ai-guardian-aiops 0.1.0

Governed observability + governance for on-endpoint local LLMs (Ollama): model inventory/provenance, a deterministic secrets/PII/jailbreak prompt scanner, allow/deny policy, and route-through guarding — the complement to IGEL AI Armor, with a built-in governance harness (audit, budget, undo, risk tiers)

AI Guardian (preview)

Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Ollama, IGEL, or any AI-security vendor. Product and trademark names belong to their owners. MIT licensed.

Governed observability + governance for on-endpoint local LLMs (Ollama). It lets you observe + audit what your local models are actually fed, and gate what leaves in a prompt — the complement to IGEL AI Armor. AI Armor governs whether a local model may run on the endpoint; ai-guardian records what it did and gates what goes into the prompt (secrets, PII, source, jailbreaks) plus which model may serve it. Self-contained: it talks to Ollama's REST API (default http://localhost:11434, usually no auth) and needs nothing beyond httpx and the MCP SDK. Preview — mock-validated only; v0.1 route-through content governance, with a transparent capture proxy on the v0.2 roadmap.

What it does

Ollama persists no queryable prompt/response history — conversational context is client-supplied on every request. So ai-guardian observes on two fronts:

• Passive inventory / state auditing — over /api/tags, /api/ps, /api/show, /api/version: what models are installed and running, their VRAM residency, license/params/capabilities, and their provenance digests. Every model is annotated with an allow/deny policy verdict, so shadow (unsanctioned) models show allowed: false.
• Opt-in route-through content governance — callers send a prompt through ai-guardian (guarded_generate / observe_chat). It scans the text (secrets / PII / source / jailbreak), checks the model against policy, records the interaction to its own usage log (~/.ai-guardian/usage.db), and only then calls Ollama — blocking when the risk band is too high or the model is disallowed. The raw prompt is never stored (only its length + redacted findings).

A transparent reverse-proxy shim that captures other clients' Ollama traffic passively is a documented v0.2 roadmap item, not v0.1.

Key features

• Deterministic, offline prompt scanner — no I/O, no network, so it is fully testable offline. Flags secrets (AWS AKIA, private-key blocks, GitHub / Slack / OpenAI / Google tokens, JWTs, assigned api_key=…, high-entropy fallback), PII (email, US SSN, credit card with a Luhn check), source/config-leak heuristics, and jailbreak / prompt-injection signatures — rolled up into a weighted risk band (low / medium / high / critical; any critical dominates). Findings are redacted — the scanner never re-emits the secret it caught.
• Model allow/deny policy (shell-glob patterns) so shadow / unsanctioned models surface as allowed: false, plus provenance digest pinning to flag a model whose digest drifted (re-pulled / tampered).
• Route-through guard — guarded_generate / observe_chat scan + policy-gate
  • record + run-if-allowed, blocking on risk-band >= block_threshold (default high) or a disallowed model.
• Vendored governance harness — audit log, token/runaway budget guard, graduated-autonomy risk tiers, and undo-token recording, bundled in the package (no external dependency).
• Highly self-testable — Ollama is free + local for the API parts; the scanner, policy, and risk-band are pure deterministic offline logic.

Capability matrix (18 MCP tools)

Reads (10)

Tool	Risk	What it returns
list_models	low	installed models, each with the allow/deny verdict (shadow → allowed:false)
running_models	low	loaded models: VRAM footprint + residency expiry
model_details	low	license / parameters / capabilities for one model
server_status	low	Ollama reachability + version
vram_usage	low	total VRAM used by loaded models; flag over-budget
policy_view	low	current allow/deny policy + provenance digest pins
model_provenance	low	each installed digest vs its pin; flag drift
scan_prompt	low	pure text scan → findings + weighted risk band (no model call)
usage_events	low	query the observed-usage log
anomaly_report	low	rollup: shadow models, digest drift, high-risk + blocked prompts

Writes (8)

Tool	Risk	Undo / safety
pull_model	medium	refused if it violates policy
remove_model	high	dry-run + undo (re-pull); requires an approver
unload_model	medium	evict from VRAM (keep_alive:0)
set_model_allowlist	medium	undo → prior allowlist
set_model_denylist	medium	undo → prior denylist
pin_model_digest	medium	pin a model's expected provenance digest
guarded_generate	medium	the route-through guard: scan + policy-gate + record + run-if-allowed
observe_chat	medium	same, for /api/chat messages

Risk-band gating: guarded_generate / observe_chat block when the prompt's risk band >= block_threshold (default high) or the model is disallowed. Blocked calls never reach Ollama and are recorded as blocked in the usage log.

Quick start

uv tool install ai-guardian-aiops          # or: pipx install ai-guardian-aiops
ai-guardian doctor                   # Ollama reachability + policy summary (works zero-config)
ai-guardian overview                 # models installed/running, shadow count, usage stats
ai-guardian model list               # installed models with allow/deny verdicts
ai-guardian guard scan "my key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"   # deterministic scan → risk band

Route a prompt through the guard (scan + policy-gate + record + run-if-allowed) via MCP:

guarded_generate(model="llama3.2:3b", prompt="…", block_threshold="high")

Run as an MCP server (stdio) — the full 18-tool surface; the CLI is a convenience subset:

export AI_GUARDIAN_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD=...   # only if a target has a stored token
ai-guardian mcp                                # or: ai-guardian-mcp

Governance

Every MCP tool passes through the bundled @governed_tool harness:

• Audit — every call (params, result, status, duration, risk tier, approver, rationale) is logged to ~/.ai-guardian/audit.db (relocatable via AI_GUARDIAN_AIOPS_HOME). This is separate from ~/.ai-guardian/usage.db, which holds the observed local-LLM usage.
• Budget / runaway guard — token and call budgets trip a circuit breaker.
• Risk tiers — graduated autonomy; high-risk ops (e.g. remove_model) can require a named approver (AI_GUARDIAN_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / AI_GUARDIAN_AUDIT_RATIONALE).
• Undo recording — reversible writes record an inverse descriptor.

Supported scope + limitations (preview)

• Scope: on-endpoint local LLMs via Ollama — single-endpoint local-LLM observability + content governance. Not GPU inference-cluster ops.
• v0.1 = passive inventory/state auditing plus opt-in route-through content governance. A transparent capture proxy for other clients' traffic is v0.2 roadmap, not v0.1.
• IGEL AI Armor interop is doc-level positioning today (complementary roles), not a wired integration.
• Preview / mock-only — the scanner, policy, and risk-band are exercised offline; the Ollama API paths are the fastest live check (ai-guardian doctor).

Missing a capability?

Want a passive capture proxy, another scanner signature, a richer policy model, or an AI Armor hook? Open an issue or PR — feedback and contributions welcome.