agent-passport
Verifiable identity for agents. Explicit trust for the systems they meet.
A small Python SDK for issuer-signed agent identities, current key and identity status, and binding a verified identity to an independently authenticated caller. It complements A2A: A2A owns discovery, messaging and tasks; agent-passport adds an application-defined ownership and trust profile.
Status: pre-1.0. Version 0.3.0 adds the identity SDK and optional A2A adapter. It has not been independently security-audited. The older local CLI remains available for compatibility.
Install and try
Python 3.10–3.14:
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install "ai-agent-passport==0.3.0"
agent-passport --help
For native A2A Agent Cards:
pip install "ai-agent-passport[a2a]==0.3.0"
From a repository checkout, run python examples/identity_demo.py (or add --a2a). The demo generates disposable keys in memory, verifies identity, rejects an unauthenticated presenter, and checks revocation. No credentials, servers or paid calls are needed.
What it provides
- A versioned identity profile: issuer, agent, owner, audience, revision, expiry and credential ID.
- Ed25519 JWS credentials through PyJWT, with a dedicated token type—not access tokens.
- An optional A2A 1.0 adapter using the official Python SDK's native Agent Card signing and a required profile extension.
- Explicit trusted-key and identity-state resolution, including revocation and overlapping rotation keys.
- Presenter binding and a fresh status check immediately before a protected operation.
- Bounded parsing, pinned algorithms, stable verification errors and packaged schemas/types.
See the runnable example and identity profile for the API and wire format. A typical receiving application calls:
identity = verify_credential(
token, trust=trust,
issuer=expected_issuer, audience=service_id, agent_id=expected_agent,
)
check_presenter(
identity, authenticated_peer,
audience=service_id, recipient=receiving_agent_id, trust=trust,
)
# Separately authorize the exact task, action and resource before execution.
trust, expected IDs and authenticated_peer come from trusted application configuration and authentication middleware, never from the request body. TrustResolver connects the SDK to your authoritative store; MemoryTrustStore is for local tests and examples.
Security boundary
A public passport is copyable. It does not authenticate its presenter, prove the underlying model, grant tool permissions, or prevent request replay by itself. Use validated OAuth/mTLS/session authentication, bind that principal with check_presenter, and enforce task-specific consent. The host owns trusted enrollment, durable status, freshness, replay protection, resource authorization and revocation/execution race handling.
The core does not fetch advertised keys or URLs. A verified endpoint is still untrusted network input: the host must enforce egress/SSRF policy before contacting it. Keep private keys in a managed secret store; never put secrets or unnecessary personal data in public cards.
A2A compatibility: the adapter pins SDK 1.2.0 and accepts a strict subset of A2A 1.0 cards. Its independent JCS check rejects data the SDK would omit from signing, including empty extension values. Use nonempty declared capabilities for the A2A encoding; see the profile restrictions. This is not a claim of universal A2A conformance.
Legacy CLI
The existing init, issue, sign, verify, inspect, fingerprint, policy-check and key commands retain the project-specific v0.1 envelope. They do not issue the new profile or provide its trust/lifecycle checks. New network integrations should use the identity SDK, not reinterpret legacy documents as credentials.
agent-passport --help
python examples/gateway_demo/run_demo.py
python examples/mcp_proxy_demo/run_demo.py
The MCP-style demo is a toy proxy, not an MCP authorization implementation. Legacy resource rules are literal globs, not filesystem confinement. Details: architecture, threat model, security reporting.
Development
pip install -e '.[dev,a2a]'
ruff check .
pyright
pytest
python -m build
See contributing, changelog and publishing.
Metadata
Release files for ai-agent-passport 0.3.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ai_agent_passport-0.3.0.tar.gz | 49.7 kB | With provenance | Details for ai_agent_passport-0.3.0.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ai_agent_passport-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for ai_agent_passport-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 75.2 kB
Release files / ai_agent_passport-0.3.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | ai_agent_passport-0.3.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 49.7 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
8a2b0f51e1fd2554f035af1e1d0f0711b7ccaeb148a462f0ef82a9c486272b53
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
6370d53e54f733914f1e60debec108cb8464b92e1f44eca72d2dbaa075b2c1e1
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 30, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / ai_agent_passport-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | ai_agent_passport-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 25.5 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
4d72d91a9cc68e14e571e115b6659dde78b96fda9be68d21f237da6b704ca95e
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
3831127654b92f6eb8c88af8de084f2a6eea3fea7ee5c26498533e86a3be05ba
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 30, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for ai-agent-passport 0.3.0
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
Both files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for ai_agent_passport-0.3.0.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 30, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.