proxmox-ops-mcp

An MCP server for Proxmox VE, built for operations work: finding out what is wrong with a cluster, whether the backups are actually there, and whether a node can be taken down for maintenance. Write access exists, but it is off by default and every change needs an explicit second call.

Why another Proxmox MCP server

The existing ones mostly expose the API endpoint by endpoint. That is fine for "start VM 104", but questions like "which guests have no backup from last night?" then need a dozen calls, and the model has to know Proxmox well enough to combine them correctly. It usually doesn't. For example, it won't know that a token without VM.Backup gets an empty backup list instead of an error.

This server puts that knowledge into the tools. backup_audit reads the backup volumes, applies the same guest selection as vzdump jobs and checks whether the token is even allowed to see the volumes. The model gets a list of findings back, each with a stable code and a recommendation.

Status

Version 0.1, usable but young. What has been tested where:

The live tests found three things the API documentation doesn't mention, and the server handles each of them:

• PVE 9 reports cpu and wait as 0 in the node status call.
• Backup listings come back empty, without an error, when the token lacks privileges.
• /cluster/resources lags a few seconds behind the real guest state.

Install

uvx proxmox-ops-mcp --version          # run without installing (uv)
pipx install proxmox-ops-mcp           # or as a CLI tool
docker pull ghcr.io/derdennis1012/proxmox-ops-mcp

Python 3.11 or newer. From source: git clone … && uv sync && uv run proxmox-ops-mcp.

Setup

1. Create an API token. Read-only to start with:

pveum user add mcp@pve
pveum acl modify / --users mcp@pve --roles PVEAuditor
pveum user token add mcp@pve ops --privsep 1          # prints the secret once
pveum acl modify / --tokens 'mcp@pve!ops' --roles PVEAuditor

With only this role, backup_audit cannot see backups. Higher tiers need more privileges, and Proxmox's ACL rules have a few traps. Both are covered in docs/proxmox-setup.md.

2. Check the connection.

$ export PROXMOX_HOST=pve1.example.com PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID='mcp@pve!ops' PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET=…
$ uvx proxmox-ops-mcp check
OK    connected to pve1.example.com:8006 as mcp@pve!ops
      Proxmox VE 9.2.5 (release 9.2)
      3 node(s) visible, access tier: read_only

If this fails with SSLError, the node certificate probably does not cover the address you use. That is common when connecting over a VPN. check prints the command to pin the certificate instead.

3. Add it to your client. Claude Code:

claude mcp add proxmox-ops \
  -e PROXMOX_HOST=pve1.example.com \
  -e PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID='mcp@pve!ops' \
  -e PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET=… \
  -- uvx proxmox-ops-mcp

Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, OpenAI Codex, Gemini CLI, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw and Docker: see docs/clients.md. It also covers what to watch out for when an autonomous agent uses the server.

Tools

Parameters and all finding codes: docs/tools.md.

Example, plan_node_evacuation(node="pve1"), shortened:

{
  "feasible": true,
  "summary": "pve1 can be drained: 3 guests to 2 target nodes, 1 container(s) with a brief restart.",
  "guests": [
    { "vmid": 100, "name": "db01",  "mode": "ha-managed",            "target": "pve3" },
    { "vmid": 101, "name": "web01", "mode": "live-with-local-disks", "target": "pve2",
      "warnings": ["local disks will be copied: scsi0@local-lvm"] },
    { "vmid": 200, "name": "dns01", "mode": "restart",               "target": "pve3" }
  ],
  "steps": [
    "ceph osd set noout   # prevent rebalancing while the node is down",
    "ha-manager crm-command node-maintenance enable pve1   # HA moves its guests automatically",
    "qm migrate 101 pve2 --online --with-local-disks",
    "pct migrate 200 pve3 --restart",
    "# perform maintenance on pve1, reboot, verify it rejoined the cluster",
    "ha-manager crm-command node-maintenance disable pve1",
    "ceph osd unset noout"
  ]
}

Write access

PROXMOX_ACCESS_TIER is read_only unless you change it, and tools above the tier are not registered at all. A write tool works in two steps:

1. Called normally, it checks the request against the live guest state and returns a preview of what would happen, plus a confirmation token.
2. Called again with the same arguments and that token, it executes.

The token works once, expires after five minutes and is bound to the exact parameters. That includes the node, so a guest that migrated in between invalidates it. Writes can additionally be limited to named pools or VMIDs and capped per hour. Every preview, execution and rejection is written to an audit log.

The token makes sure that what runs is what was previewed. It does not prove that a person approved it, because the model sees the token. Keep tool approval switched on in your MCP client for the write tools. There are no tools that delete anything.

The details, including the HTTP transport defaults, are in docs/security-model.md.

Configuration

Environment variables with the PROXMOX_ prefix: HOST, TOKEN_ID and TOKEN_SECRET are required. Optional are ACCESS_TIER, CA_BUNDLE or TLS_FINGERPRINT, AUDIT_LOG and a few more. A .env file is only read when passed with --env-file. The full list is in docs/configuration.md.

Development

make install   # uv sync + pre-commit
make check     # ruff, mypy --strict, pytest

The diagnostic logic in src/proxmox_ops_mcp/analysis/ is plain functions over API payloads and is tested without a cluster. tests/live/ runs read-only checks against a real one if you point it at an env file. docs/architecture.md explains the layout, and CONTRIBUTING.md explains how to contribute.

Documentation site: https://derdennis1012.github.io/proxmox-ops-mcp/. Planned next: direct Proxmox Backup Server checks (garbage collection, prune and verify jobs), replication jobs, guest snapshot hygiene.

License

MIT. Proxmox is a trademark of Proxmox Server Solutions GmbH; this project is not affiliated with it.