actions-warden 0.1.2

Read-only auditor for risky or injected GitHub Actions workflow config

Actions Warden

Read-only auditor for risky or injected GitHub Actions workflow config.

After the 2026 wave of repository-theft attacks, a common post-compromise move is: steal a token, then inject or tamper with a repo's .github/workflows/ so CI exfiltrates secrets or runs attacker code. Actions Warden scans those workflow files for the patterns that enable it.

It does not execute workflows, contact GitHub, modify files, or prove a pipeline is safe.

Install

pipx install actions-warden
# or
pip install actions-warden

Python 3.9+. No runtime dependencies.

Usage

actions-warden /path/to/repo
actions-warden /path/to/repo --json
actions-warden /path/to/repo --report report.json

It scans .github/workflows/*.yml|*.yaml and composite action.yml|action.yaml files. You can also point it at a single workflow file.

Exit codes:

• 0: no blocking workflow risks found
• 1: usage or runtime error
• 2: blocking workflow risks found (suitable as a CI gate)

What It Flags

Rule	Severity	What it catches
secret-exfiltration	critical	a secret reference alongside an outbound network command
untrusted-input-injection	high	attacker-controllable github.event.* / head_ref interpolated into the workflow (shell injection in run steps)
remote-code-in-run	high	a downloaded script piped straight into a shell
pull-request-target-head-checkout	high	pull_request_target running with secrets while checking out PR-controlled code ("pwn request")
checkout-unsafe-pr-opt-out	high	actions/checkout explicitly setting allow-unsafe-pr-checkout on privileged PR-adjacent triggers
self-hosted-on-untrusted	medium	self-hosted runner reachable by external pull requests
permissions-write-all	medium	write-all token permissions
oidc-with-write	medium	OIDC id-token: write combined with contents: write
deployment-trigger-review	medium	workflows triggered by deployment / deployment_status that need GitHub workflow execution protections reviewed
deployment-trigger-privileged	high	deployment-triggered workflows that also reference secrets, OIDC, or write permissions
unpinned-action	low	third-party action pinned to a mutable tag/branch instead of a commit SHA

The rules are conservative. A finding means "review this workflow," not "this repo is compromised."

GitHub announced safer actions/checkout@v7 defaults for common pull_request_target pwn-request patterns on 2026-06-18, with supported major tag backports planned for 2026-07-16. Workflows pinned to a minor, patch, or full SHA need an explicit upgrade to receive that behavior, and any allow-unsafe-pr-checkout opt-out should be treated as a deliberate high-risk review item.

GitHub's workflow execution protections public preview also lets organizations restrict which actors and event types can trigger workflows. Treat deployment / deployment_status workflows as review items, and treat deployment-triggered workflows that use secrets, OIDC, or write permissions as blocked until the repository or organization restricts that trigger.

Why text-based, not YAML-parsed

A hostile workflow can be written to parse in surprising ways. Actions Warden inspects what is actually on disk rather than a parser's normalized view, and stays dependency-free. The tradeoff is coarser context: some file_all rules flag co-occurrence within a file rather than within a single job.

Scope Limits

This is a narrow CI/CD config scanner. It does not scan dependencies or packages (see a dependency/supply-chain scanner for that), does not resolve reusable or remote workflows, and will not catch every possible injection or obfuscated payload.