ACEL — Agent Contract Enforcement Layer (core)

Runtime verification for AI agent tool calls. Declare temporal ordering contracts and Hoare-style pre/postconditions in plain Python, and have them enforced live against the stream of tool calls an agent makes — halting the agent the moment a rule is broken.

acel-core ships the transport-independent monitor (Phase 1) plus a live MCP proxy (Phase 2): the same contracts enforced against a real MCP server, via the official MCP Python SDK's request-middleware pipeline.

This is runtime verification — checking each concrete execution against a specification as it happens. It does not prove the agent correct in general; it guarantees that this run did not violate the rules you declared.

Why

Statistical agent-eval tools answer "how often does this agent behave well, on average?" ACEL answers the production question they can't: "did this execution just violate a rule we cannot allow to be violated?" — before the bad tool call lands.

Install

pip install -e .

Quickstart

from acel import Session, must_precede, at_most_n_times

session = Session(state={"authenticated": False})

# Temporal ordering rules (no logic syntax required):
session.add_contract(must_precede("validate_record", "delete_record"))
session.add_contract(at_most_n_times("send_payment", n=1))

# State-based gate: reads only allowed once authenticated.
session.register_tool(
    "read_user_data",
    precondition=lambda s: s.get("authenticated") is True,
)
# Authentication commits trusted info into session state.
session.register_tool(
    "authenticate",
    commit=lambda s, args, result: s.set("authenticated", result["ok"]),
)

session.call("authenticate", {"user": "p"}, result={"ok": True})
session.call("read_user_data", {"query": "SELECT ..."}, result={"rows": []})

# This halts: delete before validate.
session.call("delete_record", {"id": "r_42"})   # raises ContractViolation

On violation, a ContractViolation is raised carrying a Violation record:

from acel import ContractViolation

try:
    session.call("delete_record", {"id": "r_42"})
except ContractViolation as exc:
    v = exc.violation
    print(v.kind)            # "temporal"
    print(v.spec)            # "must_precede(validate_record, delete_record)"
    print(v.step)            # index of the offending call
    print(v.trace)           # every call up to the violation
    print(v.state_snapshot)  # symbolic state at the moment it broke

The seven temporal templates

Each template is a deterministic automaton advanced in O(1) per tool call, with a three-valued verdict (SATISFIED / VIOLATED / UNKNOWN) over the finite trace. at_most_total is the odd one out — it's the only template that reads call arguments rather than just the tool name, since it has to sum a numeric field (e.g. a payment amount) across calls. It fails closed: a call missing the field, or with a non-numeric value there, is treated as a violation rather than silently let through — for a contract whose whole purpose is capping spend, silently ignoring an unreadable amount would be the actually dangerous failure mode.

from acel import Session, at_most_total

session = Session()
session.add_contract(at_most_total("send_payment", "amount", limit=500))

session.call("send_payment", {"amount": 300}, result={"sent": True})
session.call("send_payment", {"amount": 250}, result={"sent": True})  # raises: 550 > 500

Pre/postconditions with decorators

from acel import Session, precondition, postcondition

@precondition(lambda s: s.get("authenticated") is True)
@postcondition(lambda s, r: r["tenant_id"] == s.get("current_tenant"))
def search_database(query): ...

session = Session(state={"authenticated": True, "current_tenant": "t_9"})
session.register(search_database)

Offline analysis / CI mode

Session.replay runs a recorded trace and returns every violation without executing anything — the basis for the coming acel replay trace.json CLI and for testing contracts against known-bad traces.

violations = session.replay([
    {"tool": "delete_record", "args": {"id": "1"}},
])

Live MCP proxy (Phase 2)

ACEL can gate a real MCP server's tool calls, live, via the official MCP Python SDK's ServerMiddleware hook. Every tools/call request passes through ACEL's gate before the real tool handler runs — a blocked call has zero side effects.

pip install "acel-core[mcp]"

from mcp.server.mcpserver import MCPServer
from acel import Session, must_precede
from acel.mcp_middleware import ACELMiddleware

session = Session()
session.add_contract(must_precede("validate_record", "delete_record"))

server = MCPServer("my-server", middleware=[ACELMiddleware(session)])

@server.tool()
def delete_record(record_id: str) -> dict: ...

See examples/toy_server.py for a complete toy server (5 tools, 3 contracts) and tests/test_mcp_proxy.py for an end-to-end demo: a real ClientSession talking to this server, with ACEL catching an ordering violation, a cardinality violation, and a state-precondition violation — each one halted before the tool it would have run.

Multiple simultaneous clients

ACELMiddleware(session) above wires one fixed Session shared by every client that connects — fine for local testing or a server that only ever has one client at a time, but unsafe once more than one client can connect at once: every connection would read and write the same state, contracts, and trace, so one client's calls could trip another client's rules or one client's authentication could leak into another's session.

For a server meant to serve more than one client at once, pass session_factory instead of session: ACEL builds a brand-new, fully isolated Session the first time each connection is seen, and reuses it for the rest of that connection's requests. Different connections never share state, contracts, or trace.

from acel.mcp_middleware import ACELMiddleware

def build_session() -> Session:
    session = Session(state={"authenticated": False})
    session.add_contract(must_precede("authenticate", "read_user_data"))
    return session

middleware = ACELMiddleware(session_factory=build_session)
server = MCPServer("my-server", middleware=[middleware])

Sessions are tracked internally by the MCP SDK's own per-connection Connection object via a weak-reference map, so a session is released as soon as its connection closes rather than accumulating forever on a long-running server. See examples/multi_tenant_server.py for a complete runnable example and tests/test_multi_tenant.py for an end-to-end proof against two real, simultaneous ClientSession connections: one client authenticates, its own follow-up call succeeds, and the other client's identical call is still blocked, proving zero state leakage between them.

Shadow mode

The recommended way to roll out a new set of contracts: shadow mode detects and records every violation exactly as enforce mode does — same evidence log, same hash chain — but never blocks a call. Run it against real traffic first, see what it would have caught, then switch to enforce once you trust the rules.

session = Session(mode="shadow")  # default is "enforce"

acel serve examples/toy_server.py --shadow

Session.call(), .precheck()/.postcheck() (the MCP proxy path), and the CLI all respect mode. Session.replay() does not — it's a retrospective CI-gate tool ("would this recorded trace have been blocked"), not a live session, so it always reports every violation regardless of mode.

Config-driven contracts (no code required)

Temporal contracts can be declared in a plain JSON or YAML file instead of Python — useful for trying ACEL against your own tools without writing any code, or for keeping the rule set separate from your server implementation:

acel init-config rules.yaml     # writes a starter file
acel validate rules.yaml        # parses it, prints the contracts it declares

state:
  authenticated: false

contracts:
  - template: must_precede
    args: [validate_record, delete_record]
  - template: at_most_n_times
    args: [send_payment]
    kwargs: {n: 1}

Layer a rules file on top of a live server (--contracts adds to whatever build_server() already sets up, and merges the state block in):

acel serve examples/toy_server.py --contracts rules.yaml

Or check a recorded trace against a rules file directly (the same format acel replay has always used, now also parseable as YAML):

acel replay trace.json --rules rules.yaml

Why preconditions/postconditions aren't in the config file: they evaluate real logic over state (lambda s: s.get("authenticated") is True), and there's no safe way to deserialize arbitrary logic from a data file without either an eval-style security hole or a bespoke expression language. Temporal contracts have no such problem — every template is fully described by tool names and simple parameters, so building one from a config file is just constructing an object from validated data, no code execution involved. Pre/postconditions stay in Python, wired directly to your tools — install YAML support with pip install "acel-core[config]".

Verifying evidence for tampering

Every violation is recorded as a tamper-evident, hash-chained bundle. Save one to disk and check it later — from a completely fresh process, with no in-memory state — with acel verify:

acel replay trace.json --rules rules.json --save-evidence evidence.json
acel verify evidence.json

OK — 3 bundle(s) verified. Hash chain is intact, no tampering detected.

If any field in any bundle was altered after the fact, acel verify fails and reports the exact bundle index where the chain first breaks — everything from that point onward is untrustworthy, but pinpointing where it broke is what actually helps you investigate:

FAIL — tampering detected. Bundle 1 (of 5) is the first to break the chain...

To actually look at what's in an evidence log, rather than just check its integrity, use acel show — a human-readable timeline instead of raw JSON:

acel show evidence.json --trace

ACEL Evidence Log — evidence.json
1 bundle(s), chain OK

[0] 2026-08-06T18:07:34.466187+00:00  step 1
    kind:     temporal
    contract: must_precede(validate_record, delete_record)
    tool:     delete_record
    args:     {"id": "1"}
    trace (0 call(s) leading up to this):
    hash:     fab359c33c…  (unsigned)

--trace prints the full call history leading up to each violation, not just the offending call; drop it for a shorter summary. If the chain is broken, acel show marks the exact bundle where it happened the same way acel verify does.

Security notes

• Evidence bundles embed full call arguments, results, and state snapshots by default. That's what makes them useful evidence, but it also means anything sensitive passed as a tool argument (a password, a raw token, a secret) ends up persisted verbatim if you save an evidence log to disk or share it — unless you opt into redaction. Pass redact_fields= to Session (or directly to EvidenceLog) with the dict-key names you consider sensitive, and any matching value anywhere in a violation's args/result/trace/state — nested dicts and per-call trace entries included — is replaced with a short, non-reversible hash marker before the bundle is hashed or signed:

  session = Session(redact_fields={"password", "api_key", "ssn"})
  

  Two redacted entries with the same original value still produce the same marker (so "this session reused the same token twice" stays visible to an auditor), but the marker never reveals the plaintext. Fields you don't list are left alone, so still prefer keeping secrets out of tool arguments entirely where you can — pass a reference/ID and resolve the real secret inside your own tool implementation instead.

• ed25519_signer() can persist its key, or stay ephemeral — your choice. Called with no arguments, it generates a fresh, unpersisted key every time (fine for signing within one process's lifetime, but restart and old signatures stop matching the new public key). Called with a path (ed25519_signer("~/.acel/signing_key.bin")), it generates the key once, writes it to that file with owner-only permissions (0o600), and reuses it on every future call with the same path — so the public key, and every signature made against it, stays verifiable across restarts:

  sign, public_key_hex = ed25519_signer("~/.acel/signing_key.bin")
  session = Session(signer=sign)
  

  Treat that key file exactly like an SSH private key: back it up if you need old signatures to keep verifying, and never commit it to a repo or evidence log.

• Config files (--rules, --contracts) are parsed with yaml.safe_load and json.loads only — never yaml.load or eval. There is no code execution path from a rules file; that's exactly why pre/postconditions can't be declared there (see above) — only tool names, counts, and plain values are ever deserialized.

Correctness

python benchmarks/correctness.py

A labeled dataset of 59 synthetic tool-call traces spanning all 7 temporal templates (valid sequences, violating sequences, and edge cases like empty traces and multiple simultaneous contracts) — measured at 100% precision and 100% recall. Since the monitor is deterministic automaton checking, not statistical detection, that's the expected result; the suite exists to prove it and to catch any future regression (it's also wired into pytest as tests/test_correctness_suite.py, so a miss fails CI directly).

Performance

python benchmarks/latency.py

Measured on the reference dev machine, 20,000 iterations, discarding a 1,000-call warmup: added p95 latency per tool call is ~0.005ms at 1 active contract and ~0.04ms at 50 concurrently active contracts — well under the <5ms target. Each temporal contract is a deterministic automaton advanced in O(1) per event, so overhead scales linearly with the number of active contracts, not with session length.

Tests

pip install pytest
pytest                    # core monitor + evidence (no extra deps)
pip install "acel-core[mcp]"
pytest tests/test_mcp_proxy.py tests/test_cli_serve.py   # live MCP proxy + CLI

Testing against a real agent, not a script

Everything above proves ACEL works against scripted tool calls. For the stronger version — a real LLM in Claude Desktop or Claude Code actually driving the tool calls, and ACEL blocking a mistake the model made itself — see docs/TESTING_WITH_REAL_AGENTS.md. It walks through wiring up examples/support_agent_server.py (a realistic customer-support/refund scenario) and gives adversarial prompts designed to actually trigger each contract.

License

MIT