django-trusted-devices 1.5

Secure and manage trusted login devices for Django users

🔐 Django Trusted Devices

A plug-and-play Django app that adds trusted device management to your API authentication system using djangorestframework-simplejwt. Automatically associates tokens with user devices, tracks login locations, and enables per-device control over access and session management.

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🚀 Features

• 🔑 JWT tokens include a unique device_uid
• 🌍 Auto-detect IP, region, and city via configurable geolocation backend
• 🛡️ Per-device session tracking with update/delete restrictions
• 🔄 Custom TokenObtainPair, TokenRefresh, and TokenVerify views
• 🚪 Logout & revoke — logout current session or revoke all other devices
• 🧼 Automatic cleanup of stale devices on login + management command
• 🏷️ Device naming — let users label their devices ("Work Laptop", "iPhone")
• 📍 is_current flag — identify which device is making the request
• 🚨 Suspicious login detection — signals when a login comes from a new country
• 🕵️ Concurrent-session hijack detection — same device_uid from a new IP inside a short window invalidates both sessions
• 🔒 Rate limiting on login to prevent brute-force and device-creation spam
• 📊 Max device limit — configurable cap with automatic oldest-device eviction (race-safe under concurrent logins)
• ⚠️ Custom exception classes — catchable, typed errors with stable error codes (and optional handler that surfaces code in JSON)
• 📖 Full OpenAPI/Swagger schema via drf-spectacular
• 🧩 API-ready — supports DRF out of the box
• ⚙️ Fully customizable via TRUSTED_DEVICE Django settings
• 🛰️ Trusted-proxy aware X-Forwarded-For parsing (off by default — opt in once behind a known reverse proxy)
• 🌐 Cached geolocation — configurable per-IP TTL keeps login latency low
• 🚫 Rejects refresh/verify from unknown or cross-user devices

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📦 Installation

pip install django-trusted-device

Add to your INSTALLED_APPS:

INSTALLED_APPS = [
    ...
    'trusted_devices',
    'rest_framework_simplejwt.token_blacklist',  # optional, for token rotation
]

Run migrations:

python manage.py migrate

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⚙️ Configuration

Customize behavior in settings.py:

TRUSTED_DEVICE = {
    "DELETE_DELAY_MINUTES": 60 * 24,       # 24 hours before a device can be deleted
    "UPDATE_DELAY_MINUTES": 60,            # 1 hour before a device can be edited
    "ALLOW_GLOBAL_DELETE": True,           # Enable/disable device deletion globally
    "ALLOW_GLOBAL_UPDATE": True,           # Enable/disable device editing globally
    "MAX_DEVICES_PER_USER": None,          # None = unlimited, or set e.g. 5
    "GEOLOCATION_BACKEND": "trusted_devices.utils.get_location_data",
    "GEOLOCATION_CACHE_SECONDS": 60 * 60 * 24,  # 24h cache; 0 disables
    "DEFAULT_CAN_UPDATE_OTHER_DEVICES": True,   # Default perm for new devices
    "DEFAULT_CAN_DELETE_OTHER_DEVICES": True,   # Default perm for new devices

    # Trusted-proxy parsing — enable only when behind a known reverse proxy.
    "USE_X_FORWARDED_FOR": False,
    "TRUSTED_PROXY_DEPTH": 1,

    # Concurrent-session hijack detection.
    "DETECT_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS": True,
    "CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS": 60,
}

Settings Reference

Setting	Default	Description
DELETE_DELAY_MINUTES	1440 (24h)	Minimum device age before it can be deleted
UPDATE_DELAY_MINUTES	60 (1h)	Minimum device age before it can be edited
ALLOW_GLOBAL_DELETE	True	Master switch for device deletion
ALLOW_GLOBAL_UPDATE	True	Master switch for device editing
MAX_DEVICES_PER_USER	None	Max active devices per user. Oldest evicted on new login (race-safe)
GEOLOCATION_BACKEND	"trusted_devices.utils.get_location_data"	Dotted path to geolocation function
GEOLOCATION_CACHE_SECONDS	86400	Per-IP cache TTL for geolocation lookups. 0 disables caching
DEFAULT_CAN_UPDATE_OTHER_DEVICES	True	Default update permission for newly created devices
DEFAULT_CAN_DELETE_OTHER_DEVICES	True	Default delete permission for newly created devices
USE_X_FORWARDED_FOR	False	When True, parse X-Forwarded-For to determine client IP. Leave False if the app is exposed directly — clients can otherwise spoof their own IP
TRUSTED_PROXY_DEPTH	1	Number of trusted reverse proxies between the client and the app. The client IP is taken at position -(depth+1) from the right of X-Forwarded-For, so spoofed leftmost entries are ignored
DETECT_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS	True	If a token's device_uid is presented from a different IP within the window below, the device is deleted (kicking both sessions) and device_compromised is fired
CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS	60	Time window inside which a same-token IP change is treated as a hijack rather than a legitimate roaming user

---

🧩 Usage

🔐 SimpleJWT Configuration

Replace default SimpleJWT serializers with TrustedDevice serializers:

from datetime import timedelta

REST_FRAMEWORK = {
    'DEFAULT_AUTHENTICATION_CLASSES': (
        'trusted_devices.authentication.TrustedDeviceAuthentication',
    ),
}

SIMPLE_JWT = {
    "ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME": timedelta(minutes=60),
    "REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME": timedelta(days=30),
    "AUTH_HEADER_TYPES": ("Bearer",),
    "TOKEN_OBTAIN_SERIALIZER": 'trusted_devices.serializers.TrustedDeviceTokenObtainPairSerializer',
    "TOKEN_REFRESH_SERIALIZER": 'trusted_devices.serializers.TrustedDeviceTokenRefreshSerializer',
    "TOKEN_VERIFY_SERIALIZER": 'trusted_devices.serializers.TrustedDeviceTokenVerifySerializer',
}

🔐 Custom Token Views

Replace the default SimpleJWT views:

from trusted_devices.views import (
    TrustedDeviceTokenObtainPairView,
    TrustedDeviceTokenRefreshView,
    TrustedDeviceTokenVerifyView,
)

urlpatterns = [
    path('api/token/', TrustedDeviceTokenObtainPairView.as_view(), name='token_obtain_pair'),
    path('api/token/refresh/', TrustedDeviceTokenRefreshView.as_view(), name='token_refresh'),
    path('api/token/verify/', TrustedDeviceTokenVerifyView.as_view(), name='token_verify'),
]

---

📡 Device Management API

Use the provided TrustedDeviceViewSet:

from trusted_devices.views import TrustedDeviceViewSet

router.register(r'trusted-devices', TrustedDeviceViewSet, basename='trusted-device')

Endpoints

Method	Endpoint	Description
GET	/trusted-devices	List all devices (includes is_current flag)
PATCH	/trusted-devices/{device_uid}	Update device name & permissions
DELETE	/trusted-devices/{device_uid}	Delete a specific device session
POST	/trusted-devices/logout	Revoke current device session
POST	/trusted-devices/revoke-all	Revoke all other device sessions

Example: List Devices Response

[
  {
    "device_uid": "a1b2c3d4-...",
    "name": "Work Laptop",
    "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 ...",
    "ip_address": "203.0.113.42",
    "country": "United States",
    "region": "California",
    "city": "San Francisco",
    "last_seen": "2026-03-22T10:30:00Z",
    "created_at": "2026-03-15T08:00:00Z",
    "is_current": true
  },
  {
    "device_uid": "e5f6g7h8-...",
    "name": "",
    "user_agent": "okhttp/4.12.0",
    "ip_address": "198.51.100.7",
    "country": "Germany",
    "region": "Berlin",
    "city": "Berlin",
    "last_seen": "2026-03-20T14:22:00Z",
    "created_at": "2026-03-10T09:15:00Z",
    "is_current": false
  }
]

Example: Revoke All Response

{
  "revoked_count": 3
}

---

🚨 Signals

Connect to device lifecycle events:

from django.dispatch import receiver
from trusted_devices.signals import (
    device_created,
    device_revoked,
    suspicious_login,
    device_compromised,
)

@receiver(device_created)
def on_new_device(sender, user, device, **kwargs):
    """Fired when a new device is registered (login)."""
    send_notification(user, f"New login from {device.city}, {device.country}")

@receiver(device_revoked)
def on_device_removed(sender, user, device_uid, **kwargs):
    """Fired when a device is deleted."""
    log_audit(user, f"Device {device_uid} revoked")

@receiver(suspicious_login)
def on_suspicious_login(sender, user, device, previous_countries, **kwargs):
    """Fired when a login comes from a country not seen before."""
    send_email(
        user,
        f"New login from {device.country} — was this you? "
        f"Your previous logins were from: {', '.join(previous_countries)}"
    )

@receiver(device_compromised)
def on_device_compromised(sender, device_uid, previous_ip, current_ip, **kwargs):
    """
    Fired when a token is presented from a new IP within
    CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS — the device record has already been
    deleted by the time this signal fires. The `user` kwarg is provided
    when the request reached the auth layer; on refresh-time detection,
    `user_id` is provided instead.
    """
    user = kwargs.get("user")
    user_id = kwargs.get("user_id") or (user.pk if user else None)
    alert_security_team(
        user_id=user_id,
        message=f"Possible token theft for device {device_uid}: "
                f"{previous_ip} → {current_ip}",
    )

Signal	Args	When
device_created	user, device	New device registered on login
device_revoked	user, device_uid	Device deleted (via API, cleanup, or eviction)
suspicious_login	user, device, previous_countries	Login from a new country
device_compromised	user or user_id, device_uid, previous_ip, current_ip	Same device_uid used from a new IP inside CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS. The device has already been deleted; both sessions are now invalid

---

⚠️ Exception Classes

All exceptions are importable from trusted_devices.exceptions:

Exception	HTTP	Code	When
DeviceUIDMissing	401	device_uid_missing	Token has no device_uid claim
DeviceNotRecognized	401	device_not_recognized	Device deleted, never existed, or belongs to a different user than the token claims
DeviceCompromised	401	device_compromised	Same device_uid used from a new IP inside CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS; session has been invalidated
InactiveAccount	401	inactive_account	User disabled after token issued
TokenBlacklisted	400	token_blacklisted	Rotated token reuse attempt
DeviceNotVerified	403	device_not_verified	No current device on request
DeviceDeletionDisabled	403	device_deletion_disabled	Global deletion turned off
DeviceEditingDisabled	403	device_editing_disabled	Global editing turned off
DeviceLacksDeletePermission	403	device_lacks_delete_permission	Device can't delete others
DeviceLacksEditPermission	403	device_lacks_edit_permission	Device can't edit others
DeviceSessionTooRecent	403	device_session_too_recent	Target within delay window
DeviceSelfModification	403	device_self_modification	Attempt to modify/delete own device (use /logout)
DevicePermissionEscalation	403	device_permission_escalation	Granting permissions the current device doesn't have
InvalidGeolocationBackend	—	—	Misconfigured GEOLOCATION_BACKEND (startup error)

from trusted_devices.exceptions import DeviceNotRecognized

try:
    # ... authenticate
except DeviceNotRecognized:
    # handle specifically instead of catching generic AuthenticationFailed
    pass

Surfacing code in JSON responses (optional)

DRF's default exception handler emits only detail in error bodies. To include the stable code alongside it — recommended for clients that branch on machine-readable error identifiers — wire up the bundled handler:

REST_FRAMEWORK = {
    # ...
    "EXCEPTION_HANDLER": "trusted_devices.handlers.trusted_device_exception_handler",
}

Responses then look like:

{
  "detail": "This session device is no longer valid.",
  "code": "device_not_recognized"
}

---

🌍 Custom Geolocation Backend

By default, geolocation uses ipapi.co. You can replace it with any provider (MaxMind GeoIP2, ip-api.com, etc.):

# settings.py
TRUSTED_DEVICE = {
    "GEOLOCATION_BACKEND": "myapp.geo.maxmind_lookup",
}

Your backend must accept an IP string and return a dict with optional keys country, region, city:

# myapp/geo.py
from trusted_devices.utils import LocationData

def maxmind_lookup(ip: str) -> LocationData:
    import geoip2.database

    reader = geoip2.database.Reader('/path/to/GeoLite2-City.mmdb')
    try:
        response = reader.city(ip)
        return {
            "country": response.country.name,
            "region": response.subdivisions.most_specific.name,
            "city": response.city.name,
        }
    except geoip2.errors.AddressNotFoundError:
        return {}

The backend's return value is automatically validated — unexpected keys are logged as warnings, non-dict returns are safely ignored.

Geolocation results are cached per-IP for GEOLOCATION_CACHE_SECONDS (default 24h). Repeat lookups don't hit the backend, so login latency stays low and external API quota isn't spent re-resolving the same client. Set GEOLOCATION_CACHE_SECONDS = 0 to disable.

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🛰️ Trusted Proxies & Client IP

By default the library uses REMOTE_ADDR as the client IP. The X-Forwarded-For header is ignored unless you opt in — otherwise a client connecting directly to the app could spoof their IP and country by setting the header themselves.

When the app runs behind a known reverse proxy (Cloudflare, AWS ALB, nginx, etc.), enable parsing and tell the library how many trusted hops sit between the public client and Django:

TRUSTED_DEVICE = {
    "USE_X_FORWARDED_FOR": True,
    "TRUSTED_PROXY_DEPTH": 1,  # 1 if you have one proxy, 2 if proxy → load balancer, etc.
}

The client IP is read at position -(TRUSTED_PROXY_DEPTH + 1) from the right of X-Forwarded-For, which is the last entry an attacker cannot inject.

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🕵️ Concurrent-Session Hijack Detection

If a stolen access or refresh token is replayed from a different IP while the legitimate user is still active, the library treats it as a session hijack:

1. On every authenticated request, the incoming IP is compared against the device's stored last_ip.
2. If they differ and last_seen is within CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS (default 60), the device record is deleted.
3. Both sessions immediately fail authentication on their next request (DeviceCompromised, code device_compromised).
4. The device_compromised signal fires so you can alert the user, revoke related sessions, or escalate to a security team.

Detection is on by default and respects USE_X_FORWARDED_FOR for IP attribution. To disable (e.g. if you have a roaming-heavy mobile audience), set:

TRUSTED_DEVICE = {
    "DETECT_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS": False,
}

ℹ️ Tune CONCURRENT_SESSION_WINDOW_SECONDS carefully. A short window catches active token-replay; a long window will cause false positives for users on flaky mobile networks where IPs change between requests.

---

🧹 Device Cleanup

Automatic (on login)

Stale devices (not seen within REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME) are automatically cleaned up each time a user logs in.

Management Command

# Delete devices not seen within the refresh token lifetime
python manage.py cleanup_devices

# Override with a custom cutoff (30 days)
python manage.py cleanup_devices --days 30

# Preview without deleting
python manage.py cleanup_devices --dry-run

Add to crontab for scheduled cleanup:

# Run daily at 3am
0 3 * * * python manage.py cleanup_devices

---

👤 Device Model

Each trusted device includes:

Field	Purpose
device_uid	UUID primary key
name	User-defined label (e.g. "Work Laptop")
user_agent	Browser or app string
ip_address	Client IP captured when the device was first registered
last_ip	Most recently observed IP — compared against incoming requests for hijack detection
country / region / city	Geolocation data
last_seen / created_at	Activity timestamps
can_update_other_devices	Permission flag
can_delete_other_devices	Permission flag

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🧠 How It Works

1. Login → a device_uid is generated and embedded in the JWT token. A TrustedDevice record is created (transactionally, with row-level locking on the user when MAX_DEVICES_PER_USER is set) with IP, user agent, and geolocation.
2. Every API request → TrustedDeviceAuthentication validates the device_uid belongs to the token's user, runs hijack detection against last_ip, then updates last_seen + last_ip.
3. Token refresh → validates the device still exists for this user, runs hijack detection, updates timestamps, and optionally rotates the token.
4. Device management → users can list, rename, update permissions, or revoke their devices via the API.
5. Session revocation → deleting a device record immediately blocks all requests using tokens linked to that device, even if the JWT hasn't expired.
6. Hijack invalidation → if the same device_uid appears from a new IP within the configured window, the device record is deleted on the spot — both sessions fail their next call with DeviceCompromised.

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🧪 Testing Locally

# Create and activate a virtual environment
uv venv
source .venv/bin/activate  # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate

# Install the package in editable mode with dev extras
uv pip install -e ".[dev]"

# Run the test suite
pytest

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🧱 Dependencies

• Django >= 4.2
• Django REST Framework >= 3.14.0
• djangorestframework-simplejwt >= 5.5.0
• drf-spectacular >= 0.28.0
• httpx >= 0.28.1 (for default geolocation backend)

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🤝 Collaboration & Contributing

We love community contributions! To collaborate:

1. Fork the repo and create a feature branch:

   git checkout -b feature/my-amazing-idea
   

2. Follow code style – run:

   make lint  # runs flake8, isort, black
   

3. Write & run tests:

   pytest
   

4. Commit with clear messages and open a Pull Request. GitHub Actions will lint + test your branch automatically.

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🗣️ Discussions & Issues

• 💡 Questions / ideas → GitHub Discussions
• 🐛 Bugs / feature requests → GitHub Issues

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🛠 Maintainer Workflow

• PRs require at least one approval and passing CI
• We squash‑merge to keep history clean
• Follows Semantic Versioning (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH), tagged as vX.Y.Z

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📄 License

MIT

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Made with ❤️ by Jahongir Ganiev Security questions or commercial support? Open an issue or email [e-mail]