Note that modern servers are pretty good with handling open inactive connections.

L7

L7 attacks are designed to abuse weaknesses in application layer protocols or specific implementation details of applications (or OS kernels). Generally more powerful but might require knowledge of how targeted system works.

Strategy Layer Transport Design Notes
GET L7 TCP Sends randomly generated HTTP GET requests overn an open TCP connection
STRESS L7 TCP Sends a sequence of HTTP requests with large body over a single open TCP connection. To maximize performance, make sure that target host allows pipelining (sending new request within persistent connection without reading response first).
BYPASS L7 TCP Sends HTTP get requests over open TCP connection, reads response back. Chunked reading is performed by recv bytes from the the connection, without parsing into HTTP response.
SLOW L7 TCP Similary to STRESS, issues HTTP requests and makes an attempt to keep connection utilized by reading back a single byte and sending additional payload with time delays between send operations. Ideally, time delay should be setup properly to avoid connection being reset by the peer because of read timeout (depends on peer setup).
CFBUAM L7 TCP Sends a single HTTP GET, after a long delay issues more requests over the same TCP connection.
AVB L7 TCP Isses HTTP GET packets into an open connection with long delays between send operations. To avoid the connection being reset by the peer because of read timeout, maximum delay is set to 1 second.

Proxies

By configuring set of proxy servers, one can simulate distributed attack even when running the toolkit from a single machine. When proxies are available, fiberfox connects to them first and only from those machines establishes connections to the target. By doing so, the system can bypass simplest IP-blocking protection measures. The toolkit supports HTTP/SOCKS4/SOCS5 protocols, and user/password authentication. It also dynamically manages set of proxies provided to avoid using those that are not responsive or do not meet attack requirements.

The are a few considerations when using proxies that you have to keep in mind:

  • The success of the attack performed now partially depends on the capacity of proxy servers. For example, when using public proxies network rate might be low because proxy is overcrowded. In this case, consider using private infrasturucture or paid clusters of dedicated proxy servers.

  • Proxy servers themselves might mitigate a few attack vectors. For example, when using "slow connection" approach, the proxy server could be configurated to throttle or close the connection. In a way "protecting" the target by doing so. Be mindful how proxy setup intervenes with the attack networking mechanics.

Analysis

One of the goal of the toolkit is to provide comprehensive monitoring information to guide vulnerabilities lookup.

The tool reports number of statistics per each target: number of packets, traffic, rate. For TCP-based attacks (both L4 and L7), it also reports histogram of packets sent within a single session (session here means traffic sent within a single open connection). Ideally, the histogram should be skewed towards left side. It means the peer closes connection earlier than "requests per connection" packets were sent. If it's mainly on the right, the target accepts what should be considered "garbage traffic".

Be careful with analysis. Low network rate, high frequency of connection attempts, high error rate, and more. All of those signals might indicate both the fact that the target stays storng facing the attack and that it's already dead. To get full understanding of the level of protection, you should use monitoring information on the target side (e.g. capability to work correctly when being challenged).

Contribute

  • Check for open issues or open a fresh issue to start a discussion around a feature idea or a bug.
  • Fork the repository on Github & fork master to feature-* branch to start making your changes.

License

Release under the MIT license. See LICENSE for the full license.


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License: MIT License (MIT)

Author: Oleksii Kachaiev

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Requires: Python >=3.8

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