af-credentials v0.3.1
Backend-side client for the AF MCP platform's broker-issued credentials (issue
#112), covering both x509/VOMS proxies and krb5 tickets. Import package:
af_credentials. No dependency on af_mcp_broker, FastAPI, or Kubernetes —
this is meant to be embedded in other MCP backends that need to trust the
broker (ami-mcp's broker mode today, later rucio-mcp), so it stays deliberately
thin: pyjwt[crypto] and httpx2 at runtime, mcp>=2.0.0,<3 opt-in via the
[mcp] extra.
Installation
pip install af-credentials
With the optional mcp SDK adapter (af_credentials.mcp):
pip install af-credentials[mcp]
Or with pixi:
pixi add af-credentials
Requirements
- Python 3.10+
- An AF MCP broker publishing a JWKS endpoint (for
BrokerTokenVerifier)
BrokerTokenVerifier (af_credentials.verifier)
Verifies an AF Broker Identity Token — the RS256 identity assertion
af_mcp_broker.credentials.broker_issued.BrokerTokenIssuer mints for AF-native
backends (see the platform's docs/auth.md, "AF Broker Identity Token"). The
claim set is exactly iss/sub/aud/exp/iat/jti, plus
uid/gid/unixname only when the issuing broker's target config requested
POSIX identity — never a capability or group claim.
from af_credentials.verifier import BrokerTokenVerifier
verifier = BrokerTokenVerifier(
jwks_url="https://mcp.af.uchicago.edu/.well-known/jwks.json",
issuer="https://mcp.af.uchicago.edu",
audience="ami-mcp",
)
claims = await verifier.verify(token)
if claims is None:
... # not authenticated: bad signature, wrong iss/aud, expired, ...
else:
claims.sub, claims.jti, claims.exp # always present
claims.uid, claims.gid, claims.unixname # None unless this token carries POSIX identity
JWKS keys are cached in-process for cache_ttl seconds (default 300), keyed by
kid. A token whose kid isn't in the current cache triggers exactly one
refetch, to pick up a key rotated in since the last fetch (see the platform's
key-rotation procedure) — if the refetched JWKS still doesn't carry that kid,
verification fails without fetching again.
verify() returns None for every way a token can be invalid (bad signature,
wrong issuer/audience, expired, malformed, unknown key), so callers can treat
"not authenticated" uniformly. It does not catch transport failures — a JWKS
fetch that can't connect, times out, or gets a non-2xx response raises the
underlying httpx2 exception, so a caller can tell "the broker is unreachable"
apart from "this token is bad" and respond accordingly (e.g. a 503 vs. a 401).
mcp_token_verifier() (af_credentials.mcp, requires the [mcp] extra)
Adapts a BrokerTokenVerifier to the mcp SDK's TokenVerifier protocol, for
wiring an AF Broker Identity Token straight into a FastMCP/mcp server's auth
configuration:
from af_credentials.mcp import mcp_token_verifier
token_verifier = mcp_token_verifier(
verifier
) # implements mcp.server.auth.provider.TokenVerifier
verify_token(token) returns
AccessToken(token=token, client_id=claims.sub, scopes=[], expires_at=claims.exp)
or None. scopes is always empty — the token itself carries no authorization
claims, so a server wanting authorization must resolve it from client_id (the
token's sub) itself, not from this adapter's output.
ProxyClient (af_credentials.proxy)
Redeems a brokered x509/VOMS proxy, krb5 ticket, or ServiceX access token.
ProxyClient takes a kind: Literal["x509", "krb5", "servicex"] = "x509"
constructor parameter that selects which credential the client redeems; the
redeem endpoint is live in the broker (see "The redeem contract" below).
from af_credentials.proxy import ProxyClient, ProxyNotAvailableError, ProxyRedeemError
client = ProxyClient("https://mcp.af.uchicago.edu") # kind="x509" by default
try:
with await client.proxy_file(bearer_token) as handle:
# handle.path -> Path to a private 0600 PEM file (proxy cert + key)
# handle.dn -> VOMS proxy subject DN
# handle.expires_at -> datetime
run_subprocess(env={"X509_USER_PROXY": str(handle.path)})
# file is deleted here, on __exit__
except ProxyNotAvailableError:
... # no proxy available for this caller right now (no linked .globus,
# or the broker's own cached proxy is too close to expiry)
except ProxyRedeemError as exc:
... # the broker rejected/failed the call; exc.status_code, exc.detail
Use pem_bytes(bearer_token) instead of proxy_file() when the caller wants
the PEM material in-memory rather than as a file.
For krb5 tickets, construct the client with kind="krb5" and use
ticket_file()/ccache_bytes() instead — proxy_file()/pem_bytes() raise
ValueError on a kind="krb5" client, and ticket_file()/ccache_bytes()
raise the same kind of guard error on a kind="x509" client:
from af_credentials.proxy import ProxyClient, ProxyNotAvailableError, ProxyRedeemError
client = ProxyClient("https://mcp.af.uchicago.edu", kind="krb5")
try:
with await client.ticket_file(bearer_token) as handle:
# handle.path -> Path to a private 0600 ccache file
# handle.principal -> krb5 principal, e.g. "gstark@CERN.CH"
# handle.realm -> krb5 realm, e.g. "CERN.CH"
# handle.expires_at -> datetime
# handle.renew_until -> datetime, or None if not renewable
run_subprocess(env={"KRB5CCNAME": str(handle.path)})
# file is deleted here, on __exit__
except ProxyNotAvailableError:
... # no ticket available for this caller right now (no linked krb5-token
# identity, or the broker's own cached ticket is too close to expiry)
except ProxyRedeemError as exc:
... # the broker rejected/failed the call; exc.status_code, exc.detail
Use ccache_bytes(bearer_token) instead of ticket_file() when the caller
wants the ccache material in-memory rather than as a file.
For a ServiceX access token, construct the client with kind="servicex" and use
access_token() — there is no file to materialize (it's a bearer token, not key
material), so this returns a ServiceXAccessToken directly rather than a
context-managed handle:
from af_credentials.proxy import ProxyClient, ProxyNotAvailableError, ProxyRedeemError
client = ProxyClient("https://mcp.af.uchicago.edu", kind="servicex")
try:
token = await client.access_token(bearer_token)
# token.access_token -> the short-lived ServiceX access token (str)
# token.expires_at -> datetime
except ProxyNotAvailableError:
... # no ServiceX refresh token linked for this caller right now, or
# the broker's own redeemed token is too close to expiry
except ProxyRedeemError as exc:
... # the broker rejected/failed the call; exc.status_code, exc.detail
The redeem contract
POST {broker_url}/v1/credentials/{kind}/redeem
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Content-Type: application/json
{}
where {kind} is x509, krb5, or servicex, matching the ProxyClient's
own kind.
A 200 response for kind="x509":
{
"pem": "<PEM-encoded proxy certificate + key>",
"dn": "<VOMS proxy subject DN>",
"voms_attributes": ["<VOMS FQAN>", "..."],
"expires_at": "<ISO-8601 timestamp>",
"remaining_seconds": 3600,
"nickname": "<CERN/VOMS nickname attribute, or null if extraction failed>"
}
and for kind="krb5":
{
"ccache_b64": "<base64-encoded ccache file contents>",
"principal": "<krb5 principal, e.g. gstark@CERN.CH>",
"realm": "<krb5 realm, e.g. CERN.CH>",
"expires_at": "<ISO-8601 timestamp>",
"remaining_seconds": 3600,
"renew_until": "<ISO-8601 timestamp, or null if not renewable>"
}
and for kind="servicex":
{
"access_token": "<short-lived ServiceX access token>",
"expires_at": "<ISO-8601 timestamp>",
"remaining_seconds": 3600
}
The following applies identically to all three kinds, via the same _redeem()
call:
- 404 →
ProxyNotAvailableError(detail)— the response'sdetailfield (or raw body if not JSON) is the exception's.detail. - Any other non-200 →
ProxyRedeemError(status_code, detail). - A 200 response whose
remaining_secondsis below the client'smin_remaining(default 60s) is also treated asProxyNotAvailableError— the broker caches the credential itself, so a caller who retried "the credential I just got" would just get the same near-expired proxy or ticket back.
ProxyClient never caches handles across calls — every proxy_file()/
pem_bytes()/ticket_file()/ccache_bytes()/access_token() call redeems
fresh (the broker is expected to be the one doing the caching). Materialized
files live under a private, 0700 directory created lazily on first use and
reused for the lifetime of the ProxyClient instance; each file inside it is
written 0600 (access_token() writes no file at all).
Development
git clone https://github.com/maniaclab/af-credentials
cd af-credentials
pixi install
pixi run pre-commit-install
pixi run test # run tests
pixi run lint # pre-commit + pylint
pixi run build # build sdist + wheel
pixi run docs-serve # build and serve docs locally
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