AgentDetox

Protection for what AI coding agents remember and obey. AgentDetox watches an agent's memory, instruction and rules files, skills and config: it checks what the agent writes there, notices what changes behind its back, and puts things back.

Status: preview. Claude Code is supported. Codex and Cursor hooks are experimental, and OpenClaw gets tamper detection only. Developed on macOS; on Windows the tests run in CI, but it has not yet been used on a real machine. Where it is going: ROADMAP.md.

Agents learn from web pages, files, emails and tool output, and some of it is written into memory or rules that every later session trusts. One poisoned write can steer an agent for weeks, as Cisco's persistent-memory compromise of Claude Code (April 2026) and MemGhost (arXiv 2607.05189, July 2026) showed. Today's models refuse much of the obvious injected text they read. What they cannot see is a file changed behind their back, by a dependency's install script or another program, which they then load as your instructions; and smaller models still save planted text when asked to remember "the setup steps".

See it

agentdetox demo

In a throwaway folder, with nothing else read or changed, the demo shows an agent trying to save a planted instruction to its memory (blocked), a dependency's install script slipping the same instruction into CLAUDE.md (reported to the agent at the next session, with the command that undoes it), and the file being restored. It runs the real hooks, so it doubles as a self-test.

Install

uv tool install agentdetox                # or: pipx install agentdetox

To run the latest code from main instead: uv tool install git+https://github.com/chriswu727/agentdetox.

Then install the Claude Code plugin, from inside Claude Code:

/plugin install agentdetox --marketplace chriswu727/agentdetox

or add the same hooks to your settings directly:

agentdetox install claude-code --apply    # adds three hooks to ~/.claude/settings.json, backed up first

Restart Claude Code to load the hooks. Use one route, not both: install declines when the plugin is enabled, and agentdetox doctor warns if the hooks are registered twice. The plugin runs the agentdetox you installed; without one it runs its own release through uvx, and with neither it says so at session start instead of failing on every tool call.

A tool install keeps AgentDetox in an environment of its own; pip install agentdetox works too. If you move Claude Code's folder with CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, AgentDetox follows it. The first session scans what is already there before trusting it; agentdetox agent scan does the same at any time.

What it does in Claude Code

• Before a write to memory, CLAUDE.md, rules, skills or config (through Write, Edit or a shell command such as a redirect, tee, sed -i, cp, mv or rm), the new content is checked. Planted instructions are denied, with the reason sent to the agent. If the flagged text is something you typed or pasted yourself, you are asked instead (hidden text is still denied, since you could not see what you pasted). An agent changing its own hooks, MCP servers or permissions needs your approval, and the prompt says exactly what is added or removed.
• After the write, the file is trusted as it now is, and the change is recorded with where it came from.
• At session start, files changed outside the agent since the last session are compared with the snapshot. Suspicious changes are reported to the agent, which is told not to follow them and to tell you, with the command that restores each file. Edits you made yourself that look benign are accepted silently, and recorded as made outside the agent.

Where memory came from. A memory write that is mostly copied from web pages, MCP data, command output or files the agent just read asks for approval, unless you asked the agent to remember it. This is how text planted in an email or page usually reaches memory. Text the model rewrites in its own words is not caught this way.

What the rules look for is what a benign memory almost never asks for: running code fetched from the network, reverse shells, loosening the agent's own approvals or sandbox, reading credentials, acting silently, standing orders to fetch a URL every session, hidden text, and injection phrasing. Memory that points package installs at a registry other than the default ones and the big public mirrors asks rather than blocks, since teams do run private registries. English and Chinese.

Cleaning up. agentdetox agent verify shows what changed and why it is suspicious; agentdetox agent restore <file> puts back the last trusted version and moves the current one to ~/.agentdetox/quarantine, never deleting it. Snapshot copies that no longer back any file are deleted once a day (agentdetox agent gc does it now); quarantined files are kept. If the snapshot list itself is damaged, or deleted while its copies remain, AgentDetox says so at every session instead of quietly trusting whatever is on disk, until you check and run agentdetox agent snapshot --reset.

Day to day

agentdetox status                         # health, what is watched, how checks are set, recent activity
agentdetox events                         # everything blocked, asked, recorded or noticed
agentdetox log                            # every change to memory, rules and config, and where it came from
agentdetox blame ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md      # where each line of a file came from
agentdetox allow 3f9c2a1b7e               # stop flagging something you reviewed
agentdetox config copied record           # change a check
agentdetox doctor                         # check the hooks are installed, current and runnable

Each change AgentDetox sees is recorded with its origin: your own words, the agent, a web page or tool output the agent copied (named), or a change made outside the agent's edit tools. agentdetox blame <file> shows that per line; lines from before AgentDetox was installed show as "earlier", and lines changed since the last recorded change as "unrecorded".

Every message from AgentDetox carries an id. If what it flagged is fine, agentdetox allow <id> stops it being flagged again in write checks, session notices and scans alike. An id stands for the flagged line, the pair of contradicting entries, or the source text was copied from (that file, page or command), not for one occurrence; agentdetox allow --list and --remove review and undo.

Settings live in ~/.agentdetox/config.toml (agentdetox config shows them). Each check is ask, record (the write goes through and is logged) or off; agents without an ask prompt record instead of asking. An AGENTDETOX_<KEY> environment variable overrides the file.

The settings, the allowlist and the snapshots are guarded like the agent's own config: an agent writing under ~/.agentdetox, deleting it, or running agentdetox allow, config <key> <value>, install, uninstall, agent snapshot or agent restore needs your approval, or an injected instruction could switch a check off or allow itself.

Hooks fail open: if AgentDetox itself errors, the agent's action proceeds. If an attacker deletes the hooks, the session-start check cannot run; agentdetox agent verify (by hand or in CI) still reports the removal.

What it does not catch

• Detection is not a security boundary. An adaptive attacker who knows these rules can evade them, and a plausible-looking false fact with nothing to contradict passes.
• Planted text the model rewrites in its own words before saving it, unless a rule still matches.
• A change made outside the agent is reported at the next session, not the moment it happens.
• The ledger knows what the hooks saw. A change the agent makes with a shell command is recorded as made outside the agent, and text it copied in its own words as the agent's.
• The guard on AgentDetox's own settings recognises plain commands and file writes. An agent that can run arbitrary code can still change them (a script that edits ~/.agentdetox is not inspected), and nothing stops a person or process outside the agent.
• On Windows the shell checks understand Git Bash commands (/c/... paths, agentdetox.exe), not PowerShell or cmd.exe syntax.

Other agents

Codex and Cursor cannot ask mid-task: checks set to ask record instead, and changes to the agent's own hooks, MCP servers or permissions are blocked. The provenance check needs Claude Code's session transcript.

Contradiction detection (experimental)

Optional: uv tool install 'agentdetox[nli]', then agentdetox fetch-models. A memory write that contradicts what the agent already knows is a common sign of a fabricated fact. This uses a multilingual NLI model (mDeBERTa-v3, about 560 MB) and records instead of asking: after a write, the hook hands the check to a background model server and returns (about 0.1 s), and conflicts are logged (agentdetox events). The server loads the model on first use (about 1 GB of memory) and exits after 30 minutes without work; agentdetox daemon status shows it. On real memory the model still misreads fragments of notes as contradicting each other, which is why it does not ask; agentdetox config contradiction ask makes it ask. Windows has no model server yet: each related write starts a background worker that loads the model (about 6 s). The roadmap replaces this model with an LLM judge. Measurements: bench/MEMORY_BENCHMARK.md.

Also: scanning a RAG knowledge base

pip install 'agentdetox[st]'                # drop [st] for a numpy-only install
agentdetox scan ./knowledge_base            # directory of .txt/.md/.html, or a .jsonl export
agentdetox trace kb.jsonl -q "Who founded Acme?" -a "Bob Smith"

Try it on the bundled example: agentdetox scan examples/kb.

scan exits with status 1 when any finding is at least --fail-on severity (default high), so it can gate ingestion in CI. A similarity clique on its own is reported as medium, because legitimately repetitive content (versioned docs, templated pages) also forms cliques; it becomes high only for members that also open with a question or carry injection markers. Use --fail-on medium if you want paraphrase-only poisoning to block ingestion too.

poison-cluster implements CleanBase (Jin et al., arXiv 2605.00460): a k-nearest-neighbour cosine-similarity graph (k=10), edges kept above mu + 2.5 sigma of a 50% edge sample, and every passage in a clique of 3 or more flagged; exact duplicates are collapsed first. trace takes a question and the wrong answer your system gave, ranks the top 4 x top-k passages by the mean z-score of similarity to the question, similarity to the wrong answer and whether the passage contains the answer, and splits them with 1-D 2-means. It is a cheap approximation of RAGOrigin (Zhang et al., IEEE S&P 2026); treat its output as a ranked lead list.

Limits: poison-cluster cannot see an attacker who plants only one or two passages per target question or makes them deliberately dissimilar, and needs a few hundred passages to estimate its threshold; injection-phrase will flag security documentation that quotes attacks; brute-force kNN is fine for tens of thousands of passages, not millions. Measurements against PoisonedRAG and other scanners: bench/KB_BENCHMARK.md.

Development

./scripts/check.sh       # lint, type checks and tests: what every change must pass
./scripts/update.sh      # the checks, then update the installed agentdetox, then `agentdetox doctor`

CONTRIBUTING.md says where each kind of change belongs, docs/architecture.md how the pieces fit, and docs/decisions.md why. SECURITY.md covers reporting and the threat model, PRIVACY.md what is stored and read.

lab/ replays attacks and everyday use against real Claude Code sessions, with and without AgentDetox (lab/README.md); its latest results are in lab/results/latest.md.

How a hook call flows: adapters.py turns an agent's event into a planned write or a shell command, engine.py runs the checks and reports signals, policy.py decides from your settings and the agent's abilities whether to block, ask or record, and the adapter formats the reply. hooks.py wires these together, and session.py runs the session-start check. The engine knows nothing about agents, so a new integration needs only an adapter. The detectors are in hidden.py and persistence.py (rules), provenance.py (copied text) and consistency.py (contradictions). The snapshot store is in integrity.py, the ledger in ledger.py, and the model server in daemon.py.

Installed hooks call a fixed executable, so updating it takes effect on the next hook call with no reinstall; a model server still running the old build is stopped by update.sh, and otherwise replaces itself on its next job. Re-run agentdetox install claude-code --apply only when agentdetox doctor says the registered hooks are from an older version. To remove everything: /plugin uninstall agentdetox or agentdetox uninstall claude-code, agentdetox daemon stop, then uv tool uninstall agentdetox, then delete ~/.agentdetox (this also deletes quarantined files).

The Claude Code plugin lives in plugins/agentdetox and the marketplace entry in .claude-plugin/marketplace.json; claude plugin validate . checks both. Its version, the version its hook script pins, and the package version must match (tests/test_plugin.py).

License

Apache-2.0