3tears-agent-audit
Unified audit envelope, fire-and-forget publish helper, and the erasure rule and hub request for anonymizing audit records, for the 3tears platform.
Purpose
Single AuditEvent envelope + single publish_audit helper used by every
domain (workspace, rbac, memory, custom tools) so the audit pipeline is
one subject tree, one consumer, one table, one admin query API. Replaces
domain-specific envelopes (WorkspaceAuditEnvelope,
RbacAuditEnvelope) that produced slightly-different wire shapes per domain
and made cross-domain audit queries require a UNION.
Publishing is the package's core: AuditEvent and publish_audit import nothing
beyond the NATS client. On a hub deployment the HUB persists every event into its
platform table, and the package's persistence code is never used; an agent there
erases a person from that table by asking the hub (request_audit_anonymization),
and the hub applies the erasure rule.
A deployment with NO hub (one application owning its own control plane) owns its
audit table, and threetears.agent.audit.persist is its persister:
ensure_audit_events_table(db)creates the table, with every envelope field andip_address, and migrates an existing one: every column the insert names beyondidand the four required fields (timestamp,event_type,action,correlation_id) is added if missing, with the default the CREATE gives it. Idempotency is on the envelopeid.start_audit_persister(nats, db, durable=..., storage="memory")runs a shared durable pull consumer with a dead-letter subject. A malformed event is dropped; a database fault is retried, then dead-lettered.storagemust match every other declarer of theauditstream.durablemust be unique per table.
prune_audit_events(db, older_than=...)is batched retention.anonymize_audit_rows(db, actor_user_ids=...)is erasure: every row and id is kept, anddetailsandip_addressare rewritten by the platform's rule and no other -- it takes no replacement anonymizer. A family whose keys are safe in this deployment declares them withdeclare_safe_detail_keys. It returns the sameAuditAnonymizationthe hub path does, and never answers the hub's anonymize subject.
db is anything with asyncpg's execute/fetch, e.g. a pool.
Public API
from threetears.agent.audit import AuditEvent, publish_audit
AuditEvent-- pydanticBaseModelwithextra='forbid', timezone-awaretimestampvalidator, closedevent_typestring family (dotted verb, e.g.workspace.fs_write,rbac.assignment.create). All common identity fields are typed columns on the envelope; event-type-specific extras live indetails: dict[str, Any].publish_audit(event, nats_client, namespace)-- fire-and-forget async helper. Serializes the envelope viamodel_dump_json()and awaits onenats_client.publishon{namespace}.audit.{event_type}. On any publish failure logs at WARN and returns; never raises.
Erasure: anonymize, never delete
from threetears.agent.audit import anonymize_details, anonymize_ip
row.details = anonymize_details(row.details, event_type=row.event_type)
row.ip_address = anonymize_ip(row.ip_address)
An audit record is never deleted by erasure and no id on it changes. Every erasure path (a GDPR request, a principal anonymization, a customer offboarding) routes the record's content through this one rule instead of writing its own:
anonymize_details(details, *, event_type)keeps every key ofdetails, keeps the value under a safe key (a dict inside it is judged key by key), and replaces the WHOLE value under any other key withANONYMIZED_MARKER("[anonymized]") -- a subtree and the keys a user chose inside it alike.NonestaysNone. Pure and idempotent.anonymize_ip(value) -> str | NonereturnsNone: an address is removed, not truncated. It is typed as the column, so its result assigns back without an ignore.SAFE_DETAIL_KEYSis the explicit safe list. A key not on it is masked, so a field nobody classified fails safe.PERSONAL_DETAIL_KEYSrecords the keys classified as able to carry personal data.declare_safe_detail_keys(event_type_prefix, keys)widens the safe set for one event family, andsafe_detail_keys_for(event_type)is the single lookup. A declaration is visible only in the process that makes it, so a family whose events the hub erases from the platform audit table is declared inthreetears/agent/audit/anonymize.pyitself.is_classified_detail_key(key, *, event_type)answers whether a key was classified. The gate that holds producers to the classification judges by this same function, injected because the gate cannot import this package: thethreetears.enforcement.audit_detailsdomain, which every producing repo runs over its ownsrc/withsafe_keys_for=safe_detail_keys_for, is_classified=is_classified_detail_key, and 3tears runs it astests/enforcement/test_audit_details_keys_are_classified.py.
An agent erasing a person: the hub's copy of its audit rows
from threetears.agent.audit import request_audit_anonymization
result = await request_audit_anonymization(
nats_client,
identity_token=current_identity_token(),
agent_id=my_agent_id,
actor_user_ids=[respondent_admission_user_id],
)
# result.rows_matched, result.rows_changed
The hub holds the audit rows an agent's events became. This asks it to anonymize the
ones that agent published about those actors, on {ns}.hub.audit.anonymize
(Subjects.hub_audit_anonymize()), with the same rule as above: rows kept, ids kept,
details and ip_address anonymized. The hub takes the agent from the verified identity
token and touches only rows whose agent is the caller. A refusal (INVALID_REQUEST,
IDENTITY_REFUSED, AGENT_MISMATCH) raises AuditAnonymizeRefusedError with the
hub's error_code, and retrying meets it again -- including a refusal that carries no
correlation id, since a hub that could not decode the body had none to echo. No token, a
timeout, a reply that does not decode or carries another request's correlation id, and
the hub's ANONYMIZE_FAILED raise AuditAnonymizeUnavailableError, which is safe to
retry. The contract, including every
obligation of the hub's responder, is the docstring of threetears/agent/audit/erasure.py.
Design commitments
- Fire-and-forget. Audit publish failures must never break the producing call. The helper catches every exception, logs at WARN, and returns.
- Typed wire contract.
extra='forbid'+ timezone-aware validator catch publisher-side drift at construction time, not at the consumer's decode. - No domain-specific envelope types. Every domain publishes the same
model;
event_typeconveys the domain. - No dual-emit. There is no legacy envelope the consumer still accepts in parallel. Emission sites migrate in the same PR that deletes the legacy envelope module.
Subject naming
{namespace}.audit.{event_type} where event_type is the dotted event
name (e.g. {namespace}.audit.workspace.fs_write). The consumer
subscribes to {namespace}.audit.> so new event types route automatically
without consumer-side changes.
1 maintainer
Metadata
1 maintainer
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