agentcam 0.3.3

Local-first CLI wrapper that records what your AI coding agent changed in your repo.

agentcam

Local-first CLI wrapper that records what your AI coding agent changed in your repo and generates a Markdown run report after each run.

agentcam does not replace Claude Code, Codex, OpenHands, Aider, or any other coding agent. It wraps them.

agentcam run -- claude "fix the failing tests"
agentcam run -- codex "add input validation to login form"
agentcam run -- bash -lc "npm run build && npm test"

After each run, you get an AGENT_RUN_REPORT.md answering four questions:

1. What did the agent change? — exact file list, diff stat, staged vs. unstaged vs. untracked, before/after HEAD.
2. Where should I look first? — heuristic risk flags for auth paths, secrets, deletions, dangerous shell strings (rm -rf /, git reset --hard, conflict markers), dependency manifests.
3. How do I roll back if something's wrong? — situation-aware rollback notes (no blanket git reset --hard suggestions).
4. What did agentcam actually observe (and not observe)? — an explicit Capture Visibility table per run, so "no output-pattern flag" cannot be misread as "no risk happened". Hook-mode reports declare stdout = not_available; wrap-mode reports declare stdout = captured. Same table also reports the ruleset id + a deterministic hash of the effective rule set, so reports stay diffable across releases.

See examples/risky-auth-change/expected-report.md for what a report looks like when the agent touches a sensitive area.

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What this is NOT

This is a flight recorder, not a governance platform.

• Not a sandbox.
• Not a pre-execution gate. agentcam does not block dangerous commands; it records that they happened and flags them for review after.
• Not a security scanner. The risk flags are heuristics ("look here"), not verdicts ("this is bad").
• Not an audit / compliance tool. The Markdown report is for the developer reviewing the diff, not for a SOC2 evidence pipeline.
• Not a SaaS. There is no account, no upload, no telemetry. Everything stays under .git/agentcam/runs/ on your machine.

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Install

agentcam needs Python ≥ 3.11 and git.

pipx install agentcam

Or via pip into a venv:

pip install agentcam

Available on PyPI: https://pypi.org/project/agentcam/.

Verify:

agentcam version
# agentcam 0.3.2

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Quick start

Inside any git repository:

agentcam run -- bash -lc "echo hello > demo.txt"

agentcam will:

1. snapshot git state (HEAD, branch, staged / unstaged / untracked)
2. run your command, tee-ing stdout and stderr to logs (raw + redacted)
3. snapshot git state again
4. scan for risk flags (path patterns, output patterns, deletions)
5. write AGENT_RUN_REPORT.md and manifest.json under .git/agentcam/runs/<run_id>/
6. exit with 0 if your command succeeded, 1 otherwise

stdout and stderr stream live to your terminal — agentcam does not buffer them.

If the wrapped command produced no git-visible changes and exited successfully, the run directory is auto-deleted and stderr gets a no git-visible changes; report skipped notice. Pass --keep-empty before -- to opt out and always keep the report:

agentcam run --keep-empty -- claude -p "..."

This is the "no-diff cleanup" default. The same logic applies to Hook mode (see below). Full rationale: docs/design.md § 23.

Wrapping Claude Code

agentcam run --name claude-fix-tests -- claude "fix the failing tests"

Wrapping Codex

agentcam run --name codex-add-validation -- codex "add input validation to login form"

Wrapping anything (with shell features)

agentcam runs the command with shell=False. If you need pipes, redirects, variable expansion, wrap your own shell explicitly:

agentcam run -- bash -lc "npm run build 2>&1 | tee build.log"
agentcam run -- pwsh -Command "Get-Process | Out-File procs.txt"
agentcam run -- cmd /c "dir > files.txt"

This is a deliberate constraint — see docs/design.md § 4.

Backends (PTY vs PIPE)

agentcam run defaults to a PTY backend so bare interactive TUI agents (claude, codex) render normally and accept keyboard input. Override with --backend:

agentcam run --backend pty -- claude     # default; pty_posix on POSIX, pty_windows on Windows
agentcam run --backend pipe -- claude    # original v0.1 PIPE behavior (TUI agents won't render)
agentcam run --backend pty_posix -- ...  # force POSIX pty.openpty()
agentcam run --backend pty_windows -- ...  # force Windows ConPTY (via pywinpty)

Under PTY, stdout and stderr deliver through one combined stream; stderr.log is created empty as a file-exists invariant and the report's Capture Visibility table shows stderr = merged_into_stdout. Output-pattern risk scanning runs over the merged stream in stdout.log exactly as it did for PIPE mode. SIGWINCH / terminal resize during a run is NOT forwarded (subprocess TUI won't reflow until restarted).

Windows requires the pywinpty dependency (installed automatically on Windows by pip install agentcam; not installed on Linux/macOS). See docs/design.md § 32 for the design rationale.

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Hook mode (Claude Code: no wrapper needed)

If your agent is Claude Code, you can register agentcam as a hook so that every claude session is recorded automatically — no need to remember a wrapper command. Add this to ~/.claude/settings.json (or a per-project .claude/settings.json):

{
  "hooks": {
    "SessionStart": [{"matcher": "", "hooks": [
      {"type": "command", "command": "agentcam hook-session-start"}
    ]}],
    "SessionEnd": [{"matcher": "", "hooks": [
      {"type": "command", "command": "agentcam hook-session-end"}
    ]}]
  }
}

That's the whole setup. Start a claude session in any git repo, make some changes, exit. agentcam writes the report under .git/agentcam/runs/<run_id>/ automatically. Sessions that don't touch the working tree leave no trace — the no-diff cleanup applies the same way as in the wrapping path.

Hook mode is Claude Code-specific (it uses Claude Code's settings.json hook mechanism). For other agents (Codex, Aider, OpenHands), use the generic wrapping path above (agentcam run -- ...).

Both hook commands always exit 0; Claude Code is never blocked even if agentcam has an internal error.

agentcam verify works mid-session: while a session is in progress it records the check against that session — not against a previous run — and the check is merged into the session's run when the session ends. A session that ends without a git-visible diff renders no run and drops its recorded checks with the rest of the session state.

Hook-mode reports do not include stdout/stderr. Claude Code does not pipe its terminal output through hook subprocesses, so agentcam cannot capture it. The Logs section in a hook-mode report points to empty placeholder files; output-pattern risk flags (rm -rf, git push --force, etc.) are unavailable. Path-based risk flags and the Dependency Changes section are unaffected — both read git state and working-tree files, not the transcript. If you need stdout/stderr captured, use the wrapping path (agentcam run -- claude "...") for that specific session.

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Where the artifacts live

.git/
└── agentcam/
    └── runs/
        └── 20260516-143000-451-claude-rate-limit-login/
            ├── AGENT_RUN_REPORT.md       # human-readable, share-friendly
            ├── manifest.json             # machine-readable
            ├── stdout.log                # raw stdout (KEEP PRIVATE)
            ├── stderr.log                # raw stderr (KEEP PRIVATE)
            ├── stdout.redacted.log       # secrets stripped (best-effort)
            └── stderr.redacted.log

Output lives under .git/ on purpose — git doesn't track its own internals, so agent invocations of git add . cannot stage agentcam's output by accident.

Warning about raw logs. Raw logs preserve the original stdout / stderr for forensic review. They will not be picked up by git push, but they will travel with .git/ if you:

• sync your repo via OneDrive / Dropbox / iCloud Drive
• back up your machine (Time Machine, Windows File History)
• zip the entire repo to share with someone

The AGENT_RUN_REPORT.md only links to the redacted logs.

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Sharing a run

To share one run with a colleague or attach it to a bug report, use agentcam export:

agentcam export <run_id>
# → ./agentcam-export-<run_id>.zip

agentcam export latest                 # shortcut for the most recent run
agentcam export latest --output ./bug-1234.zip

The default bundle contains the Markdown report, a redacted manifest, the redacted logs, sha256 checksums, and an EXPORT_NOTES.md explaining what's inside. Raw logs are excluded by default. Pass --include-raw if you understand the risk (raw logs may carry secrets the redactor missed) and need them anyway. agentcam export does not upload anything — the zip is written locally; you decide where it goes.

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Handing off a PR

Three commands connect a recorded run to a pull request (they pair with corridor-ci, but the output is plain text any reviewer can use):

agentcam verify -- pytest -q
# agentcam: recorded check (exit 0) in run 20260705-...

verify runs the check itself, as agentcam's child process, so the recorded command, exit code, and duration are observed facts rather than the agent's claim. The check's exit code is passed through, and the result lands in the run's evidence.

agentcam handoff
# Decision: <fill in: issue or decision link>
# Scope: src/auth/login.py
# Review first: src/auth/login.py
# Verified: pytest -q (exit 0) [recorded by agentcam]
# Risk: high

handoff drafts the five-line review handoff from the recorded run: Scope from the files that actually changed, Review first from the highest-severity risk flag, Risk from the overall verdict, Verified from recorded passing checks. Decision always stays with you — agentcam records what changed, not why. Without a recorded check (or with only failing ones) Verified stays a fill-in too: red must not read as verified.

agentcam export latest --files .agentcam/
# → .agentcam/AGENT_RUN_REPORT.md
# → .agentcam/manifest.redacted.json

export --files writes the redacted run record in committable form. Commit it with the PR and corridor-ci appends it to its report as recorded evidence (display-only; it never affects the check).

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Risk flags (heuristics)

Two levels: HIGH and MEDIUM. There is no LOW — filename-only heuristics for "trivial" changes are unreliable, and we don't pretend.

HIGH — flagged for any of:

• A tracked file was deleted.
• File path contains a sensitive segment: auth, login, oauth, session, jwt, permission, middleware, migration, secret, credential, terraform, kubernetes, helm, etc.
• Sensitive basename / extension: .env, .env.*, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa*, schema.prisma, fly.toml, vercel.json, .tf, .tfvars, GitHub Actions workflows.
• stdout / stderr contains a high-risk command pattern: git reset --hard, rm -rf /..., chmod 777, curl ... | sh, PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse -Force ..., Invoke-Expression, conflict markers, git push --force.

MEDIUM — flagged for any of:

• Dependency manifest changed: package.json, pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, Dockerfile, docker-compose.*, etc.
• stdout / stderr mentions tests failed, lint error, build failed, panic, segmentation fault.

Path matching is segment-based. Segment auth matches src/auth/login.py and auth.ts, but does NOT match author.md or authorization-docs/x.md. See docs/design.md § 7.

Evidence never includes raw matched text. Risk Flags cite the pattern name and a line number (stdout.log line 42), never the matched substring. Secrets that happen to land near a risk pattern in output do not leak through the report.

For the full rule list and rationale, see docs/design.md § 7, § 12, § 15.

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Dependency Changes section

When a run touches requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, or package.json, the report adds a ## Dependency Changes section grouped by (ecosystem, manifest_path). Each row lists:

• Kind: added, removed, or version_changed
• Name: the package (non-main scopes are tagged in the name — e.g. pytest [optional.test], jest [devDependencies] — so a package in both main and a dev/extra group doesn't collide)
• Before / After: the verbatim version specs

Comparison baseline is git show HEAD:<manifest> against the working-tree file; if the working tree was already dirty before the run (pre_run_dirty: yes in the header), a one-line caveat in the section notes that pre-run user edits are attributed to the run.

Credential safety. URL specs like git+https://USER:TOKEN@host/r.git are scrubbed to git+https://<redacted-credential>@host/r.git at the parser boundary, so credentials in a manifest never reach the report, manifest.json, or the DependencyChange dataclass downstream renderers consume.

v1 covers Python (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml for PEP 621 and Poetry) and npm (package.json for dependencies + devDependencies). Cargo, go.mod, and lockfiles are deliberately deferred. See docs/design.md § 25.

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Secret redaction (best-effort)

Patterns redacted in the redacted log:

• AWS access / secret keys (AKIA…, aws_secret_access_key=…)
• GitHub PAT (ghp_…, gho_…, etc.)
• OpenAI / Anthropic-shaped API keys (sk-…)
• Slack tokens (xoxa-…, xoxb-…, etc.)
• npm / GitLab tokens (npm_…, glpat-…)
• JWT (eyJ…)
• Bearer … headers
• env-style assignments where the key name looks like a secret (OPENAI_API_KEY=…, *_TOKEN=…, *_PASSWORD=…, *_CREDENTIAL=…)
• PEM private key blocks — multi-line, including PKCS#8 / RSA / EC / ED25519 / OPENSSH

We do not promise to catch every secret. New token formats appear all the time. The raw log on disk is the forensic backstop: if redaction missed something, you can find it there.

Command: field, Changed Files, Diff Stat, and Risk Flags evidence in the markdown report also pass through redaction — a literal .env.production in argv or in a diff stat shows up as <redacted-secret-filename>.

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Local-only, no telemetry

agentcam reads your local git state (git status, git diff against the .git/ directory on your machine). git is a local tool; GitHub is a separate hosting service that you push to. agentcam never talks to GitHub or any other remote service — pushing to a remote is an independent action that agentcam does not see, and reports are generated regardless of whether the repo has ever been pushed.

agentcam itself makes no network calls and does not phone home. There is no account, no upload, no opt-in or opt-out toggle for telemetry — because there is no telemetry to toggle.

This does not mean agentcam monitors the network activity of the wrapped agent or subprocess. If the wrapped command, an agent SDK, a browser subprocess, a shell script, or an MCP client makes an outbound network request, agentcam does not currently observe, block, or record that request. agentcam can only attest that its own process is silent on the network; it cannot attest that a given agent run produced no external traffic.

If you ever observe an outbound connection from agentcam itself, that's a bug; please file an issue.

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Known limitations

• Not a sandbox. agentcam does not isolate the wrapped command from your filesystem, network, or credentials.
• Does not block. High-risk patterns are recorded after they happen; agentcam does not approve or deny commands.
• Does not see inside the agent. agentcam observes only what reaches stdout / stderr and what changes in the git working tree. The agent's internal tool calls (file reads, web requests, model calls) are invisible.
• Does not monitor wrapped-agent network activity. agentcam itself makes no network calls, but it also does not observe, block, or record outbound requests made by the wrapped command, subprocesses, model SDKs, browser tools, shell scripts, or MCP clients. "agentcam is silent on the network" is not the same as "this agent run produced no external traffic."
• Best-effort redaction. New secret formats may slip through. Do not rely on agentcam alone for credential hygiene.
• Hook mode captures no stdout/stderr. Claude Code does not pipe its terminal output through hook subprocesses, so a hook-mode report shows path-based risk flags only; output-pattern scanning (rm -rf, git push --force, etc.) is unavailable. Empty placeholder log files exist so the report template renders. Use the wrapping path if you need full output capture for a specific session.
• Interactive TUI agents must be invoked with a prompt arg, not bare. agentcam wraps subprocess stdout/stderr with PIPE (not a real TTY). Agents like Claude Code that refuse to open a TUI under non-TTY will error if invoked bare:

  agentcam run -- claude
  # -> Error: Input must be provided either through stdin or as a prompt
  #    argument when using --print
  

  Workarounds that DO work (claude switches to print mode when given a prompt + no TTY):

  agentcam run -- claude "fix the failing tests"   # positional prompt
  agentcam run -- claude -p "create hello.py"      # explicit -p
  

  For free-form interactive chat, invoke the agent directly (unwrapped). True PTY-backed wrapping (Windows ConPTY / POSIX pty) so TUIs render correctly under agentcam is on the roadmap.
• No submodule traversal. Running inside a submodule treats it as an independent repo. Superproject context is not analyzed.
• No sparse-checkout special handling. Reports reflect what git status --porcelain=v1 -z shows.
• Windows console encoding can degrade live terminal display. Raw bytes are always preserved on disk; only the live forwarding to the terminal may fall back to UTF-8 lossy decode (recorded as terminal_forward_degraded in the manifest).

For the full list of "things we deliberately did NOT do," see the "Out-of-scope reminders" at the bottom of docs/design.md.

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Hacking

git clone https://github.com/shihchengwei-lab/coding-agent-guardrails.git
cd coding-agent-guardrails/agentcam
python -m venv .venv

# Windows (Git Bash / PowerShell)
.venv/Scripts/python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"
.venv/Scripts/python -m pytest

# macOS / Linux
.venv/bin/python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"
.venv/bin/python -m pytest

The codebase is intentionally small (one source module per concern):

src/agentcam/
├── cli.py               # argparse + wrap-mode orchestrator + export
├── hooks.py             # Claude Code SessionStart / SessionEnd hooks
├── runner.py            # threads-based tee + exit code interpretation
├── git_state.py         # porcelain parser + git_dir resolver
├── paths.py             # run_id + collision-safe directory creation
├── redaction.py         # streaming secret redactor
├── scanner.py           # path + output risk patterns (+ RuleSet
│                        # + ruleset provenance hashing)
├── dependency_probe.py  # pip / pyproject / npm manifest diff
├── report.py            # AGENT_RUN_REPORT.md generator + shared
│                        # write_run_artifacts helper
├── export.py            # `agentcam export` redacted bundle builder
└── models.py            # dataclass definitions (ReportBundle,
                         # CaptureCapability, RulesetProvenance)

Read docs/design.md before changing anything — it records why each module is shaped the way it is, including the "we considered X and rejected it because Y" cases.

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License

MIT. See LICENSE.