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agent-custody (Python)

Signed, verifiable receipts for AI agent tool calls, from Python. The key, the Cedar policy, and the Merkle log live in the agent-custody sidecar, a local process from the npm package; this client talks to it over HTTP with the standard library only.

npm install -g @agent-custody/receipts && agent-custody keygen --dir keys --name app
agent-custody serve --config sdk.json          # loopback, port 8788
pip install agent-custody
from agent_custody import Client, PolicyDeniedError

client = Client()                                # http://127.0.0.1:8788/
refund = client.wrap("stripe.refund", lambda args: stripe.refund(**args))
refund({"amount": 5000})                         # decide, run, record; raises PolicyDeniedError on deny

Adapters, each tested against the real package: agent_custody.langchain.ReceiptCallbackHandler (record-only), agent_custody.crewai.wrap_tools (enforce: each CrewAI tool becomes a CustodyTool with the same name, description, and schema whose run is decided, executed, and recorded; a denial is returned as the tool result), agent_custody.openai_agents.wrap_tools (enforce and record), agent_custody.claude_agent_sdk.claude_hook (PreToolUse deny, PostToolUse record), agent_custody.hermes (a Hermes Agent plugin: pre_tool_call block, post_tool_call record; the drop-in plugin directory is hermes-plugin), agent_custody.adk.adk_callbacks (Google ADK: before_tool_callback skips a denied tool and hands the model the receipt, after_tool_callback records; LlmAgent(..., **adk_callbacks(client)); extra adk, which installs google-adk[a2a]). Receipts are verified by the TypeScript verifier; the tests do exactly that. An ADK agent's delegations to other agents over A2A are not tool calls and pass no callback; the gateway's A2A front, agent-custody gateway --a2a, covers them, and tests/test_adk_a2a.py runs ADK's own RemoteA2aAgent through it.

The memory tools. agent_custody.memory.MemoryClient (extra memory) talks to the shared memory server from @agent-custody/state over MCP: write, read, retract, history. Writes from here are claimed, quarantined until a gateway confirms them, and reads leave quarantined facts out unless asked; that is the honest position of an agent that did not go through the gateway.

async with MemoryClient("http://127.0.0.1:8790/mcp", token=os.environ["MEMORY_DIRECT_TOKEN"]) as memory:
    await memory.write("acct:42", "plan", "pro", space="team:support", actor="py-agent")
    await memory.read(subject="acct:42", include_claimed=True)

Everything recorded is claimed: the sidecar trusts what this process reports, the same as the in-process TypeScript SDK. For enforcement the agent cannot skip, put the gateway in front of the tools instead; it is an MCP server and needs nothing from this package.

The verifier. agent_custody.verify (extra verify, which installs cryptography for Ed25519) checks a receipt bundle against the public keys you trust, with no sidecar and no network. It is written from the receipt specification, not ported from the TypeScript verifier; the financial-operation checks, which the specification does not name, follow src/verify.ts. tests/test_verify.py runs every conformance vector and compares the failing checks by name, and it holds the verifier to the TypeScript verdicts on receipts that tests/cross_language.mts issues with the TypeScript code for cases the vectors do not cover.

pip install 'agent-custody[verify]'
agent-custody-verify receipts/<id>.json --issuer-key gateway.pub --principal-key principal.pub --log log.jsonl
from agent_custody.verify import Trust, load_public_key, read_log, verify_bundle
report = verify_bundle(bundle, Trust(issuer=[load_public_key(pem)]), log=read_log("log.jsonl"))
report.ok, report.failing

It does not decrypt or restore withheld fields: a receipt under a capture rule verifies as committed, as it does in the TypeScript verifier without --capture-key-env or --disclose.

uv run --extra test pytest        # from packages/python; starts a sidecar with node from ../receipts

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