AgentGate
Auth0 for AI agents — verifiable identity, scoped permissions, human-approval escalation.
AgentGate gives every AI agent a cryptographic identity, enforces deny-by-default permissions through YAML-defined policies, and escalates high-risk actions to a human before they execute.
Quick Start
pip install agent-gatekeeper
from agentgate import AgentIdentity, PermissionPolicy, GateKeeper, Action
from agentgate.policy import ActionRule
# 1. Create an agent identity
agent = AgentIdentity.create("research-bot", capabilities=["search", "summarize"])
# 2. Define a permission policy
policy = PermissionPolicy(
name="research-policy",
rules=[
ActionRule(action=Action.TOOL_USE, allowed=True, allowed_targets=["search"]),
ActionRule(action=Action.LLM_CALL, allowed=True, max_per_minute=10),
ActionRule(action=Action.SHELL, allowed=False),
],
)
# 3. Enforce at runtime
gate = GateKeeper(identity=agent, policy=policy)
decision = gate.check("tool_use", target="search")
print(decision.type) # DecisionType.ALLOW
decision = gate.check("shell")
print(decision.type) # DecisionType.DENY
Features
- HMAC-signed identity — every agent gets a unique key pair for message signing and verification
- Deny-by-default policies — nothing is allowed unless explicitly permitted
- YAML round-trip — define policies as code, load and save from YAML files
- Target-level scoping — allow specific tools, files, or endpoints while denying others
- Usage thresholds — escalate or hard-deny after N uses of an action
- Rate limiting — cap actions per minute to prevent runaway agents
- Human-approval escalation — plug in your own approval handler (Slack bot, CLI prompt, webhook)
- Decision audit log — full history of every gate check for observability
API Reference
AgentIdentity
Verifiable identity for an AI agent, backed by HMAC-SHA256.
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
AgentIdentity.create(name, capabilities=None) |
Create a new agent with a generated UUID and secret key |
agent.sign(message) -> str |
Sign a message string, returns hex digest |
agent.verify(message, signature) -> bool |
Verify a signature against this agent's key |
Fields: id, name, capabilities, created_at, secret_key, metadata
PermissionPolicy
Deny-by-default permission policy with YAML serialization.
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
policy.check(action, target=None) -> str |
Returns "allow", "deny", or "escalate" |
policy.get_rule(action) -> ActionRule |
Get the rule for a specific action type |
PermissionPolicy.from_yaml(path) |
Load a policy from a YAML file |
policy.to_yaml(path) |
Save a policy to a YAML file |
Actions: tool_use, llm_call, file_read, file_write, network, shell, data_access
GateKeeper
Runtime enforcement engine that combines identity, policy, thresholds, and escalation.
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
gate.check(action, target=None) -> Decision |
Check permission; returns a Decision object |
gate.is_allowed(action, target=None) -> bool |
Convenience boolean check |
gate.require(action, target=None) -> Decision |
Check and raise PermissionError if denied |
gate.decisions -> list[Decision] |
Full audit history of all gate checks |
Decision fields: type (ALLOW/DENY/ESCALATE), agent_id, action, target, reason, timestamp, approved_by
Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Your Agent │
│ │
│ action request │
│ │ │
│ v │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │GateKeeper│───>│PermissionPolicy │ │
│ │ │ │ (YAML rules) │ │
│ │ │ └──────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │──> threshold / rate-limit check │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │──> escalation ──> approval_handler() │
│ │ │ (human / webhook)│
│ └──────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ v │
│ Decision(ALLOW / DENY / ESCALATE) │
│ + full audit log │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
v
AgentIdentity
(HMAC-signed, UUID-backed)
Comparison
| Feature | AgentGate | Raw LLM APIs | LangChain Tools | Custom middleware |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agent identity with crypto signing | Yes | No | No | Manual |
| Deny-by-default policies | Yes | No | No | Manual |
| YAML policy definition | Yes | No | No | No |
| Per-action rate limiting | Yes | No | No | Manual |
| Human-approval escalation | Yes | No | No | Manual |
| Decision audit log | Yes | No | No | Manual |
| Zero dependencies beyond pydantic | Yes | N/A | Heavy | Varies |
License
MIT License. See LICENSE for details.
Metadata
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