Agent Sentinel SDK
The runtime authority for AI agents. Every tool call your agent makes is authorized before it runs, budgets are reserved before execution, and what happened is recorded in a ledger you can verify.
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What it does
Observability tells you what happened. Agent Sentinel decides what is allowed to happen, before it does. Two ways to put it in front of your agent:
- In-process, with the SDK. Decorate functions with
@guarded_action. Policy, budgets, approvals, loop protection and PII/moderation guardrails run before the function body does. No approval, no execution. - In front of every MCP tool call.
agentsentinel-mcpandagentsentinel-runtimeconnect Claude Code, Cursor or any MCP client to the hosted gateway, so eachtools/callis authorized first and the model never holds the credential.
What you get:
- Hard budget caps per action, run and session, reserved before execution
- Deny lists, allow lists, rate limits and policy-as-YAML
- Human approval workflows for sensitive actions
- Fail-closed by default for writes (since 0.4.0)
- Secrets redacted from ledger inputs before they are written or uploaded
- A local JSONL ledger, plus remote sync to the hosted platform, where ledger rows are Ed25519-signed and the chain can be verified from the console or API
- Remediation on every block (retry guidance, safe alternatives) so an agent can self-correct
Installation
pip install agentsentinel-sdk # core: decorator, policy, local ledger
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[remote]" # sync to the hosted platform
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[mcp]" # agentsentinel-mcp and agentsentinel-runtime
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[langchain]" # LangChain callbacks
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[crewai]" # CrewAI callbacks
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[llm]" # OpenAI, Anthropic, Grok, Gemini helpers
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[integrations]" # all framework integrations
pip install "agentsentinel-sdk[all]" # everything
The package needs Python 3.11+. For development, work from
packages/agent-sentinel-sdk in the
monorepo with uv sync.
Quick Start
Basic Usage
from agent_sentinel import guarded_action
# Decorate any function to track it. impact="read" declares this as a
# read: since 0.4.0 the default enforcement mode blocks unconfigured
# actions of impact "medium"/"high" (see Enforcement modes below).
@guarded_action(name="search_tool", cost_usd=0.01, tags=["search", "api"], impact="read")
def search_web(query: str) -> dict:
"""Search the web for a query"""
results = call_search_api(query)
return {"results": results, "count": len(results)}
# Use it normally - telemetry happens automatically
response = search_web("Python best practices")
Async Support
@guarded_action(name="generate_text", cost_usd=0.05, tags=["llm"])
async def generate_text(prompt: str) -> str:
"""Generate text using an LLM"""
response = await openai_client.chat.completions.create(
model="gpt-4",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]
)
return response.choices[0].message.content
# Async works automatically
result = await generate_text("Write a haiku about Python")
Complex Objects
The SDK handles complex, non-serializable objects gracefully:
from dataclasses import dataclass
import socket
@dataclass
class Context:
user_id: int
session: str
connection: socket.socket # Not JSON-serializable!
@guarded_action(name="process_data", cost_usd=0.001)
def process_data(ctx: Context, data: dict):
# Complex objects are automatically stringified
return {"processed": True, "user": ctx.user_id}
# No crashes even with non-serializable objects!
ctx = Context(user_id=123, session="abc", connection=socket.socket())
process_data(ctx, {"value": 42})
MCP authority
Every MCP tools/call goes through the gateway's authorize decision before the
tool executes (allow, deny or require approval), and the result is recorded as a
ledger row. Two stdio entry points ship in the [mcp] extra:
agentsentinel-mcp
A stdio MCP server for MCP-native harnesses such as Claude Code and Cursor. It
answers initialize locally and forwards tools/list and tools/call to the
platform's /mcp endpoint with an agent-bound API key, so the harness gets
governed tools and the model never sees a credential. Results pass through
unchanged, including isError and structuredContent.reason_code on refusals.
{
"mcpServers": {
"agentsentinel": {
"command": "agentsentinel-mcp",
"env": {
"AGENT_SENTINEL_API_KEY": "<agent-bound API key>",
"AGENT_SENTINEL_HARNESS": "claude-code"
}
}
}
}
Put this in .mcp.json for Claude Code or .cursor/mcp.json for Cursor. The
file then holds the key, so keep it out of version control, or use
agentsentinel-runtime below to keep the key out of the workspace entirely.
AGENT_SENTINEL_API_KEY(required) must be an agent-bound key.AGENT_SENTINEL_URL(optional) overrides the hosted platform URL for self-hosted or staging; the proxy targets<url>/mcp.httpsis required unless the host islocalhostor127.0.0.1.AGENT_SENTINEL_HARNESS(optional) is sent asX-Sentinel-Harness.
A missing key or a disallowed URL exits non-zero with a one-line message on
stderr. The key is only ever sent in the upstream Authorization header and
never appears in output, logs or MCP messages. Upstream 401/403 or transport
failures surface as an MCP error (tools/list) or an isError tool result
(tools/call). See the
Claude Code and
Cursor guides.
agentsentinel-runtime (0.5+)
Serves the same stdio proxy from one validated runtime.yaml (url,
workspace, api_key_file, harness, approvals), reading the key from a file
outside the model's workspace. It is outbound-only. Subcommands: run,
config and doctor.
- Approvals (0.6+). With
approvals.wait: true, atools/callthat the platform answers withrequire_approvalis held while the runtime polls the approval outbound with the same key, then retried once if approved. Rejected, expired, cancelled and info-requested outcomes return a clear tool error; a wait that times out does not cancel the approval. agentsentinel-runtime doctor(0.6+) checks that the key is out of the model's reach: key and config file location, ownership and permissions, a bounded scan of the workspace for the key's bytes, known harness config files, the environment, and upstream reachability (--offlineskips it). It never passes what it cannot prove, for example when the runtime runs as root or as the user that owns or can write the workspace.
agent_sentinel.mcp remains the client for the legacy REST facade.
Log Format
Logs are written as JSON Lines (.jsonl) to .agent-sentinel/ledger.jsonl:
{
"id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"timestamp": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.123456Z",
"action": "search_tool",
"cost_usd": 0.01,
"duration_ms": 234.5,
"outcome": "success",
"tags": ["search", "api"],
"payload": {
"inputs": {
"args": [],
"kwargs": {"query": "Python best practices"}
},
"outputs": {
"results": ["..."],
"count": 10
}
}
}
Fields Explained
id: Unique UUID for this actiontimestamp: ISO 8601 timestamp (UTC)action: Name of the action (from decorator or function name)cost_usd: Cost in USD for this actionduration_ms: Execution time in millisecondsoutcome:"success"or"error"tags: Custom tags for categorizationpayload.inputs: Function arguments (args and kwargs)payload.outputs: Return value (on success) or error message (on failure)
Advanced Usage
Budget Enforcement
Programmatic Configuration:
from agent_sentinel import PolicyEngine, CostTracker, BudgetExceededError
# Configure budget limits
PolicyEngine.configure(
session_budget=5.0, # Max $5 for entire session
run_budget=1.0, # Max $1 per run
action_budgets={
"expensive_llm": 0.50, # Max $0.50 for this action
}
)
# Your actions now respect these limits
@guarded_action(name="expensive_llm", cost_usd=0.30)
def call_gpt4(prompt: str) -> str:
# This will be blocked if budget exceeded
return generate_text(prompt)
# Check current costs
print(f"Run total: ${CostTracker.get_run_total():.2f}")
# Reset between agent runs
CostTracker.reset_run()
YAML Configuration:
Create callguard.yaml:
budgets:
session: 5.0
run: 1.0
actions:
expensive_llm: 0.50
denied_actions:
- delete_database
- dangerous_operation
strict_mode: true
Load it:
from agent_sentinel import PolicyEngine
PolicyEngine.load_from_yaml("callguard.yaml")
# Now all decorated actions respect these policies
Action Control Lists
Deny Dangerous Actions:
PolicyEngine.configure(
denied_actions=["delete_database", "send_money"]
)
@guarded_action(name="delete_database")
def delete_database():
# This will raise PolicyViolationError immediately
pass
Allowlist Safe Actions:
PolicyEngine.configure(
allowed_actions=["read_file", "search_web"]
)
# Only these actions are permitted
# All others will raise PolicyViolationError
Remote Sync to Platform
Enable Background Sync:
from agent_sentinel import enable_remote_sync, flush_and_stop
# Start background sync to the hosted platform. The URL defaults to the hosted
# platform (0.5+); set AGENT_SENTINEL_PLATFORM_URL to target a self-hosted or
# staging deployment.
sync = enable_remote_sync(
api_token="your-api-key", # or set AGENT_SENTINEL_API_KEY
flush_interval=10.0, # Upload every 10 seconds
)
# Use your agent normally - logs are synced automatically
# At exit, flush remaining logs
flush_and_stop()
Manual Sync Control:
from agent_sentinel import BackgroundSync, SyncConfig
# Create custom sync config
config = SyncConfig(
api_token="your-api-key",
run_id="custom-run-id", # Optional
flush_interval=5.0,
batch_size=50,
max_retries=3,
)
# Start sync
sync = BackgroundSync(config)
sync.start()
# Trigger immediate flush
sync.flush_now()
# Stop with final flush
sync.stop()
Platform URL: every client (configure, enable_remote_sync,
SyncConfig, PolicyEngine.enable_remote_sync, KillSwitchClient,
ApprovalClient, RemoteCostBackend, MCPClient) connects to the hosted
AgentSentinel platform by default, so platform_url is optional. The API key
falls back to AGENT_SENTINEL_API_KEY when not passed.
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
AGENT_SENTINEL_API_KEY |
Platform API key, used when api_token/api_key is not passed |
AGENT_SENTINEL_PLATFORM_URL |
Overrides the hosted platform URL (for self-hosted or staging) |
AGENT_SENTINEL_URL |
Same override, lower precedence than AGENT_SENTINEL_PLATFORM_URL |
Precedence: explicit platform_url argument > AGENT_SENTINEL_PLATFORM_URL >
AGENT_SENTINEL_URL > hosted platform.
Fail-Open Design:
The sync is designed to never crash your agent:
- If platform is unreachable, logs stay local
- Retries with exponential backoff
- Continues logging locally even if all uploads fail
- Agent performance unaffected by network issues
Custom Action Names
# Use function name (default)
@guarded_action(cost_usd=0.01)
def my_function():
pass # Action name: "my_function"
# Or specify explicitly
@guarded_action(name="custom_name", cost_usd=0.01)
def my_function():
pass # Action name: "custom_name"
Tagging and Organization
@guarded_action(
name="expensive_operation",
cost_usd=1.50,
tags=["llm", "gpt4", "production"]
)
def expensive_operation():
pass
Error Handling
The decorator never catches your exceptions - they propagate normally:
@guarded_action(name="might_fail", cost_usd=0.01)
def risky_operation():
if something_bad:
raise ValueError("Oops!") # This exception is raised normally
return "success"
try:
risky_operation()
except ValueError as e:
print(f"Caught: {e}")
# Exception is logged with outcome="error" and error message in outputs
Configuration
import os
# Change log directory via environment variable
os.environ["AGENT_SENTINEL_HOME"] = "/var/log/my-agent"
# Now logs go to /var/log/my-agent/ledger.jsonl
Reading Logs Programmatically
import json
from pathlib import Path
ledger_path = Path(".agent-sentinel/ledger.jsonl")
# Read all entries
with open(ledger_path) as f:
entries = [json.loads(line) for line in f]
# Calculate total cost
total_cost = sum(e["cost_usd"] for e in entries)
print(f"Total cost: ${total_cost:.2f}")
# Filter by outcome
errors = [e for e in entries if e["outcome"] == "error"]
print(f"Found {len(errors)} errors")
API Reference
@guarded_action(name=None, cost_usd=0.0, tags=None, ...)
Decorator to wrap a function with telemetry and cost tracking.
Parameters:
name(str, optional): Name for the action. Defaults to function name.cost_usd(float, optional): Cost in USD for this action. Default: 0.0tags(list[str], optional): Tags for categorization. Default: []requires_human_approval(bool, optional): Hold the call until a human approves it.approval_descriptioncustomizes what the approver sees.idempotency_key/idempotency_ttl_seconds(optional): Replay a prior result instead of running a duplicate side effect.agent_id,task_id,mission_id(str, optional): Attribution for the ledger and platform.impact("read"|"low"|"medium"|"high", optional): Declared consequentiality of the action. Default:"medium". Sent to the platform in the ledger entry and used by thefail_closed_writesenforcement mode — see Enforcement modes.
Returns:
- Decorated function that logs telemetry and re-raises exceptions
Example:
@guarded_action(name="my_action", cost_usd=0.05, tags=["api", "external"])
def my_function(arg1, arg2):
return arg1 + arg2
Exceptions
All exceptions inherit from AgentSentinelError:
from agent_sentinel import (
AgentSentinelError, # Base exception
BudgetExceededError, # Cost limit exceeded (Phase 2)
PolicyViolationError, # Policy rule violated (Phase 2)
ReplayDivergenceError, # Replay mismatch (coming soon)
)
# Handle budget violations
try:
expensive_operation()
except BudgetExceededError as e:
print(f"Budget exceeded: {e}")
# Take corrective action
# Handle policy violations
try:
denied_operation()
except PolicyViolationError as e:
print(f"Policy violation: {e}")
# Log security incident
Enforcement modes
As of 0.4.0, the default is fail_closed_writes: an unconfigured or
unreachable PolicyEngine blocks write-impact actions and permits
read-impact ones. This is a breaking change from 0.3.x, where an
unconfigured engine permitted everything unconditionally — see the escape
hatch below if you need the old behaviour for now.
Every @guarded_action declares an impact:
from agent_sentinel import guarded_action
@guarded_action(name="read_balance", impact="read") # or "low" — always proceeds
def read_balance(account_id):
...
@guarded_action(name="transfer_funds") # impact defaults to "medium" — a write
def transfer_funds(from_account, to_account, amount):
...
impact is one of "read", "low", "medium", or "high" (default
"medium"). It is sent to the platform in the ledger/ingest entry
(entry["impact"]) and consulted locally whenever the policy layer cannot
vouch for the action — unconfigured, a remote sync that has never produced a
usable local cache, or policy evaluation itself raising an unexpected error:
impact="medium"/"high"(a write): blocked withNoPolicyForWriteError(reason_code="NO_POLICY_FOR_WRITE").impact="read"/"low": permitted, with a one-time warning logged.
from agent_sentinel import PolicyEngine
PolicyEngine.set_enforcement_mode("fail_open") # or AGENT_SENTINEL_ENFORCEMENT=fail_open
Escape hatch: set fail_open explicitly (env var or
set_enforcement_mode) to restore the exact pre-0.4 behaviour: an
unconfigured engine permits every action regardless of declared impact. It
exists for migrations, not as a recommended mode.
PolicyEngine.set_enforcement_mode("fail_closed") # or AGENT_SENTINEL_ENFORCEMENT=fail_closed
fail_closed remains available too: checking any action with no policy
loaded raises PolicyNotConfiguredError, regardless of declared impact —
use it in any deployment whose job is enforcing everything, not just writes.
An unrecognised value in AGENT_SENTINEL_ENFORCEMENT raises rather than
falling back — an operator who typed it was turning enforcement on.
PolicyEngine.reset() is a test/ops utility with its own, independent
contract: it reverts an unpinned mode to fail_open, not to the SDK's
fail_closed_writes default. A real process that never calls reset() or
set_enforcement_mode() sees fail_closed_writes from the start.
Sharing budgets across processes
CostTracker keeps counters in process memory by default. That is exact for a
single agent using @guarded_action, and wrong for anything multi-process — a
proxy, a worker pool, a CLI invoked per tool call — where every process starts
from a zero balance and budget enforcement silently stops working.
from agent_sentinel import CostTracker, FileCostBackend
CostTracker.set_backend(FileCostBackend("/var/lib/sentinel/costs.json"))
or, the usual path for a container:
AGENT_SENTINEL_COST_BACKEND=file
AGENT_SENTINEL_COST_PATH=/var/lib/sentinel/costs.json
@guarded_action reserves atomically. Checking the budget and recording
the spend as two separate calls is check-then-act: concurrent workers can all
pass the check before any of them records, and the cap gets overshot. Measured
with 6 threads against a $1.00 run budget at $0.50 each, the two-step path
spends $3.00; reserving holds it at exactly $1.00 with 2 permitted and 4
blocked.
You get this by default — the decorator calls PolicyEngine.check_and_reserve()
for you. Do not call it yourself on an action that is already decorated, or
the spend is counted twice.
# Only for code that is NOT using @guarded_action:
PolicyEngine.check_and_reserve("transfer_funds", cost=0.50)
# ...run the action. The reservation is the record; do not add the cost again.
check_action() remains available for callers that want to ask without
reserving. For enforcement across multiple hosts, implement CostBackend
against Redis or Postgres — the contract is five methods.
CostTracker
Track costs across your application:
from agent_sentinel import CostTracker
# Get current totals
session_total = CostTracker.get_session_total()
run_total = CostTracker.get_run_total()
# Get per-action statistics
stats = CostTracker.get_action_stats("expensive_llm")
print(f"Calls: {stats['count']}, Cost: ${stats['total_cost']:.2f}")
# Get all action stats
all_stats = CostTracker.get_action_stats()
for action, cost in all_stats['costs'].items():
count = all_stats['counts'][action]
print(f"{action}: {count} calls, ${cost:.2f}")
# Reset for new run
CostTracker.reset_run()
# Get complete snapshot
snapshot = CostTracker.get_snapshot()
PolicyEngine
Configure and enforce policies:
from agent_sentinel import PolicyEngine
# Programmatic configuration
PolicyEngine.configure(
session_budget=10.0,
run_budget=1.0,
action_budgets={"expensive_action": 0.50},
denied_actions=["dangerous_op"],
allowed_actions=None, # None = all allowed (except denied)
strict_mode=True
)
# Load from YAML
PolicyEngine.load_from_yaml("callguard.yaml")
# Check if configured
if PolicyEngine.is_configured():
config = PolicyEngine.get_config()
print(f"Run budget: ${config.run_budget}")
# Reset (for testing)
PolicyEngine.reset()
Ledger
Direct access to the ledger (advanced usage):
from agent_sentinel import Ledger
# Manually record an entry
Ledger.record(
action="manual_entry",
inputs={"key": "value"},
outputs={"result": 42},
cost_usd=0.01,
duration_ms=100.0,
outcome="success",
tags=["manual"]
)
Use Cases
1. LLM Agent Monitoring
@guarded_action(name="llm_call", cost_usd=0.03, tags=["openai", "gpt4"])
async def call_llm(messages: list[dict]) -> str:
response = await openai_client.chat.completions.create(
model="gpt-4",
messages=messages
)
return response.choices[0].message.content
2. Tool Call Tracking
@guarded_action(name="database_query", cost_usd=0.001, tags=["db"])
def query_database(sql: str) -> list:
return database.execute(sql).fetchall()
@guarded_action(name="api_request", cost_usd=0.01, tags=["external"])
def call_external_api(endpoint: str) -> dict:
return requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/{endpoint}").json()
3. Multi-Agent Systems
# Agent 1
@guarded_action(name="planner_think", cost_usd=0.02, tags=["agent1", "planning"])
def plan_tasks(goal: str) -> list[str]:
return ["task1", "task2", "task3"]
# Agent 2
@guarded_action(name="executor_run", cost_usd=0.05, tags=["agent2", "execution"])
def execute_task(task: str) -> dict:
return {"status": "done", "task": task}
Framework Integrations
AgentSentinel provides robust integrations with popular AI frameworks, featuring active policy enforcement and intervention tracking.
LangChain Integration
The LangChain integration provides 4 critical features:
- Pre-Authorization Checks: Blocks tools/LLMs if budget exceeded or policy violated (like a credit card terminal checking funds)
- Intervention Recording: Tracks blocked/modified actions for dashboard visibility
- Async Support: Fully compatible with async LangChain agents in production
- Context Propagation: Maintains agent identity and budget across nested chains
Basic Usage:
from langchain.chat_models import ChatOpenAI
from langchain.agents import initialize_agent, Tool, AgentType
from agent_sentinel.integrations.langchain import SentinelCallbackHandler
# Create callback handler with enforcement
sentinel = SentinelCallbackHandler(
run_name="my_agent_run",
track_costs=True,
track_tools=True,
enforce_policies=True # Enable active blocking
)
# Use with LangChain LLM
llm = ChatOpenAI(
temperature=0,
model="gpt-4o-mini",
callbacks=[sentinel]
)
# Or with agents
agent = initialize_agent(
tools=tools,
llm=llm,
agent=AgentType.ZERO_SHOT_REACT_DESCRIPTION,
callbacks=[sentinel],
verbose=True
)
# Run agent - enforcement happens automatically
try:
result = agent.run("What's the weather in SF?")
except BudgetExceededError as e:
print(f"Blocked: {e}")
# View interventions
from agent_sentinel import InterventionTracker
interventions = InterventionTracker.get_interventions()
With Policy Enforcement:
from agent_sentinel import PolicyEngine
# Configure budget and deny lists
PolicyEngine.configure(
run_budget=0.50, # Max $0.50 per run
denied_actions=["delete_database", "send_email"],
strict_mode=True
)
# Create handler - it will enforce policies before each action
sentinel = SentinelCallbackHandler(
run_name="policy_enforced_agent",
enforce_policies=True
)
llm = ChatOpenAI(callbacks=[sentinel])
# Second LLM call will be BLOCKED if over budget
# Dangerous tools will be BLOCKED before execution
# All blocks are recorded as interventions for dashboard
Async Agents:
# Works with async LangChain agents automatically
async def run_async_agent():
sentinel = SentinelCallbackHandler(
run_name="async_agent",
enforce_policies=True
)
llm = ChatOpenAI(callbacks=[sentinel])
# All async callbacks are supported
result = await llm.apredict("Hello!")
return result
Rate Limiting:
PolicyEngine.configure(
rate_limits={
"expensive_search": {
"max_count": 10,
"window_seconds": 60
}
}
)
# Tool will be blocked after 10 calls per minute
sentinel = SentinelCallbackHandler(enforce_policies=True)
agent = initialize_agent(tools, llm, callbacks=[sentinel])
View Interventions:
from agent_sentinel import InterventionTracker
# After running your agent
interventions = InterventionTracker.get_interventions()
for intervention in interventions:
print(f"Type: {intervention.intervention_type.value}")
print(f"Outcome: {intervention.outcome.value}")
print(f"Action: {intervention.action_name}")
print(f"Reason: {intervention.reason}")
print(f"Risk Level: {intervention.risk_level}")
Examples:
- Basic tracking:
examples/langchain_integration.py - Policy enforcement:
examples/langchain_policy_enforcement.py
CrewAI Integration
from agent_sentinel.integrations.crewai import SentinelCrewCallbacks
from crewai import Agent, Task, Crew
# Create callbacks
callbacks = SentinelCrewCallbacks(
run_name="crewai_agent",
track_costs=True
)
# Create agent
agent = Agent(
role="Researcher",
goal="Research topics",
backstory="Expert researcher",
callbacks=callbacks
)
# Create and run crew
crew = Crew(agents=[agent], tasks=[task])
result = crew.kickoff()
See examples/crewai_integration.py for more details.
OpenAI Integration
from agent_sentinel.integrations.openai import track_openai
# Track OpenAI calls automatically
track_openai()
# Now all OpenAI calls are tracked
import openai
response = openai.chat.completions.create(
model="gpt-4o-mini",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]
)
See examples/llm_instrumentation.py for more integrations.
Troubleshooting
Logs not appearing?
import logging
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)
# Check if directory is writable
from pathlib import Path
log_dir = Path(".agent-sentinel")
print(f"Log directory: {log_dir.absolute()}")
print(f"Exists: {log_dir.exists()}")
print(f"Writable: {log_dir.exists() and log_dir.is_dir()}")
Large logs?
The SDK appends to the same file. Rotate logs periodically:
# Rotate logs (keep last 5)
mv .agent-sentinel/ledger.jsonl .agent-sentinel/ledger-$(date +%Y%m%d).jsonl
# Compress old logs
gzip .agent-sentinel/ledger-*.jsonl
License
MIT License - see LICENSE file for details
Contributing
See the monorepo for contribution guidelines.
Support
- Issues: GitHub Issues
- Email: hello@agentsentinel.dev
- Docs: https://docs.agentsentinel.dev
Metadata
Release files for agentsentinel-sdk 0.6.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1.tar.gz | 280.6 kB | Without provenance | Details for agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 461.4 kB
Release files / agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 280.6 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.14.7
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Release files / agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | agentsentinel_sdk-0.6.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 180.8 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.14.7
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Security for agentsentinel-sdk 0.6.1
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