vouch-mcp
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that lets AI agents issue and verify Vouch Credentials, so every action an agent takes carries cryptographic proof of who authorized it.
MCP standardized how agents call tools. It does not say who is calling, or on
whose authority. vouch-mcp adds that layer: every authorized action carries
a W3C Verifiable Credential with an eddsa-jcs-2022 Data Integrity proof (or the
post-quantum hybrid profile), and any party can verify one over the same MCP
connection.
The key stays out of the model. MCP already runs this server in its own process, so the agent's private key lives here, never in the LLM's context. A prompt-injected model cannot exfiltrate a key it never holds.
When to use this vs vouch.autosign
Vouch gives you two front doors onto one signing primitive:
vouch.autosign(in-process, Python): wrap a tool withprotect([...])and every call is signed deterministically, before the tool runs, with no LLM cooperation. Best when your agent is Python and you want zero-effort, can't-forget signing.vouch-mcp(this package): the out-of-process, cross-language path. Any MCP client in any language callssign/verifyover the wire, and the key is isolated in the server process. Best for non-Python agents, key isolation, or exposing verification as a shared service.
Both call the same sign_intent core, so credentials are identical either way.
Install
pip install vouch-mcp # or: uvx vouch-mcp
This pulls in vouch-protocol[mcp], including the official MCP SDK. For the
post-quantum profile, install pip install 'vouch-protocol[mcp,pq]'.
Configure
from vouch import generate_identity
kp = generate_identity("agent.example.com")
print(kp.did) # did:web:agent.example.com
print(kp.private_key_jwk) # set as VOUCH_PRIVATE_KEY
Run
Local (stdio) for Claude Desktop, Cursor, and desktop agents:
VOUCH_PRIVATE_KEY='...' VOUCH_DID='did:web:agent.example.com' vouch-mcp
Remote (Streamable HTTP) for hosted / networked deployments:
VOUCH_MCP_TRANSPORT=http VOUCH_MCP_HOST=0.0.0.0 VOUCH_MCP_PORT=8080 \
VOUCH_PRIVATE_KEY='...' VOUCH_DID='did:web:agent.example.com' vouch-mcp
// Claude Desktop / Cursor MCP config
{
"mcpServers": {
"vouch": {
"command": "vouch-mcp",
"env": {
"VOUCH_DID": "did:web:agent.example.com",
"VOUCH_PRIVATE_KEY": "<jwk-json-string>"
}
}
}
}
Tools
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
sign(action, target, resource, post_quantum=False) |
Issue a credential authorizing one action, bound to that exact resource. Set post_quantum=True for the post-quantum profile, which returns a proof set with an eddsa-jcs-2022 proof and an mldsa44-jcs-2024 proof. |
verify(credential_json, public_key=None) |
Verify a credential another agent or service presented. Any MCP client can verify without installing an SDK. |
create_session(purpose, valid_seconds, decay_lambda, initial_trust) |
Issue a trust-decaying session voucher (Heartbeat Protocol). |
check_revocation(credential_json) |
Check a credential's BitstringStatusList entry: ACTIVE, REVOKED, or not individually revocable. |
get_identity() |
Return the agent's DID. |
evaluate_freshness(tier, snapshot_json=None, now_iso=None) |
Bounded-staleness revocation gate for offline/DTN use: decide if a last-synced revocation snapshot is fresh enough for the action's consequence tier, failing closed when too old. |
check_intent_freshness(credential_json, last_pulse, tier='high') |
Event-triggered intent recheck: decide if a reasoned action's intent seal is fresh for its tier, requiring a sensitive action to be sealed after the last heartbeat boundary so timing the gap between heartbeats does not help. |
verify_disconnected_edge(credential_json, public_key) |
Authenticate any disconnected-edge (DTN) credential type (freshness token, presence, ephemeris grant, revocation, bundle custody, …); returns its type and subject. |
scan(text) |
Scan text (a diff, log, message, or file) for leaked Ed25519/hybrid private keys, seed env vars, and DID documents that embed a private key, before it crosses a trust boundary. |
decode_did(key) |
Decode a did:key:z... identifier or bare Multikey and report its algorithm and public-key size, so you can confirm a peer's key is the algorithm you expect before trusting it. |
delegate(action, target, resource, to=None, valid_seconds=None, reputation_score=None) |
Issue a narrowed sub-delegation grant to a worker agent; every action it signs chains under the grant and can only narrow the authority, never widen it (Spec §9.3). |
check_action(tool, capabilities_json, requirements_json) |
Decide whether an agent's capabilities (filesystem/network/shell) permit a tool call. This is the authorization gate Vouch Shield applies before a tool runs. |
check_trust(voucher_json, threshold=0.5, now_iso=None) |
Recompute a session voucher's current trust after decay (Trust Entropy) and compare it to the threshold the action requires; refuse when trust has fallen too far. |
disclose_ai_origin(content_hash, content_ref=None) |
Sign a Vouch Credential attesting this agent produced the content at content_hash, so downstream parties verify the AI-origin claim instead of trusting an unsigned label. |
create_authority_state(authority_epoch, status="active", valid_seconds=300, subject_did=None) |
Publish this authority's current state as a signed credential carrying a monotonic authorityEpoch and a status (active, suspended, incident, exposure_breached, revoked). Bump the epoch on every authority-relevant transition. |
verify_authority_state(credential_json, public_key) |
Verify an AuthorityState credential another authority published and report its epoch and status, which is what a verifier records as the highest epoch it has seen. |
check_authority_freshness(tier, voucher_epoch=None, last_seen_epoch=None, current_status=None, live_cosign_ok=False) |
Authority Freshness gate: refuse a session voucher minted under an epoch older than the highest one this verifier has seen, even when its time-decay trust still passes. routine is time-decay only, sensitive applies the epoch rule locally, critical also requires a live M-of-N quorum co-sign whose outcome you pass in. |
reputation(did, events_json) |
Compute an agent's reputation score and success rate from a history of recorded outcomes, to weigh how much to trust a peer with a track record. |
attribute(manifest_json, path=None) |
Attribute authorship from a signed attribution manifest: a whole-manifest human/AI/pre-existing split, or per-line blame for one file. |
Why verify matters
Signing proves you acted. Verifying is how everyone else benefits: any MCP-capable agent, in any framework, can confirm another agent's credential with a single tool call and no SDK. That is what turns Vouch Protocol from a per-app library into an interoperable trust layer.
Verifying without a key
verify checks the cryptographic signature, so a credential that only looks
well-formed will not pass. When you do not pass a key, it resolves the issuer's
key from the credential's DID: did:key is
self-certifying and resolves offline, while did:web is fetched over HTTPS from
the issuer's own domain. If the key cannot be resolved, the credential is
rejected. To verify fully offline, pass the issuer's key as public_key.
Registry
This package ships a server.json manifest for the MCP registry, so it can be
discovered and installed like any other MCP server.
License
Apache-2.0.
MCP registry
This server is listed in the Model Context Protocol registry.
mcp-name: io.github.vouch-protocol/vouch-mcp
Metadata
Release files for vouch-mcp 2.2.0
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| vouch_mcp-2.2.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 16.0 kB
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