This release has been yanked by its maintainers, and will be ignored by installers, except when explicitly specified.
agent-guard
The safety check an AI agent runs before it acts.
Every agent that installs packages, runs shell commands, or commits/outputs text can do real
damage: install malware, wipe a disk, or leak a credential. agent-guard is three cheap,
dependency-free checks — the "look before you leap" gate an agent (or you) calls before the
irreversible step.
pip install agent-tripwire # the checks (zero deps)
pip install "agent-tripwire[mcp]" # + the MCP server for agents
Use it as an MCP tool (for agents)
An agent can call these itself before acting. Add to your MCP client (Claude/Cursor/Claude Code):
{ "mcpServers": { "agent-guard": { "command": "agent-guard-mcp" } } }
MCP registry identity — mcp-name: io.github.ipezygj/agent-guard
| tool | the agent calls it before… |
|---|---|
check_package |
pip/npm install — is it real, malware, a typosquat, or does it run code on install? |
check_command |
running a shell command — is it a destructive / remote-code-exec vector (rm -rf, curl|bash, dd, force-push)? |
scan_secrets |
committing / pasting / logging — does the text leak an API key, token, or private key? |
The three checks
check_package — existence on the registry (a hallucinated name is a red flag), typosquat distance to popular packages, npm install/postinstall scripts (the classic supply-chain malware vector), and OSV malware/vulnerability advisories. Mainstream packages pass; look-alikes and install-time-code flag.
check_command — matches destructive / RCE shell patterns with a severity and a plain reason.
rm -rf /, curl … | bash, dd of=/dev/sda, fork bombs → critical; force-push, hard-reset,
sudo, DROP TABLE → high.
scan_secrets — AWS/OpenAI/Anthropic/Google/Stripe/GitHub/Slack keys, private-key blocks, JWTs,
and generic api_key=/password= assignments. Returns each finding (type, line, redacted).
from agent_guard import analyze_command, scan_secrets, check_package
analyze_command("rm -rf /")["danger"] # "critical"
scan_secrets("token = 'ghp_...'")["leaked"] # True
check_package("reqwests", "pypi")["risk"] # "high" (typosquat of requests)
The point: an agent about to install/run/commit should check first — and now it can, in one call, with a plain verdict and a recommendation. If a check comes back high/critical, stop and get a human.
License
MIT
Metadata
Release files for agent-tripwire 0.1.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz | 11.7 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agent_tripwire-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 24.1 kB
Release files / agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 11.7 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
4b73c3de4a9553fe4d13bb2404ecc929f867a13cb88b67d4c1b2a90f885960ea
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
dc4483cbc17b1db23484d5ff1a983013c727a85c9b3fe5738c35deca5ed40be7
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 23, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / agent_tripwire-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | agent_tripwire-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 12.4 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
1723edd390136f4a8ed46c8f81aed55608b32b3f28ac3859df730227b2033daf
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
2b4961cf98af61c8fb82f425db5fe0a85c628bed4e8cf46d8320868bd76bdec8
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 23, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for agent-tripwire 0.1.1
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 23, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.