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Linux host vulnerability assessment with optional AI analysis.

Project description

AuditAI

AI-powered host vulnerability assessment tool running entirely inside Docker.

AuditAI runs nine security scanner modules against your Linux host, feeds the raw findings to Claude, and produces a prioritized vulnerability report with attack chain analysis — all from a single command.

export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
./run.sh

Full write-up: Building a Dockerized AI-Powered Host Vulnerability Assessment Tool


How It Works

AuditAI is a three-stage pipeline:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        HOST MACHINE                             │
│                                                                 │
│  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │              DOCKER CONTAINER (read-only)                │  │
│  │                                                          │  │
│  │  ┌─────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────┐  │  │
│  │  │   STAGE 1   │   │    STAGE 2     │   │  STAGE 3   │  │  │
│  │  │  9 Scanner  │──▶│  Preprocessor  │──▶│   Report   │  │  │
│  │  │  Modules    │   │  + Claude AI   │   │ Generator  │  │  │
│  │  │  (parallel) │   │  (sequential)  │   │            │  │  │
│  │  └─────────────┘   └────────────────┘   └────────────┘  │  │
│  │        │                   │                  │          │  │
│  │        ▼                   ▼                  ▼          │  │
│  │  raw_output dicts   Finding[] +         HTML + .md       │  │
│  │                     attack chains       ./output/        │  │
│  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                                                                 │
│  /proc  /sys  /etc  /var  /home  /usr  (mounted read-only)     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Stage 1 — Scan: Nine modules run in parallel collecting raw host data (process table, network state, filesystem, packages, kernel parameters, etc.).

Stage 2 — AI Analysis: A preprocessor filters each module's raw output (60–90% size reduction), then Claude analyzes each module sequentially and performs a cross-module synthesis to identify attack chains.

Stage 3 — Report: Findings, attack chains, and priorities are rendered to a self-contained HTML report and Markdown file.

The container mounts the host filesystem read-only and uses --pid=host + --network=host to see the real process table and network state. It cannot modify anything on the host.


Requirements

  • Docker (any recent version)
  • Linux host (Ubuntu/Debian recommended; other distros work)
  • Anthropic API key — ~$0.10–0.30 per full scan on Sonnet

The installed auditai CLI can run directly on a Kali/Linux host without Docker or an API key:

sudo auditai --no-ai --output-dir ./output

Quick Start

1. Install Docker (if not already installed):

curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
sudo usermod -aG docker $USER && newgrp docker

2. Clone and run:

git clone https://github.com/anpa1200/AuditAI.git
cd AuditAI

export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
./run.sh

run.sh builds the image, shows you exactly what host access it requests, asks for confirmation, then writes reports to ./output/.

No pip install, no virtualenv, no dependency management on your side — everything is baked into the Docker image.

Kali Linux Submission

The core package runs locally with --no-ai; Anthropic analysis is optional. Debian/Kali metadata is under debian/, with a complete New Tool Request draft.

License

MIT


Usage

# Full assessment — all 9 modules, AI analysis, all severities
./run.sh

# Skip lynis — faster (~2 min vs ~10 min), saves API cost
./run.sh --skip lynis

# Specific modules only
./run.sh --modules network,users,kernel

# No AI analysis — raw scanner output only (no API calls)
./run.sh --no-ai

# Show only HIGH and CRITICAL findings
./run.sh --severity HIGH

# Use Claude Opus for deeper attack chain reasoning
./run.sh --model claude-opus-4-6

# Verbose logging (shows preprocessor reduction stats, AI timing)
./run.sh --verbose

Docker Compose

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... docker compose run assessment

Direct CLI (development mode — no Docker)

# HOST_ROOT="" makes scanners read the real / instead of /host
HOST_ROOT="" python3 -m assessment.cli --modules kernel,os_hardening --no-ai

Useful when iterating on a scanner without rebuilding the image.


What the Terminal Looks Like

► Running 9 scanner modules...
  Modules: network, services, os_hardening, users, processes,
           filesystem, kernel, packages, lynis

  ✓ network              12.3s
  ✓ services              0.1s
  ✓ os_hardening          0.0s
  ✓ users                 0.0s
  ✓ processes             0.2s
  ✓ filesystem           31.2s
  ✓ kernel                0.0s
  ✓ packages             15.5s
  ✓ lynis                 0.0s

► Running AI analysis (Claude)...
  Analyzing modules...
  Running synthesis...

► Generating reports...
  HTML:     ./output/report_2026-03-11T09-18-35Z.html
  Markdown: ./output/report_2026-03-11T09-18-35Z.md

╔══════════════════ SUMMARY ══════════════════╗
  Overall Risk: HIGH (67/100)
  Lynis Hardening Index: 58/100
  Findings:
    3 Critical  11 High  24 Medium  18 Low

  Top Action: Disable PasswordAuthentication in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝

Scanner Modules

Module What it checks
network Open ports (nmap SYN scan), services binding to 0.0.0.0, firewall rules (iptables/ufw/nftables), IPv6 exposure
services Systemd units (via filesystem fallback when inside Docker), failed services, cron jobs, docker socket permissions
os_hardening 25+ sysctl parameters vs. secure baseline, AppArmor/SELinux, GRUB boot flags, PAM config, core dumps
users UID 0 accounts, sudoers NOPASSWD, SSH config weaknesses, authorized keys, legacy files (.rhosts)
processes Process capabilities (decoded from hex bitmask), deleted executables, reverse shell indicators, root processes
filesystem SUID/SGID binaries vs. known-good baseline, world-writable system files, sensitive file permissions
kernel CPU vulnerability mitigations (Spectre/Meltdown/etc.), kernel lockdown, BPF restrictions, loaded modules
packages Installed packages vs. OSV.dev CVE database (no API key needed), dangerous legacy packages, auto-update config
lynis Full lynis host audit, hardening index score (0–100), warnings and suggestions

The AI Analysis

Two passes run over the scanner data:

Pass 1 — Per-module analysis: Each module's output goes through a preprocessor that strips known-safe baseline data (e.g. compliant sysctl params, known-safe SUID binaries, service accounts without login shells) before sending to Claude. This reduces prompt size 60–90%, eliminating token limit errors and cutting cost.

Pass 2 — Synthesis: A single prompt receives all module findings and is asked to identify:

  • Attack chains — how findings combine into real exploit paths on your specific host
  • Top 10 priorities — ranked by actual exploitability, not just severity label
  • Overall risk rating — CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW with justification
  • Executive summary — non-technical prose for a system owner

Report Output

Two files are written to ./output/ after each scan:

  • report_<timestamp>.html — self-contained dark-theme HTML with filterable findings table, attack chain cards, and collapsible module sections. No internet connection required to open.
  • report_<timestamp>.md — Markdown version for archiving, tickets, or plain-text sharing.

Report Sections

Section Description
Risk badge CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW with 0–100 score
Immediate actions 3–5 things to fix today, in order
Attack chains Multi-step exploit scenarios specific to your host
Top 10 priorities Findings ranked by real exploitability
Module sections Collapsible, each with risk score, evidence, and remediation commands
Lynis appendix Full hardening index and raw lynis suggestions

Docker Flags Explained

Flag Why it's needed
--pid=host Without this, /proc only shows container PIDs. Needed to enumerate all host processes, read capabilities, and resolve executable paths.
--network=host Places the container in the host's network namespace. nmap sees actual interfaces and real IP addresses — without this it only sees the container's virtual eth0.
--cap-add=NET_RAW nmap SYN scans (-sS) require raw socket access to craft TCP packets. Without it, nmap falls back to slower TCP connect scans.
--cap-add=NET_ADMIN Required to read iptables/netfilter state from inside the container.
--cap-add=SYS_PTRACE Needed to follow /proc/<pid>/exe symlinks and read process memory maps.
--cap-add=AUDIT_READ Allows reading the kernel audit log for privilege escalation records.
-v /:/host:ro Bind-mounts the entire host root at /host, read-only. Gives access to /etc, /var, /usr, /home.
-v /proc:/host/proc:ro /proc is a virtual filesystem not captured by the / mount. Must be mounted separately.
-v /sys:/host/sys:ro Same as /proc. Contains CPU vulnerability data, security module status, kernel parameters.

--privileged is intentionally not used. The container operates within normal Linux namespace boundaries and cannot modify host kernel state.


Error Handling

Error Behavior
Scanner crash (nmap timeout, permission denied) Records error in report, continues other modules
API rate limit (429) Exponential backoff: 15s → 30s → 60s → 120s, up to 4 retries
Insufficient API credits (400) Fails immediately with actionable message, suggests --no-ai
JSON decode error in AI response Retries up to 4 times, records empty findings on final failure
systemctl not found (Docker) Falls back to reading .service files from host filesystem

Security Notes

  • All host mounts are read-only. The only writable path is ./output/.
  • Scan data is sent to the Anthropic API for AI analysis. Use --no-ai for air-gapped or regulated environments.
  • Reports contain detailed host configuration — treat them like passwords. Don't commit to public repos.
  • This tool is for authorized use only on systems you own or have permission to assess.

Project Structure

AuditAI/
├── Dockerfile
├── docker-compose.yml
├── run.sh                       # Host-side launcher with consent prompt
├── requirements.txt
└── assessment/
    ├── cli.py                   # Click CLI — entry point, orchestrates all stages
    ├── config.py                # HOST_ROOT paths, sysctl baselines, SUID whitelist
    ├── models.py                # Finding, ModuleResult, AttackChain, Report dataclasses
    ├── runner.py                # Stage 1 — parallel scanner execution
    ├── scanners/
    │   ├── base.py              # Abstract BaseScanner with error isolation + timing
    │   ├── network.py           # nmap, ss, iptables, ufw, nftables, IPv6
    │   ├── services.py          # systemd units (with Docker filesystem fallback)
    │   ├── os_hardening.py      # sysctl, AppArmor, SELinux, GRUB, PAM
    │   ├── users.py             # passwd, shadow, sudoers, SSH keys
    │   ├── processes.py         # /proc enumeration, capability decoding
    │   ├── filesystem.py        # SUID/SGID, world-writable, sensitive perms
    │   ├── kernel.py            # CPU vulns, lockdown, modules
    │   ├── packages.py          # dpkg + OSV.dev CVE API
    │   └── lynis_wrapper.py     # lynis audit + report.dat parser
    ├── ai/
    │   ├── client.py            # Anthropic SDK wrapper, retry + billing error handling
    │   ├── preprocessor.py      # Per-module data filter (60–90% size reduction)
    │   ├── prompts.py           # All prompt templates (edit to tune AI quality)
    │   └── analyzer.py          # Stage 2 — sequential module analysis + synthesis
    └── reports/
        ├── html.py              # Self-contained dark-theme HTML (no CDN)
        └── markdown.py          # Markdown report generator

Adding a Scanner Module

# assessment/scanners/my_module.py
from assessment.scanners.base import BaseScanner

class MyScanner(BaseScanner):
    name = "my_module"

    def _scan(self) -> tuple[dict, list]:
        result = {}
        result["data"] = collect_something()
        return result, []  # AI identifies findings from raw data

Register in assessment/scanners/__init__.py:

from assessment.scanners.my_module import MyScanner

ALL_SCANNERS = {
    ...
    "my_module": MyScanner,
}

The AI analysis, preprocessor hook, report generation, and CLI integration are automatic.

To also add preprocessor logic for your module, add a handler to assessment/ai/preprocessor.py:

def _process_my_module(raw: dict) -> dict:
    # Return only the high-signal subset of raw
    return {"key_finding": raw.get("key_finding")}

_HANDLERS["my_module"] = _process_my_module

Read More

Full architecture deep-dive, design decisions, and real findings from running this on a live machine:

Building a Dockerized AI-Powered Host Vulnerability Assessment Tool


License

MIT

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