Deterministic, capability-based policy enforcement runtime for AI agents
Project description
APE - Agent Policy Engine
Deterministic, capability-based policy enforcement runtime for AI agents.
APE provides a complete security framework for AI agent systems, enforcing explicit intents, validated plans, and auditable execution. It solves critical security challenges in AI agent deployments including prompt injection, confused deputy attacks, unauthorized privilege escalation, and agent-driven denial of service.
Core Principle
"Prompts guide intent, but never are intent."
User prompts are compiled through APE's Intent Compiler into structured, policy-constrained intents. The prompt itself never becomes executable — only the validated, narrowed intent is enforced.
Features
Security Guarantees
- Deterministic Enforcement: Non-probabilistic, predictable policy decisions
- Cryptographic Binding: Authority tokens bound to specific intent and plan hashes
- Default-Deny: Any action not explicitly allowed is denied
- Complete Audit Trail: Every decision logged for compliance and debugging
- Provenance Tracking: Data origin tracking prevents untrusted data in authority decisions
Core Components
- Action Repository: Canonical registry of known actions with schemas and risk levels
- Intent Compiler: Natural language → structured intent transformation
- Plan Generator: Intent → validated execution plan with LLM support
- Policy Engine: YAML-based policies with parameterized conditions and external evaluator support
- Runtime State Machine: Enforces valid execution flow
- Authority Manager: Single-use, time-limited execution tokens
- Enforcement Gate: Mandatory checkpoint for all tool execution
- Escalation Handler: Routes high-risk actions for approval
- Session Manager: Multi-turn conversation continuity with cumulative tracking
- Rate Limiter: Global, per-action, and per-target rate limiting and quota enforcement
- MCP Scanner: Auto-generates policies from MCP configurations
- APE Orchestrator: Unified one-call API from prompt to execution
Enterprise Integration
- Parameterized Policy Conditions: Constrain parameters at execution time (path prefixes, domain allowlists, size limits)
- External Policy Adapters: Delegate policy decisions to OPA/Rego, AWS Cedar, or XACML engines
- Dynamic Policy Reload: Live policy updates via URL polling or webhook-triggered reload
- Framework SDKs: Native integration adapters for LangChain, AutoGen, and CrewAI
Installation
pip install agent-policy-engine
Or from source:
git clone https://github.com/agent-policy-engine/ape.git
cd ape
pip install -e .
Quick Start
APE offers two integration paths: Orchestrator (simple) and Manual (full control).
Orchestrator Path (Recommended for Most Use Cases)
from ape import APEOrchestrator
# Create orchestrator from policy
orch = APEOrchestrator.from_policy("policies/read_only.yaml")
# Register your tool implementations
orch.register_tool("read_file", lambda path: open(path).read())
orch.register_tool("list_directory", lambda path: os.listdir(path))
# Execute with one-call API
result = orch.execute("Read the config.json file")
if result.success:
print(result.results[0]) # File contents
else:
print(f"Error: {result.error}")
Session-Aware Execution
# Create a session for multi-turn conversations
session = orch.create_session(user_id="user_123", ttl_minutes=30)
result1 = session.execute("Read config.json") # Tracked
result2 = session.execute("Now update it") # Knows context
# Session tracks cumulative behavior
print(session.actions_executed) # ["read_file", "write_file"]
print(session.cumulative_risk) # 0.4
print(session.time_remaining) # 1740 seconds
session.get_usage_summary()
Manual Path (Maximum Control)
from ape import (
PolicyEngine, IntentManager, PlanManager,
RuntimeOrchestrator, AuthorityManager, EnforcementGate,
ActionRepository, IntentCompiler, PlanGenerator,
Action, Provenance, RuntimeState,
create_standard_repository,
)
# 1. Setup components
repository = create_standard_repository()
policy = PolicyEngine("policies/read_only.yaml")
compiler = IntentCompiler(repository)
generator = PlanGenerator(repository)
# 2. Compile intent from prompt
intent = compiler.compile(
prompt="Read the config.json file",
policy_allowed=policy.get_all_allowed_actions(),
)
# 3. Generate plan
plan = generator.generate(intent)
# 4. Setup APE runtime
runtime = RuntimeOrchestrator()
intent_manager = IntentManager()
plan_manager = PlanManager(intent_manager)
authority = AuthorityManager(runtime)
enforcement = EnforcementGate(authority)
# 5. Execute through APE
intent_version = intent_manager.set(intent.to_ape_intent(), Provenance.USER_TRUSTED)
runtime.transition(RuntimeState.INTENT_SET)
plan_hash = plan_manager.submit(plan.to_ape_plan(), Provenance.USER_TRUSTED)
plan_manager.approve()
runtime.transition(RuntimeState.PLAN_APPROVED)
runtime.transition(RuntimeState.EXECUTING)
for idx, step in enumerate(plan.steps):
action = Action(
action_id=step.action_id,
tool_id=step.tool_id,
parameters=step.parameters,
intent_version=intent_version,
plan_hash=plan_hash,
plan_step_index=idx,
)
policy.evaluate_or_raise(action.action_id)
token = authority.issue(intent_version, plan_hash, action)
result = enforcement.execute(token, my_tool, action, **step.parameters)
runtime.transition(RuntimeState.TERMINATED)
Architecture
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ APE Orchestrator │
│ (Unified API - orchestrates all components) │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ Action │ │ Intent │ │ Plan │ │
│ │ Repository │───►│ Compiler │───►│ Generator │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ • Known actions │ │ • Prompt→Intent │ │ • Intent→Plan │ │
│ │ • Schemas │ │ • Policy narrow │ │ • LLM parsing │ │
│ │ • Risk levels │ │ • Risk filter │ │ • Validation │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────┤
│ APE Core │ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ Intent │ │ Plan │ │ Policy │ │
│ │ Manager │───►│ Manager │───►│ Engine │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │ • Conditions │ │
│ │ │ │ • Adapters │ │
│ ▼ ▼ └─────────────────┘ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ Runtime │ │ Authority │ ▼ │
│ │ Orchestrator │───►│ Manager │───►┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ Enforcement │ │
│ │ State machine │ │ Token lifecycle │ │ Gate │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ▼ │
│ │ Session │ │ Rate │ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ Manager │ │ Limiter │ │ Audit Logger │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Policy Configuration
Policies are YAML files that define allowed actions with optional parameter conditions.
# policies/read_only.yaml
name: read_only
version: "1.0"
description: "Read-only file access"
default_decision: deny
rules:
- action: read_file
decision: allow
- action: list_directory
decision: allow
- action: write_file
decision: deny
- action: delete_file
decision: deny
Parameterized Conditions
# policies/scoped_access.yaml
rules:
- action: write_file
decision: allow
conditions:
path:
prefix: ["/tmp/", "/home/user/workspace/"]
size_bytes:
max: 10485760
- action: http_get
decision: allow
conditions:
domain:
allowlist: ["api.github.com", "*.internal.corp"]
Example Policies
| Policy | Description |
|---|---|
minimal_safe.yaml |
Minimal read-only, maximum safety |
read_only.yaml |
File reading only |
development.yaml |
Broader permissions for development |
filesystem_scoped.yaml |
Path-constrained file access |
human_in_loop.yaml |
All actions require escalation |
Risk Levels
Actions are classified by risk:
| Level | Description | Default Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| MINIMAL | Read-only, no side effects | Allowed |
| LOW | Reversible side effects | Allowed |
| MODERATE | Irreversible but recoverable | Allowed with caution |
| HIGH | Potentially destructive | Requires escalation |
| CRITICAL | Requires explicit approval | Always escalates |
CLI Tools
# Validate a policy file
ape validate policies/my_policy.yaml
# Test a prompt through the full pipeline
ape test-prompt policies/read_only.yaml "Read the config file"
# Analyze a prompt without policy check
ape analyze "Read config.json and delete temp files"
# Simulate policy evaluation for an action
ape simulate policies/read_only.yaml read_file
# Compare two policies
ape diff policies/read_only.yaml policies/development.yaml
# List available actions
ape actions --by-category
# Scan MCP configuration and generate policy
ape mcp-scan ~/.config/claude/claude_desktop_config.json -o policies/mcp_generated.yaml
Error Handling
APE provides typed, deterministic errors:
from ape import (
PolicyDenyError,
EscalationRequiredError,
IntentAmbiguityError,
PlanValidationError,
RateLimitExceededError,
SessionExpiredError,
PolicyConditionError,
)
try:
result = orch.execute("Delete all files")
except PolicyDenyError as e:
print(f"Policy denied: {e.action_id}")
except EscalationRequiredError as e:
print(f"Needs approval: {e.action_id}")
except RateLimitExceededError:
print("Rate limit exceeded, try again later")
Security Considerations
Threat Model
APE mitigates:
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Prompt Injection | Prompts compiled, never executed directly |
| Confused Deputy | Actions bound to explicit intent |
| Privilege Escalation | Policy narrowing, risk-based filtering |
| Token Replay | Single-use, time-limited tokens |
| Plan Tampering | Cryptographic plan hashing |
| Agent DDoS | Rate limiting with per-action and per-target quotas |
| Parameter Abuse | Parameterized conditions on action parameters |
Best Practices
- Start with minimal policies — Add permissions as needed
- Use parameterized conditions — Constrain file paths, domains, and resource limits
- Use sessions for multi-turn agents — Track cumulative risk across a conversation
- Configure rate limits — Prevent runaway API calls and resource exhaustion
- Use escalation for high-risk actions — Human approval for destructive operations
- Enable audit logging — Complete trail for compliance
- Validate all policies — Use
ape validatebefore deployment - Test with dry-run — Use
orch.analyze_prompt()before execution
Development
# Install with dev dependencies
pip install -e ".[dev]"
# Run tests
pytest
# Type checking
mypy ape
# Linting
ruff check ape
License
Apache License 2.0 — See LICENSE for details.
Contributing
Contributions welcome! Please read our contributing guidelines and submit pull requests.
Changelog
See CHANGELOG.md for version history.
Project details
Release history Release notifications | RSS feed
Download files
Download the file for your platform. If you're not sure which to choose, learn more about installing packages.
Source Distribution
Built Distribution
Filter files by name, interpreter, ABI, and platform.
If you're not sure about the file name format, learn more about wheel file names.
Copy a direct link to the current filters
File details
Details for the file agent_policy_engine-1.0.2.tar.gz.
File metadata
- Download URL: agent_policy_engine-1.0.2.tar.gz
- Upload date:
- Size: 102.4 kB
- Tags: Source
- Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? No
- Uploaded via: twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.10.11
File hashes
| Algorithm | Hash digest | |
|---|---|---|
| SHA256 |
687d558729f3051a3fc64bc44bd498704f5a3c43a1851909a21284102058fa4c
|
|
| MD5 |
b4ccc6a3805ef6cb76289eb2f301651b
|
|
| BLAKE2b-256 |
5614927e38f7e743dc712ee679a2a450a7d4141d1179c21da0d36c497dcefd4a
|
File details
Details for the file agent_policy_engine-1.0.2-py3-none-any.whl.
File metadata
- Download URL: agent_policy_engine-1.0.2-py3-none-any.whl
- Upload date:
- Size: 118.2 kB
- Tags: Python 3
- Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? No
- Uploaded via: twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.10.11
File hashes
| Algorithm | Hash digest | |
|---|---|---|
| SHA256 |
82cc766d3c214cafbe833a60ae2deef97c3e741cff5bb85f6c8f53757efc5d84
|
|
| MD5 |
2135eb85819ff33896c3da7a31b1fd0c
|
|
| BLAKE2b-256 |
71d2c823328065918d5e9c4cea325c82a817d38e044f1d457016c8e71ee03fdc
|