mcp-watchdog 0.1.9

MCP security proxy that detects and blocks all known MCP attack classes

mcp-watchdog

MCP security proxy that sits between AI coding assistants and MCP servers, detecting and blocking all known MCP attack classes. Works with any MCP server (tools, resources, prompts) on macOS, Linux, and Windows.

Catches Rug Pulls, Tool Poisoning, Tool Shadowing, Name Squatting, Parameter Injection, SSRF, Command Injection, SQL Injection, Reverse Shell, Supply Chain Impersonation, Token Leakage, OAuth Confused Deputy, Session Smuggling, Context Leakage, Email Header Injection, False-Error Escalation, Preference Manipulation, ANSI Escape Injection, MCP Parasite, Thanatos (all 4 layers), SANDWORM_MODE-style prompt injection, Resource Content Injection, Prompt Template Injection, Sampling Hijack, and Elicitation Credential Harvesting — before any of it reaches your AI assistant.

Why this exists

MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers have full access to your AI assistant's context. A malicious or compromised server can:

• Inject hidden instructions into tool descriptions (<IMPORTANT> blocks telling the AI to exfiltrate credentials)
• Silently redefine tools after initial approval (Rug Pull attacks)
• Shadow trusted tools by injecting cross-server override instructions in tool descriptions (100% ASR on Claude Desktop)
• Squat tool names by registering duplicate tool names from different servers
• Steal system prompts and conversation history via parameter injection (HiddenLayer attack)
• Access cloud metadata via SSRF through URI parameters (MCP fURI, 36.7% of servers vulnerable)
• Execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in tool arguments
• Inject SQL via tool arguments to SQLite/database MCP servers (Trend Micro disclosure)
• Spawn reverse shells to C2 servers (JFrog found 3 PyPI + npm packages with identical reverse shell payloads)
• Impersonate legitimate packages via typosquatting (fake Postmark MCP server - 1,643 downloads)
• Leak API keys and tokens (GitHub PATs, AWS keys, Slack tokens, JWTs) in responses
• Hijack OAuth flows via malformed authorization endpoints (CVE-2025-6514, 437K+ dev environments)
• Inject messages into sessions via agent session smuggling (A2A attacks)
• Silently BCC emails to attacker addresses via email header injection (postmark-mcp incident)
• Trigger privilege escalation via fake error messages designed to manipulate AI into granting elevated access
• Manipulate tool selection via persuasive language in descriptions biasing which tools the AI chooses
• Hide instructions via ANSI escape sequences and bidirectional text overrides invisible in terminal UIs
• Profile your behavior by collecting commit timestamps, deploy windows, and activity patterns
• Encode payloads steganographically inside normal-looking JSON responses
• Propagate across servers - output from Server A influences calls to Server B
• Persist across sessions by writing state to project files outside declared scope
• Escape filesystem sandboxes via symlink attacks bypassing path restrictions
• Exfiltrate data via URL params - sensitive tokens embedded in https://evil.com/steal?data=SECRET
• Poison schema fields - injection in parameter defaults, enums, and nested schema values (CyberArk FSP)
• Flood approval requests to cause consent fatigue, then slip in destructive actions
• Replay OAuth tokens across servers via audience mismatch (RFC 8707 violation)
• Inject fake notifications (tools/list_changed) to trigger tool re-fetching for rug pulls
• Poison resource content — resources/read responses can contain prompt injection payloads targeting the AI model
• Inject via prompt templates — prompts/get returned messages are a direct LLM injection vector
• Hijack sampling requests — malicious servers use sampling/createMessage to control LLM behavior with injected system prompts
• Harvest credentials via elicitation — elicitation/create (MCP 2025-11-25) lets servers phish users for passwords, API keys, and tokens
• Flood resource update notifications — rapid notifications/resources/updated events trigger re-reads of now-poisoned resources

mcp-watchdog intercepts all JSON-RPC traffic and applies multi-layer detection before any data reaches your AI model.

What it catches

Attack Class	Detection Layer	Rule	Severity
SANDWORM_MODE <IMPORTANT> injection	SMAC-L3	SMAC-5	Critical
HTML comment injection	SMAC-L3	SMAC-1	High
Zero-width unicode steganography	SMAC-L3	SMAC-1	High
ANSI escape sequence injection	SMAC-L3	SMAC-1	High
Bidirectional text overrides (LRE/RLO/LRI)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-1	High
Markdown reference link exfiltration	SMAC-L3	SMAC-2	High
Credential-seeking patterns	SMAC-L3	SMAC-5	Critical
Token/secret leakage (GitHub, AWS, Slack, JWT, OpenAI, Stripe, Discord, npm, PyPI, Supabase, Sendgrid, Twilio, Vault, Datadog, GCP, Azure, PEM keys)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-6	Critical
Homoglyph <IMPORTANT> injection (Greek Ι, Cyrillic А)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-5	Critical
HTML-encoded &lt;IMPORTANT&gt; injection	SMAC-L3	SMAC-5	Critical
Role injection markers ([SYSTEM]:, [ADMIN]:, [ASSISTANT]:)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-5	Critical
URL-encoded zero-width characters (%E2%80%8B)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-1	High
Double-encoded HTML entities (&amp;#x200b;)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-1	High
Double-encoded path traversal (..%252f)	Input Sanitizer	CMD-INJECT	High
Split-line tag evasion (<IMPOR\nTANT>)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-5	Critical
Space-split token evasion (sk_ live_)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-6	Critical
Unlabeled secret key detection (secret_key:, private_key:)	SMAC-L3	SMAC-6	Critical
Token exfiltration via URL params (Stripe, npm, PyPI, Sendgrid, Vault, Datadog, Discord, Azure keys)	URL Filter	EXFIL	Critical
Rug Pull (silent tool redefinition)	Tool Registry	RUG-PULL	Critical
Sneaky tool addition (new tools after initial registration)	Tool Registry	RUG-PULL	High
Tool removal after establishing trust	Tool Registry	RUG-PULL	High
Tool Shadowing (cross-server desc pollution)	Tool Shadow	SHADOW	Critical
Tool Name Squatting (duplicate names across servers)	Tool Shadow	SHADOW	Critical
Preference Manipulation (biasing tool selection)	Tool Shadow	SHADOW	High
Cross-server tool reference in descriptions	Tool Shadow	SHADOW	High
Parameter injection (system_prompt, conversation_history)	Param Scanner	PARAM-INJECT	Critical
Suspicious parameter patterns	Param Scanner	PARAM-INJECT	High
Full Schema Poisoning (defaults, enums, nested fields)	Param Scanner	PARAM-INJECT	Critical
SSRF to cloud metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS)	URL Filter	SSRF	Critical
SSRF to localhost / internal networks	URL Filter	SSRF	High
Data exfiltration via URL parameters (Slack CVE-2025-34072)	URL Filter	EXFIL	Critical
Base64-encoded token exfiltration in URL params	URL Filter	EXFIL	Critical
Shell metacharacter injection	Input Sanitizer	CMD-INJECT	Critical
Command injection patterns	Input Sanitizer	CMD-INJECT	Critical
Path traversal attacks	Input Sanitizer	CMD-INJECT	High
SQL injection (UNION SELECT, DROP TABLE, etc.)	Input Sanitizer	SQL-INJECT	Critical
Reverse shell patterns (bash /dev/tcp, nc -e, mkfifo)	Input Sanitizer	REVERSE-SHELL	Critical
Email header injection (BCC exfiltration)	Tool Shadow	EMAIL-INJECT	Critical
Email comma injection (multiple recipients in to/cc fields)	Tool Shadow	EMAIL-INJECT	Critical
False-error escalation (fake errors triggering privilege escalation)	Tool Shadow	ESCALATION	High
Supply chain typosquatting	Registry Checker	SUPPLY-CHAIN	Critical
Known malicious server patterns	Registry Checker	SUPPLY-CHAIN	Critical
OAuth authorization endpoint injection (CVE-2025-6514)	OAuth Guard	OAUTH	Critical
Excessive OAuth scope requests	OAuth Guard	OAUTH	High
Suspicious OAuth redirect URIs	OAuth Guard	OAUTH	Critical
OAuth javascript:/data:/vbscript: redirect URIs	OAuth Guard	OAUTH	Critical
OAuth open redirect via query parameters	OAuth Guard	OAUTH	Critical
Token audience mismatch / replay (RFC 8707)	OAuth Guard	TOKEN-REPLAY	Critical
MCP sampling exploitation (message + system prompt injection)	Proxy	SAMPLING	High
Elicitation credential harvesting (password, token, api_key fields)	Proxy	ELICITATION	Critical
Elicitation message injection	Proxy	ELICITATION	Critical
Resource content injection (resources/read responses)	Proxy	CMD-INJECT	Critical
Resource description poisoning (resources/list responses)	Proxy	SMAC-5	Critical
Resource template description poisoning	Proxy	SMAC-5	Critical
Prompt message injection (prompts/get responses)	Proxy	SMAC-5	Critical
Prompt description poisoning (prompts/list responses)	Proxy	SMAC-5	Critical
Prompt argument schema injection	Proxy	SMAC-5	Critical
Session smuggling (orphaned/injected responses)	Flow Tracker	SESSION	Critical
Cross-server data propagation (JWTs, UUIDs, API keys)	Flow Tracker	CROSS-SERVER	High
Context leakage between servers	Proxy	CONTEXT-LEAK	High
Consent fatigue / approval flooding	Rate Limiter	RATE-LIMIT	High
Burst flooding (rapid-fire tool calls)	Rate Limiter	RATE-LIMIT	Critical
Notification event injection (tools/list_changed, resources/updated)	Rate Limiter	NOTIF-INJECT	Critical
Windows command injection (cmd.exe, powershell -enc)	Input Sanitizer	CMD-INJECT	Critical
Behavioral fingerprinting	Behavioral Monitor	DRIFT	High
Scope creep (credential field access)	Behavioral Monitor	DRIFT	Critical
Credential path access in tool arguments	Behavioral Monitor	BEHAVIORAL	Critical
Phase transitions (sudden behavior change)	Behavioral Monitor	DRIFT	Critical
Base64 payload detection (embedded and standalone)	Entropy Analyzer	ENTROPY	Medium
Multiple base64 segment aggregation	Entropy Analyzer	ENTROPY	Medium
Steganographic C2 payloads	Entropy Analyzer	ENTROPY	Medium
Hidden instructions in tool responses	Entropy + Semantic	ENTROPY	High
Structural anomalies (unusual JSON depth)	Entropy Analyzer	ENTROPY	Low
Out-of-scope filesystem writes	Scope Enforcer	SCOPE-L4	Critical
MCP config file modification	Scope Enforcer	SCOPE-L4	Critical
Symlink escape attacks	Scope Enforcer	SCOPE-L4	Critical

SMAC-L3 compliance

mcp-watchdog implements the SMAC (Structured MCP Audit Controls) Level 3 preprocessing standard:

• SMAC-1: Strip HTML comments, zero-width unicode (raw, JSON-escaped, HTML entities, URL-encoded, double-encoded), ANSI escape sequences, and bidirectional text overrides
• SMAC-2: Strip markdown reference links used for data exfiltration
• SMAC-4: Log all violations with content hashes and timestamps
• SMAC-5: Detect and strip <IMPORTANT> instruction blocks (with attributes, unclosed tags, homoglyph variants, HTML-encoded forms, split-line evasion), [SYSTEM]/[ADMIN]/[ASSISTANT] role injection (full line stripping), and credential-seeking patterns
• SMAC-6: Detect and redact leaked tokens/secrets (GitHub PATs, AWS keys, Slack tokens, JWTs, OpenAI keys, Stripe keys, Discord bot tokens, npm/PyPI tokens, Supabase, Sendgrid, Twilio, Vault, Datadog, Heroku, GCP service account keys, Azure connection strings, PEM private keys, unlabeled secret keys) with space-split evasion normalization

Install

git clone https://github.com/bountyyfi/mcp-watchdog.git
cd mcp-watchdog
pip install -e ".[dev]"

With optional dependencies:

pip install -e ".[all]"    # Includes anthropic SDK + watchdog filesystem monitoring
pip install -e ".[semantic]"  # Just the LLM semantic classifier
pip install -e ".[filesystem]"  # Just filesystem monitoring

Usage

Wrap any MCP server command with mcp-watchdog --verbose --. The original server command goes after --:

# Proxy mode — wrap an upstream MCP server:
mcp-watchdog --verbose -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ~/projects

# Standalone scanner — pipe MCP messages through for testing:
echo '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"tools/list"}' | mcp-watchdog

Configuration

Replace your existing MCP server entry with mcp-watchdog + the original command as args after --.

Claude Desktop

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "filesystem-watchdog": {
      "command": "mcp-watchdog",
      "args": ["--verbose", "--", "npx", "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/Users/you/projects"],
      "env": {}
    }
  }
}

Cursor / Windsurf

Same pattern — see configs/ for IDE-specific examples.

Live demo

See every detection layer fire in real time:

python demo.py

The demo starts a real proxy wrapping a fake MCP server, sends clean traffic and 7 different attack types through it, and shows what gets caught vs what passes through.

Detection layers

Layer 0: SMAC-L3 Preprocessing

Static pattern matching applied to every MCP response — tools/call, resources/read, prompts/get, prompts/list, resources/list, and resources/templates/list. Pre-normalization defeats split-line tag evasion and space-split token evasion before pattern matching. Strips injection patterns (including homoglyph, HTML-encoded, and role-injection variants), zero-width characters (raw, JSON-escaped, HTML entities, URL-encoded, double-encoded), ANSI escape sequences, bidirectional text overrides, hidden instructions, and redacts 30+ leaked token/secret patterns before they reach the AI model.

Layer 1: Behavioral Drift Detection

Monitors MCP server behavior over time. Detects scope creep, behavioral fingerprinting, and phase transitions after establishing a baseline.

Layer 2: Entropy + Semantic Analysis

Shannon entropy analysis detects base64-encoded payloads, instruction-like language, and structural anomalies. Optional LLM semantic classifier (Claude Haiku) catches steganographic payloads that are statistically normal but semantically malicious.

Layer 3: Cross-Server Flow Tracking + Session Integrity

Tracks tokens (JWTs, UUIDs, prefixed API keys like ghp_*, sk-*, AKIA*) across servers to detect cross-server propagation. Monitors request/response message sequences to detect session smuggling and injected responses.

Layer 4: Filesystem Scope Enforcement

Blocks writes to .git/config, .ssh/, .aws/, MCP config files via inotify/FSEvents monitoring. Resolves symlinks to prevent sandbox escape attacks.

Layer 5: Tool Integrity + Shadow Detection

Hashes every tool definition on first load. Detects rug pulls (silent redefinition), tool removal, and schema changes. Scans parameter names for injection patterns that leak system prompts and conversation history. Detects tool shadowing (cross-server description pollution), name squatting (duplicate tool names), and preference manipulation (persuasive language biasing tool selection).

Layer 6: Network Security + Injection Prevention

SSRF protection blocks requests to cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure), localhost, and internal networks. Command injection scanner catches shell metacharacters and injection patterns in tool arguments — including Windows-specific vectors (cmd.exe /c, powershell -enc, system32 shell paths). SQL injection scanner detects UNION SELECT, DROP TABLE, and boolean-based injection. Reverse shell detector catches bash /dev/tcp, nc -e, mkfifo, and Python socket/subprocess patterns.

Layer 7: Supply Chain + Auth + Email

Typosquatting detection via Levenshtein distance against known-good server registry. OAuth flow validation catches malformed authorization endpoints (CVE-2025-6514), excessive scopes, and suspicious redirects. Token audience validation prevents replay attacks across servers (RFC 8707). Email header injection detector catches BCC exfiltration attacks (postmark-mcp style).

Layer 8: Escalation + Response Integrity

False-error escalation detector catches fake error messages designed to trick AI into granting elevated access. Response content is scanned for patterns like "permission denied, need admin access" that manipulate the AI's decision-making.

Layer 9: Rate Limiting + Notification Guard

Consent fatigue protection monitors tool call frequency per server. Detects both sustained flooding and burst patterns designed to desensitize user approval. Notification event injection detector catches rapid notifications/tools/list_changed and notifications/resources/updated events used to trigger rug pull re-fetches and resource re-reads.

Layer 10: MCP Protocol Method Scanning (2025-11-25 spec)

Method-aware scanning for all MCP JSON-RPC methods:

• resources/read responses: Full SMAC + injection scanning on resource content (prompt injection via resource poisoning)
• resources/list responses: Description scanning for hidden instructions
• resources/templates/list responses: Template description scanning
• prompts/get responses: Message content scanning for injection in prompt templates
• prompts/list responses: Prompt description and argument schema scanning
• sampling/createMessage: Deep scanning of message array and systemPrompt for injection/exfiltration (not just presence alerting)
• elicitation/create (new in 2025-11-25): Credential harvesting detection — flags schemas requesting password, token, api_key, secret, ssh_key, etc. Scans message text for social engineering and SMAC injection
• initialize: Capability tracking for server and client feature declarations

Running tests

# Full suite
pytest tests/ -v

# E2E only (starts real proxy subprocess)
pytest tests/test_e2e_proxy.py -v

# Unit/integration only
pytest tests/ -v --ignore=tests/test_e2e_proxy.py

273+ tests across unit, integration, and end-to-end suites.

Unit tests test each detection module in isolation. Integration tests test the MCPWatchdogProxy class across multi-server sequences. End-to-end tests start the actual proxy binary as a subprocess, connect it to a fake MCP server, and push real JSON-RPC traffic through stdin/stdout.

Architecture

AI Assistant <-> mcp-watchdog proxy <-> MCP Server(s)
                      |
                      |-- SMAC-L3 preprocessor (token redaction + ANSI stripping)
                      |-- Entropy analyzer
                      |-- Behavioral monitor
                      |-- Flow tracker + session integrity (JWTs, UUIDs, API keys)
                      |-- Tool registry (rug pull detection)
                      |-- Tool shadow detector (shadowing + squatting)
                      |-- Parameter scanner
                      |-- URL filter (SSRF)
                      |-- Input sanitizer (cmd + SQL + reverse shell + Windows)
                      |-- Registry checker (supply chain)
                      |-- OAuth guard (+ token replay detection)
                      |-- Rate limiter (consent fatigue + notification injection)
                      |-- Email injection detector
                      |-- Escalation detector
                      |-- Semantic classifier (optional)
                      |-- Scope enforcer (filesystem + symlink)
                      |-- MCP method scanner:
                      |     resources/read, resources/list, prompts/get,
                      |     prompts/list, sampling/createMessage,
                      |     elicitation/create, initialize
                      +-- Capability tracker (server + client features)

mcp-watchdog is a transparent JSON-RPC proxy. It does not modify clean responses - only strips malicious content and raises alerts.

Changelog

0.1.9

• Tool Shadow hardening — expanded override/replace instruction detection to catch disregard, substitute, supersede, don't use the other, and use this instead of patterns. CC field now checked alongside BCC for email header injection.
• Email comma injection detection — detects multiple recipients injected via commas in to, cc, bcc, and other recipient fields (e.g. [e-mail], [e-mail]).
• OAuth javascript:/data:/vbscript: URI blocking — redirect URIs using dangerous schemes are now caught. Open redirect detection via query parameters (redirect_url=, return_to=, next=, etc.) added.
• Behavioral monitor credential path access — tool call arguments accessing .ssh/, .aws/, .env, id_rsa, credentials.json, .kube/config, etc. now trigger critical alerts. Wired into proxy request pipeline (was previously imported but never called).
• Entropy analyzer base64 overhaul — relaxed base64 validation (pad-tolerant, URL-safe variant support), regex-based chunk extraction finds base64 embedded in larger strings, and multiple small base64 segments are aggregated and flagged when total exceeds 32 chars.
• Registry checker expansion — allowlist expanded from 12 to 55+ known-good servers (official + widely-used community servers). Substring-based impersonation detection added. Unknown server alerts now include nearest known-good match with edit distance.
• Rug pull sneaky tool addition — new tools appearing after initial tools/list registration are now flagged as tool_added (previously only redefinition and removal were caught).
• URL filter base64 exfil detection — base64-encoded tokens in URL query parameters are decoded and checked against the full exfil pattern set. Added sk-proj-, sk-ant-, rk_live_, rk_test_, xoxa-, xoxr-, sbp_, SharedAccessKey= patterns.
• 273+ tests (up from 263+).

0.1.7

• Split-line tag evasion defense — pre-normalization collapses whitespace within <IMPORTANT> tag names (<IMPOR\nTANT>, <I M P O R T A N T>) before pattern matching.
• Space-split token evasion defense — collapses spaces in known token prefixes (sk_ live_ → sk_live_, npm_ xxx → npm_xxx) to prevent regex-bypass evasion.
• [SYSTEM]/[ADMIN] full-line stripping — role injection markers now strip the entire injected instruction, not just the [SYSTEM]: prefix.
• Heroku labeled key detection — catches HEROKU_API_KEY=uuid and HEROKU_OAUTH_TOKEN=uuid patterns without requiring "heroku" context word.
• Unlabeled secret key detection — catches secret_key:, private_key:, secret_access_key= with 30+ char values even without vendor-specific prefixes.
• Discord bot token URL exfiltration — added Discord bot token pattern to URL filter exfiltration scanner.
• 263+ tests (up from 253+) — 10 new tests covering all evasion technique fixes.

0.1.6

• 26 security audit gap fixes — comprehensive hardening across all detection layers.
• SMAC-6 expanded to 30+ token patterns — added Stripe (sk_live_, sk_test_, rk_live_, rk_test_), PEM private keys (RSA, EC, DSA, OPENSSH), Discord bot tokens, npm (npm_), PyPI (pypi-), Supabase (sbp_), Sendgrid (SG.), Twilio (SK), HashiCorp Vault (hvs., s.), Datadog (dd[ap]_), Heroku UUIDs, GCP service account keys (private_key_id), and Azure connection strings (AccountKey=, SharedAccessKey=).
• SMAC-5 bypass hardening — catches <IMPORTANT> with HTML attributes, unclosed tags (to end-of-string), Unicode homoglyph variants (Greek Ι U+0399, Cyrillic І U+0406), HTML-encoded <IMPORTANT> tags, and [SYSTEM]:/[ADMIN]:/[ASSISTANT]: role injection markers.
• SMAC-1 multi-encoding bypass fixes — strips URL-encoded ZWSP (%E2%80%8B, %E2%80%8C, %E2%80%8D), double-encoded HTML entities (​, ​), and URL-encoded bidi overrides (%E2%80%8E, %E2%80%8F).
• Input sanitizer improvements — double-encoded path traversal detection (..%252f, %2e%2e/), reduced false positives on CSS (color: red;) and pipe-delimited data (name|age|city) by gating shell metacharacter detection on command context.
• URL filter exfiltration expansion — detects Stripe, npm, PyPI, Sendgrid, Vault, Datadog, Azure tokens and api_key=/key=/credential= parameters in URLs.
• Stream buffer crash fix — sys.maxsize StreamReader limit prevents proxy crash on large MCP responses (previously crashed on >64KB messages).
• 253+ tests (up from 208+) — 45 new tests covering all audit gap fixes across 3 new/updated test files. (Now 263+ with 0.1.7 additions.)

0.1.5

• MCP 2025-11-25 protocol coverage — method-aware scanning for resources/read, resources/list, resources/templates/list, prompts/get, prompts/list, sampling/createMessage (deep scan), and elicitation/create (credential harvesting).
• P0 bug fixes — scope enforcer and semantic classifier were instantiated but never called in the proxy pipeline; symlink escape detection was dead code (compared resolve() to itself).
• Elicitation credential harvesting — detects elicitation/create requests with schemas requesting password, token, api_key, secret, ssh_key, credit_card, ssn fields.
• Deep sampling scan — sampling/createMessage now scans the full message array and systemPrompt for SMAC injection, not just alerting on method presence.
• Cross-platform Windows support — Windows command injection detection (cmd.exe /c, powershell -enc, system32 shell paths), OS-native path separators in scope enforcement, case-insensitive path matching on Windows, credential path regex matches both / and \.
• Flow tracker improvements — now extracts JWTs, UUIDs, and prefixed API keys (ghp_*, sk-*, AKIA*) for cross-server propagation detection.
• Notification guard expanded — notifications/resources/updated added to rate-limited notification set alongside list_changed types.
• Removed unused dependencies — websockets, fastapi, uvicorn removed from install requirements.
• 208+ tests (up from 158) — 50 new tests across 9 new test files; all tests use tmp_path and Path.home() for cross-platform correctness. (Now 253+ with 0.1.6 additions.)

0.1.3

• Fix SMAC corrupting non-filesystem servers — SMAC regex patterns now run against individual JSON string values instead of the raw wire-format JSON, preventing corruption of structural characters ({, }, ", etc.) in legitimate responses. This fixes compatibility with resources, prompts, and other MCP server types beyond the filesystem server.
• Windows support — thread-based stdin reader replaces connect_read_pipe (unavailable on Windows ProactorEventLoop); signal handlers are now conditional on platform.

0.1.0

• Initial release with SMAC-L3, behavioral drift, entropy analysis, flow tracking, tool integrity, shadow detection, SSRF/injection prevention, supply chain checks, OAuth guard, rate limiting, and scope enforcement.

License

MIT

Credits

Open source by Bountyy Oy.

Research references:

• Bountyy Oy - SMAC: Structured MCP Audit Controls
• Bountyy Oy - Thanatos MCP Attack Framework
• Bountyy Oy - ProjectMemory: MCP Parasite PoC
• Invariant Labs - Tool Poisoning & Rug Pull Attacks
• HiddenLayer - Parameter Injection
• BlueRock - MCP fURI SSRF
• Unit 42 - MCP Sampling Attacks
• OWASP MCP Top 10
• Docker - MCP Supply Chain Horror Stories
• Elastic Security Labs - MCP Attack Vectors
• Pillar Security - MCP Risks
• Trail of Bits - Line Jumping Attack
• Trail of Bits - mcp-context-protector
• JFrog - Malicious MCP PyPI Reverse Shells
• Snyk - Malicious postmark-mcp on npm
• Noma Security - Unicode Exploits in MCP
• CoSAI - MCP Security White Paper
• MCPSecBench - Security Benchmark
• MCP-Guard - Defense Framework
• Breaking the Protocol - MCPSec
• CVE-2026-0755 - Gemini MCP Tool Command Injection
• Invariant Labs - WhatsApp MCP Exfiltration