aqta-verify-receipt

Offline verifier for Seal receipts (ATTESTATION-v1).

Seal signs the model call at runtime. This package checks that signature without contacting Aqta. No account. Same algorithm as the npm package.

30-second check

pip install aqta-verify-receipt
aqta-verify-receipt receipt.json \
  --key 9Y3Eiq6V8QjRDUM5nPqSwKIOPQaoEU4SbagfYFdvWa4

Default output is one compact line (words carry meaning; colour is optional):

✓ valid  ALLOWED  2d41…871e94c  pinned issuer key

Invalid:

✕ invalid  signature mismatch  2d41…871e94c

Optional human-readable summary (the compact line and exit code are the result):

aqta-verify-receipt receipt.json --key <pinned> --pretty
# …
◈ seal intact · verified offline

Or pipe:

curl -sS https://api.aqta.ai/v1/receipts/YOUR_RECEIPT_ID/public | aqta-verify-receipt - \
  --key 9Y3Eiq6V8QjRDUM5nPqSwKIOPQaoEU4SbagfYFdvWa4

Current production key id: aqta-att-01269bb4b6a7d950 (/v1/attestation/public-key).

Pin that string; do not re-fetch it inside a verify loop. Keys rotate and receipts do not: a receipt verifies against the key current when it was signed, and the permanent key record (with retired keys and their validity windows) is at app.aqta.ai/security/issuer-keys.txt.

Library

from aqta_verify_receipt import verify_receipt, fetch_published_public_key

# Once per environment: fetch, then pin somewhere you control.
trusted = fetch_published_public_key()

result = verify_receipt(receipt, trusted_public_key=trusted)
if not result.valid:
    raise ValueError(result.reason)

CLI

aqta-verify-receipt <file|-> --key <base64url> [--no-strict] [--json] [--pretty] [-q]
aqta-verify-receipt <file|-> --integrity-only [--no-strict] [--json] [--pretty] [-q]

NO_COLOR=1 disables colour. Meaning never depends on colour alone.

Pinning is required by default. Without --key, pass --integrity-only (embedded key only; anyone can self-sign; result is marked untrusted).

Dependencies

cryptography (>= 42) for constant-time Ed25519. Nothing else.

Chain profile (draft)

GRANT-v1 and USE-v1 are draft specifications, not frozen; their wire formats may change. --profile chain checks a bundle of GRANT-v1 approvals, USE-v1 records and the ACTION-v1 records they authorised, and returns PASS, FAIL or INCOMPLETE. Missing evidence is INCOMPLETE, never PASS, and without --approver-keys an authorised action is INCOMPLETE.

aqta-verify-receipt bundle.json --profile chain --key <issuer key> --approver-keys <k1,k2>

Exit 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 3 INCOMPLETE, 2 usage or IO. --key is required; --integrity-only and --no-strict are refused. Library: from aqta_verify_receipt import verify_chain, then verify_chain(bundle, trusted_public_key=..., approver_keys=[...]). Opt-in only: nothing selects this profile from a record's shape. The two separately written verifiers, this one and the TypeScript one, must return the same verdict and reason on every vector in test-vectors/chain/.

Transparency proofs

A receipt signature answers what the issuer asserted. It cannot answer whether that entry is in the issuer's log, or whether the log has only ever grown.

from aqta_verify_receipt import verify_inclusion_proof, verify_consistency_proof

result = verify_inclusion_proof(proof)
if not result.valid:
    raise ValueError(result.reason)

RFC 6962 inclusion and consistency verification, plus the signed-tree-head signature. Written separately from the TypeScript implementation rather than ported, and checked against the transparency vectors in the repository.

An inclusion proof establishes that what you were shown is genuinely in the log. It does not establish that what you were not shown is irrelevant. That is omission, and it is open.

Scope

A small offline verifier for signed Seal records and their log proofs. It reads a record and a key, and reports a verdict. It does not store, send or host records, and it never contacts Aqta.

Licence

Apache-2.0. Aqta Technologies Limited.

If you implement or cite the ATTESTATION-v1 format itself, credit under CC-BY-4.0: see the repo CITATION.cff.