agentlighthouse-verify
Standalone verifier for AgentLighthouse evidence.
AgentLighthouse is a
security mediator for AI agents. It writes a signed receipt for every decision
it takes. This package checks those receipts, and it does so without the
mediator: it does not import the runtime, and its only dependency is
cryptography.
That separation is the point. An auditor, a customer or a regulator can verify the evidence with a small tool they can read end to end, and does not have to trust the operator's binary.
- Source: https://github.com/neural-nomad1709/agentlighthouse
- Receipt specification: receipt-v1
- License: MIT
- Python: 3.12 or newer
Contents
- Install
- Verify a ledger
- What can be verified
- What verification checks
- Command line
- The receipt format
- Trust model
- Related packages
- License
Install
pip install agentlighthouse-verify
This installs one command, al-verify.
Verify a ledger
You need two files from the operator: the ledger and the mediator's public key.
al-verify ledger.jsonl --pubkey mediator_ed25519.pub
chain of 11 receipt(s) verified from genesis
OK
The exit code is 0 when everything verifies and non-zero when anything does
not, so the command can gate a pipeline.
What can be verified
| Input | What it is |
|---|---|
A receipt (.json) |
One mediated decision |
A ledger (.jsonl, or a JSON array) |
The full chain of receipts, from the first one |
| A posture attestation | A signed per-organization summary of posture and evidence over a period |
| A rule bundle | A signed set of detection rules; the mediator refuses to load an unsigned or altered one |
What verification checks
Verification is fail-closed. Any one failure fails the whole run.
- The record hash. The receipt is canonicalized with RFC 8785 (JCS) and
hashed with SHA-256. The result must equal the
record_hashthe receipt carries, so a changed field is detected. - The signature.
sigmust be a valid Ed25519 signature over that hash by the mediator key you supplied. - The chain. Each receipt's
prev_hashmust equal the previous receipt'srecord_hash, and sequence numbers must be contiguous from genesis. A removed, reordered or inserted receipt is detected.
The canonicalization and the hash chain are implemented in this package from the specification, with no third-party code, so the trust surface stays small enough to audit.
Command line
al-verify [--pubkey PUBKEY] [--quiet] [--version] receipt
| Argument | Meaning |
|---|---|
receipt |
Path to a receipt .json, a .jsonl ledger, an attestation or a rule bundle |
--pubkey |
The mediator's public key: a file, or the key inline as hex. Default: keys/mediator_ed25519.pub |
--quiet |
Print only the final verdict |
--version |
Print the version |
The receipt format
A receipt records exactly one decision:
{
"v": 1,
"seq": 42,
"ts": "2026-07-10T12:00:00.000Z",
"actor": "spiffe://acme/agent/claude-code",
"action": "mcp_tool_call",
"target": "tool:send_email",
"verdict": "block",
"findings": [
{ "scanner": "tool_policy", "rule_id": "policy.default_deny", "severity": "high", "owasp": "ASI03", "mitre": "T1078" }
],
"block_reason": "TOOL_NOT_ALLOWED",
"policy_hash": "sha256:...",
"redaction": { "aws-access-key": 1 },
"prev_hash": "sha256:...",
"record_hash": "sha256:...",
"sig": "ed25519:..."
}
actoris the identity the decision is bound to.actioncomes from a closed vocabulary. The vocabulary grows additively, so this verifier still checks a receipt that carries a newer action.redactionholds counts per class. A receipt never carries the secret or the personal data that was redacted.
The format is specified, with a JSON Schema, in receipt-v1. The specification is MIT-licensed, so third parties can produce and verify receipts without this code.
Trust model
Verification proves that the receipts were signed by the holder of the key you supplied and that the chain has not been altered since. It follows that:
- The public key must reach you through a channel you trust. A ledger and a key handed over together by the same party prove only that they match.
- A verified chain is complete from genesis to its last receipt. It does not show that the mediator saw every action an agent took. That depends on how the mediator is deployed: see the architecture document.
- A posture attestation names the chain head it was cut from, so it can be tied back to a ledger you have verified.
Related packages
| Package | What it is |
|---|---|
| agentlighthouse-core | The mediator that produces the receipts. It depends on this package. |
| agentlighthouse-governance | Organizations, role-based access, budgets and signed posture attestation. |
License
MIT. See the LICENSE file shipped with this package.
Metadata
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