Map the AWS blast radius of GitHub Actions workflows
Project description
ActionScope
Map the AWS blast radius of your GitHub Actions workflows. One command. No AWS credentials required. Instant plain-English results.
๐ Full documentation: https://r12habh.github.io/ActionScope/ ย ยทย ๐ก๏ธ Compromised Actions Database: https://r12habh.github.io/ActionScope/compromised-actions-database/
Your GitHub Actions workflows hold AWS credentials. Do you know what they can do?
ActionScope reads your .github/workflows/ files, Terraform IAM resources,
and JSON IAM policies, then tells you in plain English what your CI/CD
pipeline can do in AWS if it is compromised.
It also detects:
- ๐จ Known-compromised actions (
actions-cool,tj-actions,trivy-action) - ๐ OIDC trust policy misconfigurations (wildcard org subjects, missing sub/aud)
- ๐ Script injection (PR titles, issue bodies in
run:blocks) - ๐ญ Artifact poisoning (
workflow_run+ untrusted artifact execution) - ๐ค AI agent prompt injection surfaces (Claude Code, Copilot in CI)
- ๐ Unpinned actions with SHA resolution
Try it on your repo in 30 seconds
pip install actionscope
cd /path/to/your/repo-with-github-actions
actionscope scan .
That's it. No AWS credentials needed, no telemetry, no sign-up. Static
analysis runs in under a second on a typical repo. If you have nothing
relevant, you get Overall Risk: โน๏ธ INFO. If you have something, you'll
see exactly what and why.
Want a guided first-scan walkthrough? See Your First Scan โ 5 minutes from install to understanding the output.
Common flags
actionscope scan . --aws-verify # fetch live IAM policies (read-only)
actionscope scan . --resolve-pins # suggest full-SHA pins for unpinned actions
actionscope scan . --fail-on high # exit 1 if any finding is HIGH or above
actionscope scan . --output-format sarif --output-file results.sarif
actionscope scan . --save-state # save state for PR delta comparison
Example Output
ActionScope โ Blast Radius Report
Path: /my-repo | Workflows: 2 | Overall Risk: ๐ด CRITICAL
โ KNOWN COMPROMISED ACTIONS (1 found)
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ CRITICAL: actions-cool/issues-helper@v3 (issue-triage.yml)
Compromised 2026-05-18 โ mutable tags may run credential-stealing code
Fix: Remove this action or pin to a verified pre-compromise SHA
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
deploy.yml โ deploy โ Configure AWS credentials
AWS Role: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/github-deploy-role
Auth: OIDC โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ iam:PassRole โ Permissions mgmt โ ๐ด CRIT โ
โ ec2:TerminateInstances โ Write โ ๐ HIGH โ
โ s3:GetObject โ Read โ ๐ข LOW โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโดโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโดโโโโโโโโโโโ
๐ด Privilege Escalation Path: iam:PassRole on * โ can escalate to any role
Use as a GitHub Action
name: ActionScope Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # for SARIF upload
pull-requests: write # for PR comments
jobs:
actionscope:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: r12habh/ActionScope@v0
with:
fail-on: high # fail CI if HIGH or above
comment-pr: true # post findings as PR comment
upload-sarif: true # show in GitHub Security tab
resolve-pins: true # suggest SHA pins for unpinned actions
What Makes ActionScope Different
ActionScope answers a question no other tool answers:
"This workflow assumes this IAM role. If the workflow is compromised, what can an attacker actually do in your AWS account?"
| Capability | actionlint | zizmor | Scorecard | ActionScope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Workflow syntax validation | โ | Partial | โ | Partial |
| Security pattern detection | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| GITHUB_TOKEN permission review | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| Unpinned action detection | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| Known-compromised action detection | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| AWS credential source detection | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| Workflow โ IAM role correlation | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| Live AWS IAM policy verification | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| Blast radius in plain English | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| OIDC trust policy analysis | โ | โ | โ | โ |
| Script injection detection | โ | Partial | โ | โ |
| SARIF / GitHub Security tab | โ | โ | โ | โ |
How It Works
ActionScope performs static analysis only by default. It never sends your code to an external service and does not require AWS credentials unless you explicitly enable live AWS verification.
.github/workflows/*.yml
terraform/**/*.tf โ ActionScope โ Blast Radius Report
policies/**/*.json + PR Comment
+ SARIF โ GitHub Security Tab
- Find
aws-actions/configure-aws-credentialsin workflows - Extract role ARNs and credential patterns
- Match roles to IAM policies in Terraform or JSON files
- Classify IAM actions using the
policy-sentryaction database - Detect privilege escalation paths
- Check for known-compromised actions in the bundled database
- Output a plain-English blast radius report
Live AWS Verification (--aws-verify)
pip install actionscope[aws]
actionscope scan . --aws-verify
Requires read-only IAM permissions:
iam:GetRole, iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies, iam:GetPolicy,
iam:GetPolicyVersion, iam:ListRolePolicies, iam:GetRolePolicy.
See docs/aws-verify-permissions.md for the minimal required policy.
Security Detectors
๐จ Known-Compromised Actions
Checks workflows against a curated database of GitHub Actions with documented supply chain compromises. Updated with each ActionScope release.
Current entries: actions-cool/issues-helper (2026-05-18),
actions-cool/maintain-one-comment (2026-05-18),
tj-actions/changed-files (2025-03-19), and
aquasecurity/trivy-action (2026-03-19).
๐ OIDC Trust Policy Analysis
Detects wildcard org subjects, missing sub/aud conditions, and
insufficient branch/environment scoping in GitHub OIDC trust policies.
๐ Script Injection Detection
Finds direct interpolation of attacker-controlled GitHub context values
(github.event.pull_request.title, github.event.issue.body, etc.) into
run: shell blocks: the "Pwn Request" attack class.
๐ญ Artifact Poisoning Detection
Identifies workflow_run workflows that download and execute artifacts from
potentially untrusted fork PR workflows with secret access.
๐ค AI Agent Prompt Injection Surface
Detects Claude Code, GitHub Copilot Agent, Gemini CLI and similar AI coding agents configured with write permissions in untrusted PR contexts.
๐ Action Pinning + SHA Resolution
Detects unpinned actions and resolves tags to current SHAs via the GitHub API. Distinguishes full SHAs (safe) from short SHAs (still mutable) and tags.
โก IAM Privilege Escalation Paths
Detects documented escalation paths including PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, CreateAccessKey, Lambda+PassRole, EC2+PassRole, CloudFormation+PassRole, and more.
Research
ActionScope is backed by an empirical study of 493 public GitHub repositories and 3,981 GitHub Actions workflow files using AWS.
| Finding | Result |
|---|---|
| Using static AWS keys (not OIDC) | 58.2% of repos |
| Using unpinned external actions | 95.5% of repos |
pull_request_target + write permissions |
8.1% of repos |
| Exposing role ARNs directly in workflows | 44.0% of repos |
โ Full research findings | Scanner and anonymized dataset
Output Formats
actionscope scan . --output-format terminal # default: colored Rich output
actionscope scan . --output-format json # for CI integration
actionscope scan . --output-format markdown # for PR comments
actionscope scan . --output-format sarif # for GitHub Security tab
FAQ
How do I detect compromised GitHub Actions like tj-actions or actions-cool?
ActionScope ships a curated database of known-compromised actions (tj-actions,
actions-cool/issues-helper, actions-cool/maintain-one-comment, trivy-action)
and scans every uses: reference in your workflows against it. Run
actionscope scan . and any compromised reference appears as a CRITICAL
finding with the advisory URL.
What can my GitHub Actions workflow do in my AWS account?
ActionScope extracts every aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials step from
your workflows, follows the role ARN, and correlates it with Terraform or JSON
IAM policy files in the same repo. The output is a plain-English blast-radius
report โ every IAM action the workflow can perform, classified by risk. Add
--aws-verify to fetch the live policies from AWS using read-only IAM calls.
How do I scan a GitHub Actions workflow for security issues without AWS credentials?
actionscope scan . runs as pure static analysis by default. It needs no AWS
credentials, no GitHub token (except for --resolve-pins), and never sends
your code to an external service.
How do I find script injection or pull_request_target risks?
ActionScope detects direct injection of attacker-controlled GitHub event
fields (PR titles, issue bodies, branch names) into run: blocks, and flags
pull_request_target jobs that combine untrusted event data with
write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN permissions โ the pattern behind the April 2026
prt-scan attack.
How do I get GitHub Code Scanning alerts for my workflows?
Run actionscope scan . --output-format sarif --output-file results.sarif
and upload results.sarif to the GitHub Security tab via the
github/codeql-action/upload-sarif action. ActionScope emits SARIF rules
AS001โAS014 covering AWS exposure, OIDC trust, unpinned actions,
compromised actions, script injection, and environment hardening.
How do I pin GitHub Actions to a full commit SHA?
actionscope scan . --resolve-pins uses the GitHub API to look up the
current full-SHA tip for every mutable uses: owner/repo@vX reference in
your workflows and prints a suggested pinned version with the tag preserved
as a comment.
What's the difference between ActionScope and actionlint, zizmor, or Checkov?
actionlint validates workflow YAML syntax. zizmor and Scorecard detect workflow security patterns. Checkov scans IAM policies independently. ActionScope is the only tool that crosses the boundary โ it ties a specific workflow to a specific IAM role to a specific blast radius.
Does ActionScope require AWS credentials?
Only if you opt in to --aws-verify, which makes read-only IAM API calls to
fetch live attached policies. See
docs/aws-verify-permissions.md for the
exact permission set required.
Documentation
๐ Full docs site: https://r12habh.github.io/ActionScope/
- First Scan Tutorial โ install โ first scan โ reading the output, in 5 minutes
- FAQ โ empty scans,
policy_source: not_found,--aws-verifysafety, DB refresh cadence, tool comparisons - Compromised Actions Database โ every action ActionScope flags, with permalinks
- CLI reference
- OIDC trust policy analysis
- Known-compromised actions detector
- SARIF and GitHub Security tab
- AWS verification permissions
- Release runbook
Contributing
See CONTRIBUTING.md for setup instructions.
New to the codebase? Start with a good first issue.
The most impactful contributions right now:
- Add IAM actions to the risk database
- Add compromised action entries when a new supply-chain attack happens
- Add test fixtures from real-world workflows, anonymized
- Improve error messages when policies are missing
Built By
Rishabh Singh.
ActionScope performs static analysis by default. It does not transmit your code or credentials to any external service.
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