AgentGuard — Python SDK
Runtime guardrails and observability for LLM and agent applications.
One call to init() instruments your provider clients. Every LLM call is then
scanned against the guardrails you configure in the AgentGuard console, and
traced — prompts, responses, token usage, cost, and any guardrail that fired.
pip install actaclad-agentguard
import agentguard
agentguard.init(
public_key="pk-...",
secret_key="sk-...",
base_url="https://your-agentguard-host",
project_id="your-project-id",
)
That is the whole setup. Your existing OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini or LiteLLM calls are now guarded and traced — no call sites change.
Scoping a request
policy() attaches identity to the work inside it and opens the trace, so an
agent run is one trace rather than a scatter of unlinked calls.
with agentguard.policy(
user_id="u-123",
session_id="s-456",
feature="support-triage",
metadata={"tenant": "acme"},
):
answer = my_agent.invoke(question)
Everything inside — guarded LLM calls, tool calls, agent steps — lands in one trace, with the identity recorded once at the top and filterable in the console.
Agent frameworks
LangChain and LangGraph are traced automatically inside a policy() scope.
No callback wiring:
with agentguard.policy(user_id=user_id, feature="triage"):
agent.invoke({"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": question}]})
Pass the handler yourself only if you want to — agentguard.langchain_handler().
Opt out with policy(autotrace=False).
Other frameworks:
agentguard.instrument_crewai() # pip install "actaclad-agentguard[crewai]"
agentguard.instrument_openai_agents() # pip install "actaclad-agentguard[openai-agents]"
Guardrails
Guardrails are configured server-side per project and enforced in the SDK, so a policy change takes effect without a redeploy.
| Content | PII redaction, secret scanner, token scanner |
| Safety | prompt injection, toxic content |
| Cost & rate | budget guard, rate limit, token limit |
| Policy | allowed-model list, tool permission |
| Output | schema validation, hallucination (LLM-as-judge) |
A blocked call raises, so you can handle it explicitly:
try:
with agentguard.policy(user_id=user_id, on_block="raise"):
answer = my_agent.invoke(question)
except agentguard.AgentGuardBlocked as blocked:
answer = "Sorry — I can't help with that."
Use on_block="refuse" to get a safe refusal response instead of an exception.
Configuration
Credentials can come from the environment instead of init() arguments:
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
AGENTGUARD_PUBLIC_KEY |
Project public key |
AGENTGUARD_SECRET_KEY |
Project secret key |
AGENTGUARD_BASE_URL |
Your AgentGuard host |
AGENTGUARD_PROJECT_ID |
Project id |
AGENTGUARD_CAPTURE_CONTENT |
true to record prompts and responses. Default off — PII-safe by default. |
Other init() options: environment, on_block, tracing (batch or
realtime), streaming, fail, poll_interval.
API
init(...) |
Instrument providers and start guardrail config polling |
policy(...) |
Scope guardrails and identity to a block of work; opens the trace |
start_trace(name, ...) |
Open a trace explicitly, e.g. to name it |
chat(...) / achat(...) |
Guarded chat completion through the built-in client |
langchain_handler() |
LangChain/LangGraph handler, for passing explicitly |
flush() |
Flush pending telemetry — call before a short-lived process exits |
AgentGuardBlocked |
Raised when a guardrail blocks a call |
Optional extras
pip install "actaclad-agentguard[gemini]" # google-genai
pip install "actaclad-agentguard[anthropic]"
pip install "actaclad-agentguard[langchain]" # LangChain / LangGraph
pip install "actaclad-agentguard[guardrails]" # ML detectors (PII NER, injection, toxicity)
The base install keeps dependencies small; each extra is pulled in only when you need it.
Notes
- Enforcement runs in your process. Detection and the block decision happen locally, so a guarded call adds no network hop for most guardrails. Budget and rate limits are the exception — they check server-side counters so limits hold across every instance of your service.
- Content capture is off by default. Prompts and responses are only recorded
when
AGENTGUARD_CAPTURE_CONTENT=true. - Failures degrade, they don't break. If telemetry or config polling fails, your application call still runs.
© ActaClad Technologies. See the AgentGuard console for documentation and project settings.
Metadata
Release files for actaclad-agentguard 1.6.1
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Total release size: 270.1 kB
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