af-filesystem-mcp v0.2.0
An MCP server that gives an AF (Analysis Facility) user browse/read access to
their own files on the AF's shared NFS home (/home/<unixname>) and Ceph data
area (/data/<unixname>) — nothing more. Designed to sit behind
af-mcp-platform's credential broker so an LLM session can look at a user's own
analysis outputs, condor logs, and scratch files without a human copying paths
around.
What it does
| Tool | Does | Read/write |
|---|---|---|
fs_list |
List a directory | read-only |
fs_read |
Read a file, by byte range or line range, including head/tail | read-only |
fs_stat |
Stat a path — size, mtime, type, permissions | read-only |
fs_grep |
Search for a pattern across files under a directory, capped in files scanned and matches returned | read-only |
That is the entire v1 tool surface: all four tools are read-only
(read_only_hint=true in their MCP tool annotations) and confined to the
caller's own two AF roots (open_world_hint=false). There is deliberately no
write tool, no delete, no chmod, no arbitrary command execution, and no
full-tree walk (directory-size, duplicate-finder). See CLAUDE.md for the
design rationale and phase-2 (write) plan.
Security model
Every filesystem operation for user alice runs in a short-lived helper
subprocess impersonating alice's real uid/gid — the server process itself
(running as root, holding only CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID) never reads or writes
a byte of user data directly. This means the kernel (and, for the NFS-mounted
homes, the NFS server) enforces every permission check against the real
identity: even a bug in this server's own path-pinning logic can only let alice
reach what alice's real uid could already reach. See CLAUDE.md § "Security
model" and src/af_filesystem_mcp/paths.py for the full design rationale, and
maniaclab/af-mcp-platform#188
for the workplan and the (rejected) alternatives this design was chosen over.
Installation
pip install af-filesystem-mcp
Or with pixi:
pixi add af-filesystem-mcp
Requirements
- Python 3.10+
- Linux (the impersonation mechanism is POSIX
setuid/setgid; there is no Windows/macOS deployment target — localstdiomode runs fine on any OS for development, since it never impersonates)
Quick start (local development, stdio)
In stdio mode there is exactly one caller (you), so no impersonation happens —
the server operates directly as your own uid/gid, confined to your own $HOME
and a configurable data root:
af-filesystem-mcp serve --data-root /data
Broker mode (production, HTTP)
af-filesystem-mcp serve --transport http \
--broker-url https://mcp.af.uchicago.edu \
--broker-audience af-filesystem-mcp \
--home-root /home --data-root /data
Bearers are broker-issued identity JWTs (aud=af-filesystem-mcp) carrying
uid/gid/unixname POSIX claims (af-mcp-platform's
identityProviders[].targetOptions.af-filesystem-mcp.includePosix: true).
Requires the broker extra: pip install af-filesystem-mcp[broker].
Development
pixi install
pixi run test
pixi run lint
See CLAUDE.md for architecture, the impersonation/path-confinement design, and
conventions for adding a new tool.
Metadata
Release files for af-filesystem-mcp 0.2.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0.tar.gz | 126.6 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 172.7 kB
Release files / af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 126.6 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
d9d1768b943b66a6173188f26fb994d7e17776780d2b2e7701c550fd24f9ebb7
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
ff1e32822a701dc3e002351597e13e94adb9cc9b646a93cac3218e94cf97feb7
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 18, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 46.1 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
dcebe14990181f3320251fee071539390db1347da8d87f05fe3d638e10eadd5e
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
dd21834bcaf42a98c537c226e45373a33fda390bab3804cb180e5438bcfda41e
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 18, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for af-filesystem-mcp 0.2.0
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for af_filesystem_mcp-0.2.0.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 18, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.