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a2a-agent-checker

test

Check a domain's A2A Agent Card against the v1.0 specification.

$ a2a-check stillopen.work --probe
stillopen.work: PASS  (StillOpen)
  https://stillopen.work/.well-known/agent-card.json
  info  endpoint https://stillopen.work/api/v1/a2a answers JSON-RPC and reports an unknown task correctly (-32001)

Install

pip install a2a-agent-checker               # card and endpoint checks
pip install "a2a-agent-checker[signatures]" # also verifies card signatures

There is also an online version at https://stillopen.work/agents/check.

What it checks

  • The card exists at /.well-known/agent-card.json, over HTTPS, as JSON.
  • Every field v1.0 requires is present and the right type: name, description, supportedInterfaces, version, capabilities, defaultInputModes, defaultOutputModes, skills.
  • Each interface is HTTPS, names a known binding (JSONRPC, GRPC, HTTP+JSON) and a protocol version.
  • Each skill has an id, name, description and tags; ids are unique.
  • Common mistakes: a 0.3-era card (top-level url, preferredTransport), snake_case keys, an endpoint on a different host from the card.

With --probe it also asks each endpoint on the card's own host for a task that cannot exist (GetTask with a random id):

  • JSONRPC: a conforming agent answers error -32001 (TaskNotFound).
  • HTTP+JSON: GET {url}/tasks/{id} (with the interface's tenant prefixed when set); a conforming agent answers HTTP 404 with a google.rpc.Status body whose ErrorInfo.reason is TASK_NOT_FOUND. A bare 404 is reported as a warning, since it is also what a server returns for a route that does not exist.
  • GRPC is not probed.

This is the most harmless call A2A defines: nothing is created or run on the other side. The checker never sends SendMessage, and never probes an endpoint on a different host from the card.

Card signatures (spec 8.4) are verified when cryptography is installed (pip install "a2a-agent-checker[signatures]"): the key is fetched from the jku in each signature's header, and each signature is reported as valid, invalid or unverifiable. A signature that verifies only over the card as served, with its empty fields kept (the spec's canonical form drops them), is reported as signature-noncanonical: the card is unaltered, but a strict verifier will reject it. EdDSA, ES256/384/512, RS256/384/512 and PS256/384/512. A key published on the card's own host proves the card is unaltered, not who signed it, and the finding says so.

Declared extensions (spec 4.6) are listed, and a declaration with no absolute uri, or a non-boolean required, is a warning. A URI with no version in its path is pointed out, since a breaking change then has no new URI to move to.

Results

Each finding is fail (a v1.0 client cannot use the card), warn (usable, but something will trip a client or a person) or info. The exit status is 1 if any domain fails, otherwise 0. --json prints machine-readable output, described by the JSON Schema that a2a-check --schema prints (src/a2a_agent_checker/report.schema.json). Finding codes are stable identifiers; new ones may appear in a minor release, so treat an unknown code by its level.

Library

from a2a_agent_checker import check, validate

report = check("example.com", probe=True)
print(report.verdict, [f.message for f in report.findings])

findings = validate(card_dict, "https://example.com/.well-known/agent-card.json")

Safe to run on untrusted input

The checker is built to sit behind a public web form, so every URL is treated as hostile:

  • HTTPS on port 443 only; no IP literals, no credentials in URLs.
  • The name is resolved once, every address must be public, and the connection goes to that checked address (the name is kept for TLS). This closes the DNS-rebinding gap where a second lookup returns 127.0.0.1.
  • Redirects are followed by hand, each hop re-checked, at most 3.
  • 10-second timeouts and a 256 KB response cap.

Rate-limiting visitors is the host application's job.

Licence

Apache 2.0.

Metadata

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