agsrv
HTTP API for remote Claude and Codex execution using their Python SDKs.
Each query is one ephemeral Claude or Codex run. There are no resumable agent sessions or conversation state. The synchronous API cancels on disconnect; the durable job API stores outcomes in SQLite so short-lived clients can submit, disconnect, and retrieve the result later.
Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /health |
no | Readiness probe: {"status": "ok"} |
| GET | /v1/info |
yes | Server defaults and limits |
| GET | /v1/agents |
yes | Agent capabilities and health |
| GET | /v1/agents/codex/rate-limits |
yes | Codex account limits |
| POST | /v1/query |
yes | Run one agent query, return the result |
| POST | /v1/jobs |
yes | Submit a durable asynchronous job (202) |
| GET | /v1/jobs/{job_id} |
yes | Poll status and terminal result |
| POST | /v1/jobs/{job_id}/cancel |
yes | Request cancellation |
See docs/api/rest-api.md for the full reference.
Quickstart
Server:
uv sync
export AGSRV_API_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
export AGSRV_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/srv/workspaces
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=... # or log in with `claude` as the server user
uv run uvicorn agsrv.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
Client (another machine, via TLS or a private network):
curl -sS https://agsrv.example.net/v1/query \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGSRV_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agent": "claude", "prompt": "List the files in this directory", "cwd": "myproject", "max_turns": 5}'
curl -sS https://agsrv.example.net/v1/jobs \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGSRV_API_KEY" \
-H "Idempotency-Key: muse-vm-task-001" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agent": "claude", "prompt": "Summarize README.md", "cwd": "myproject"}'
# Poll GET /v1/jobs/<job_id> from a replacement VM using the same bearer key.
Configuration
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
AGSRV_CODEX_BIN |
unset (SDK bundled binary) | Optional Codex executable path |
AGSRV_CODEX_ENABLED |
true |
Enable Codex |
AGSRV_CODEX_MAX_CONCURRENCY |
2 |
Simultaneous Codex runs |
AGSRV_API_KEY |
unset | Bearer token clients must send |
AGSRV_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED |
false |
Allow requests with no key configured (local dev only) |
AGSRV_WORKSPACE_ROOT |
current directory | All request cwd values must resolve inside this path |
AGSRV_DEFAULT_MODEL |
unset (SDK default) | Model used when a request omits model |
AGSRV_PERMISSION_MODE |
acceptEdits |
Default permission mode |
AGSRV_ALLOWED_TOOLS |
Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep |
Default auto-approve list (not a restriction; see below) |
AGSRV_MAX_CONCURRENCY |
4 |
Simultaneous runs; excess requests get HTTP 429 |
AGSRV_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS |
3600 |
Default and maximum run duration |
AGSRV_JOBS_DB_PATH |
~/.local/state/agsrv/jobs.sqlite3 |
Persistent SQLite database (single worker only) |
AGSRV_JOBS_MAX_PENDING |
32 |
Maximum queued and running jobs (429 when full) |
AGSRV_JOBS_RETENTION_SECONDS |
86400 |
Terminal record and idempotency-key retention (24 h) |
AGSRV_JOBS_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES |
65536 |
Maximum canonical request size |
AGSRV_JOBS_MAX_RESULT_BYTES |
1048576 |
Maximum persisted result size |
AGSRV_SANDBOX_ALLOWED_DOMAINS |
GitHub, PyPI, and npm hosts (see below) | Comma-separated egress allow-list for sandboxed Bash; set-but-empty means no egress |
The default sandbox domains are github.com, api.github.com,
codeload.github.com, uploads.github.com, raw.githubusercontent.com,
objects.githubusercontent.com, release-assets.githubusercontent.com,
pypi.org, files.pythonhosted.org, and registry.npmjs.org.
(including an empty string, OFF, Opt-In, padded values, or required)
aborts startup. Domain entries are trimmed and lowercased, and empty
comma-separated entries are dropped (a.com,,b.com is two entries; a set but
empty or blank list means no egress). Each entry must be an ASCII hostname with
at least two DNS labels, each 1-63 characters (letters, digits, inner hyphens),
and at most 253 characters in total. A single leading *. wildcard is allowed;
embedded wildcards, empty labels (a..com), trailing dots, and raw Unicode
names (use punycode, xn--...) abort startup. Entries are checked as ASCII
before lowercasing, so look-alike characters such as the Kelvin sign are rejected.
Codex requests use "agent": "codex" and may set options.sandbox to
"read-only" (default) or "workspace-write", and options.network_access
to a boolean (default false). Codex threads are ephemeral, approvals are
denied, and explicit network access uses the SDK’s low-level sandbox policy.
Rate limits come from account/rateLimits/read.
Security model
-
The API key is a shell. Holding the key is equivalent to running a shell as the service user (with the workspace as the starting directory). Protect it accordingly; the default Claude Bash sandbox is only one part of defence in depth.
-
API key required by default. Without
AGSRV_API_KEY(or with an empty one), execution endpoints return 503 unlessAGSRV_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=trueis set explicitly. Keys are compared in constant time. -
allowed_toolsis an auto-approve list, not a restriction. It names the tools a run may use without a permission decision; it does not remove other tools, and under the defaultacceptEditsmode file edits are approved regardless. The server-sideAGSRV_ALLOWED_TOOLSis only a default — any key holder can send a different list per request. -
The agent can read the server's secrets. A run inherits the service environment, including
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, the Claude login credentials, andAGSRV_API_KEYitself. Prompt-injected workspace content can therefore exfiltrate them; do not point the service at untrusted workspaces. The default-on sandbox only narrows the Bash path (see below). -
Default-on Bash sandbox. Claude requests default to
sandbox: trueand run Bash and its child processes inside the CLI sandbox. Setsandbox: falseonly for a deliberate control operation that needs access to the host: writes are limited to the working directory, temp, and a dedicated cache directory; egress is limited to the allow-list; the systemd/D-Bus user bus is unreachable; common secret directories are unreadable; and the API keys are unset in the Bash environment. The sandbox is fail-closed (failIfUnavailable): if it cannot start, the run fails rather than running unsandboxed. A sandboxed request is also rejected with 403 when its effective permission mode (request value, elseAGSRV_PERMISSION_MODE) isautoorbypassPermissions, because those modes can approve hosts outside the allow-list; and when the resolvedcwdis~/.cache, an ancestor of it (including the service home directory), or inside~/.cacheoutside~/.cache/agsrv-sandbox, because the CLI makes the whole working directory writable. Sandboxed runs use only the CLI bundled with the SDK (they fail closed if it is missing) and verify that the cache directory is a real directory owned by the service user, tightening it to mode 0700. Limits to be aware of: only Bash is covered, not Read/Edit/Write, Glob/Grep, WebFetch, or MCP. BecauseReadis auto-approved, secret files such as the service env file can still be read, and anything readable can be exfiltrated to allow-listed hosts (GitHub). Theghtoken stays readable so push and PR creation work; use a minimal-scope token. -
Workspace confinement. Request
cwdis resolved (symlinks included) and must stay insideAGSRV_WORKSPACE_ROOT. Note this confines the agent's starting directory, not what its tools (e.g.Bash) can reach; run the server as an unprivileged user or in a container for real isolation. It is not a meaningful boundary on its own: withBashauto-approved, the default posture is already shell-equivalent. -
Client disconnects. Claude
POST /v1/querypromptly cancels the run and frees its concurrency slot when the client disconnects. Durable/v1/jobsruns are owned by the server and continue after the client disconnects. -
Bind and TLS. Bind to loopback or a private interface and put TLS in front (reverse proxy, Tailscale, or an SSH tunnel). The API key travels in a header.
-
Claude statelessness. Request bodies containing
resume,session_id, or any other unknown field are rejected with 422. Runs are hermetic: CLI session persistence is disabled, so no resumable transcript is written, and host and project settings are not loaded (setting_sourcesis empty), so hooks or MCP servers from those settings cannot leak into a run. Auto memory is disabled (CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY=1), and MCP configuration is strict and isolated. Managed policy settings and~/.claude.jsonstill load. The default system prompt is the Claude Code preset. What still persists after a run: files the agent creates or edits in the workspace, and ordinary CLI bookkeeping under~/.claude.
Durable job contract
POST /v1/jobs requires the same validated Claude/Codex request as
POST /v1/query. Provide a stable Idempotency-Key on retries: an identical
request reuses its original job_id, while conflicting content returns 409.
Poll GET /v1/jobs/{job_id} until succeeded, failed, cancelled, or
interrupted; cancellation is requested via POST to /cancel.
A result with is_error: true is recorded as failed. Error codes are
sanitized. Non-terminal jobs are bounded, and queue saturation returns 429
with Retry-After. Expired terminal records and idempotency keys are removed
after 24 hours by default. Jobs run in-process and do not survive process
termination: after restart nonterminal records become interrupted
without replaying filesystem or Git side effects. Only one uvicorn worker may
use a given SQLite database; the server rejects concurrent owners via a lock
file alongside the database. Synchronous queries and jobs targeting overlapping
workspace directories are serialized. Oversized transcripts are omitted with
messages_truncated: true while retaining the final answer. If even the core
result exceeds the size limit, result_truncated: true preserves a minimal
outcome summary. Shared API keys represent one caller and authorize access to the
same job records; use a separate server/key for caller isolation.
Development
Requirements: Python 3.11–3.14 and uv.
git clone https://github.com/dceoy/agsrv.git
cd agsrv
uv sync
uv run uvicorn agsrv.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
Swagger UI is at http://127.0.0.1:8000/docs.
uv run ruff format --check .
uv run ruff check .
uv run pyright .
uv run pytest
uv run mkdocs build --strict
Dependency versions are tracked in the committed uv.lock.
License
AGPL-3.0-only. See LICENSE.
Metadata
Release files for agsrv 0.3.0
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Total release size: 81.7 kB
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