Skip to main content
Yanked

This release has been yanked by its maintainers, and will be ignored by installers, except when explicitly specified.

agent-guard

The safety check an AI agent runs before it acts.

Every agent that installs packages, runs shell commands, or commits/outputs text can do real damage: install malware, wipe a disk, or leak a credential. agent-guard is three cheap, dependency-free checks — the "look before you leap" gate an agent (or you) calls before the irreversible step.

pip install agent-tripwire            # the checks (zero deps)
pip install "agent-tripwire[mcp]"     # + the MCP server for agents

Use it as an MCP tool (for agents)

An agent can call these itself before acting. Add to your MCP client (Claude/Cursor/Claude Code):

{ "mcpServers": { "agent-guard": { "command": "agent-guard-mcp" } } }

MCP registry identity — mcp-name: io.github.ipezygj/agent-guard

tool the agent calls it before…
check_package pip/npm install — is it real, malware, a typosquat, or does it run code on install?
check_command running a shell command — is it a destructive / remote-code-exec vector (rm -rf, curl|bash, dd, force-push)?
scan_secrets committing / pasting / logging — does the text leak an API key, token, or private key?

The three checks

check_package — existence on the registry (a hallucinated name is a red flag), typosquat distance to popular packages, npm install/postinstall scripts (the classic supply-chain malware vector), and OSV malware/vulnerability advisories. Mainstream packages pass; look-alikes and install-time-code flag.

check_command — matches destructive / RCE shell patterns with a severity and a plain reason. rm -rf /, curl … | bash, dd of=/dev/sda, fork bombs → critical; force-push, hard-reset, sudo, DROP TABLE → high.

scan_secrets — AWS/OpenAI/Anthropic/Google/Stripe/GitHub/Slack keys, private-key blocks, JWTs, and generic api_key=/password= assignments. Returns each finding (type, line, redacted).

from agent_guard import analyze_command, scan_secrets, check_package
analyze_command("rm -rf /")["danger"]           # "critical"
scan_secrets("token = 'ghp_...'")["leaked"]     # True
check_package("reqwests", "pypi")["risk"]       # "high" (typosquat of requests)

The point: an agent about to install/run/commit should check first — and now it can, in one call, with a plain verdict and a recommendation. If a check comes back high/critical, stop and get a human.

License

MIT

Metadata

Release files for agent-tripwire 0.1.1

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for agent-tripwire 0.1.1
File Size Uploaded Provenance
agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz 11.7 kB With provenance Details

Built distribution (wheel)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for agent-tripwire 0.1.1
File Interpreter ABI Platform
agent_tripwire-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details

Total release size: 24.1 kB

Release files / agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz

Download URL agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz
Size 11.7 kB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
4b73c3de4a9553fe4d13bb2404ecc929f867a13cb88b67d4c1b2a90f885960ea
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
dc4483cbc17b1db23484d5ff1a983013c727a85c9b3fe5738c35deca5ed40be7
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 23, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / agent_tripwire-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl

Download URL agent_tripwire-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl
Size 12.4 kB
Tags Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
1723edd390136f4a8ed46c8f81aed55608b32b3f28ac3859df730227b2033daf
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
2b4961cf98af61c8fb82f425db5fe0a85c628bed4e8cf46d8320868bd76bdec8
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 23, 2026.

Transparency log

Security for agent-tripwire 0.1.1

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

Full provenance

All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.

Select from 2 files

Attestation for agent_tripwire-0.1.1.tar.gz

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 23, 2026.

Transparency log

A note on package security

PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.

Release history Release notifications | RSS feed

This release
Anthropic, PBC Visionary sponsor Bloomberg Visionary sponsor Hudson River Trading Visionary sponsor Meta Visionary sponsor NVIDIA Visionary sponsor Microsoft Sustainability sponsor Depot Continuous Integration AWS Cloud computing and Security Sponsor Datadog Monitoring Fastly CDN Google Download Analytics Sentry Error logging StatusPage Status page