ansible-compose: deploy docker-compose over ssh
Deploying a docker-compose.yml
Provide ssh configuration and target dir as first argument, then the path to a docker-compose.yml file:
ansible-compose user@host:22/absolute/target/path ./docker-compose-example.yml
Or, deploy from a url, just like kubectl apply would let you:
ansible-compose user@host:22/absolute/target/path https://raw.git.../docker-compose.yml
Automatic creation of volume dirs
It will try to automatically create the volume bind dirs for you. To set the uid and/or guid, set them as env vars, either in the compose.yml:
environment: uid: 1001 gid: 100
Or with an env var:
web_environment_uid=1001
Transforms for docker-compose.yml on the CLI
Transforms apply on the docker-compose.yml as if it was a template we are going to render using environment variables.
Suppose that you start with such a docker-compose.yml:
version: '3.4'
services:
web:
build: .
environment:
base: here
wrong: todrop
First, all build lines will be dropped. You will have to specify images with env vars ie.:
web_image=abc # sets services[web][image]=abc
If you wanted to drop the environment line use the drop prefix:
drop_web_environment= # dels services[web][environment]
You can also override deeper in the YAML tree:
web_environment_SECRET_TOKEN=yoursecret
Even for drop:
drop_web_environment_VERSION=
Or even drop a whole service:
drop_web=
You can however require all variables to have a particular prefix, ie:
dev_drop_mail= # to prevent the mail service on dev branches ansible_compose_prefix=dev # to enable only variables starting with dev_
Don’t forget ansible-compose will also forward extraneous arguments to the ansible-playbook call beneath.
Running commands on the compose of a target
Provide ssh configuration and target dir as first argument, then the docker-compose command:
ansible-compose user@host:22/absolute/target/path stop ansible-compose user@host:22/absolute/target/path start ansible-compose user@host:22/absolute/target/path logs ansible-compose user@host:22/absolute/target/path help
Installation
Local:
pip install --user ansible-compose export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
The current configuration in CI for image yourlabs/ansible-compose is:
ANSIBLE_HOST_KEY_CHECKING=false
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY=our passwordless private key generated with ssh-keygen -t ed25519 and default options
SSH_INSECURE=true not checking any host key today !
Example gitlab ci job
deploy:
stage: deploy
image: yourlabs/ansible-compose
script:
- ansible-compose
deploy@example.com/home/staging
./docker-compose.yml
# composed to rely on $CI_COMMIT_SHA
Metadata
Release files for ansible-compose 1.0.6.post15
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Release files / ansible-compose-1.0.6.post15.tar.gz
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