argus-probe
Open-source CLI for Argus, black-box red-team testing for AI agents.
Point argus-probe at any AI agent endpoint — chat APIs, custom HTTP services, gRPC, or browser-using agents — and get a report mapped to MITRE ATLAS, OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act.
$ argus-probe run --target argus-target.json --probes owasp_07_system_prompt_leakage --format html --out report.html
Submitting run to https://<your-server>/api/v1/redteam/runs ...
run_id: abc123
Polling until completion...
status: completed, findings: 1
Fetching html report...
Wrote report to report.html
Install
Python 3.11+ is required.
pipx install argus-probe
# or
pip install argus-probe
The package includes the probe engine, so --local, quickstart, list-probes and scan-skill work after a plain install. The [local] extra still exists for older pins but adds nothing.
The unrelated argus project on PyPI also installs a top-level argus package. Do not install it in the same environment as argus-probe; pipx keeps each tool in its own venv.
From a clone of the repo: pip install ..
The engine is importable as argus, for example from argus.targets import build_target. Code written against orchestrator.redteam (the argus-orchestrator package, 0.3.x) needs one change: replace orchestrator.redteam with argus in its imports.
To see a report before you set anything up, run argus-probe quickstart. It starts a deliberately insecure demo MCP agent and a hostile MCP testbed on 127.0.0.1, runs the 12 MCP probes and writes argus-quickstart.html (--out changes the path). It needs no API key. The demo agent is meant to fail. Judged probes such as prompt injection still need ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or OPENAI_API_KEY.
argus-probe quickstart
Quickstart
# 1. Generate a target spec interactively
argus-probe init --kind openai_compat
# 2a. Run locally: set a judge key, no server needed
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="<your key>"
argus-probe run --local --target argus-target.json \
--probes owasp_07_system_prompt_leakage --format html --out report.html
# 2b. Or submit to a server implementing the /api/v1/redteam API
export ARGUS_API_TOKEN="<your token>"
export ARGUS_API_URL="https://<your-server>"
argus-probe validate-target --target argus-target.json
argus-probe run --target argus-target.json \
--probes owasp_07_system_prompt_leakage --format html --out report.html
--local also runs browser_use targets. The CLI serves each probe's trap page from your machine and sends your agent its URL, so the agent must be able to open it:
argus-probe run --local --target browser-target.json \
--probes browser_dom_inject_html_comment --format html --out report.html
The trap page listens on 127.0.0.1 by default, which works when the agent runs on the same machine. For an agent in a container or on another machine, set trap_host, trap_port and trap_public_url in the target spec; the target spec cookbook explains them. If your agent can't reach your machine at all, submit the run with --api-url and --token to a compatible hosted service instead.
The local judge uses ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or OPENAI_API_KEY when that is the only key set. For a local model, set REDTEAM_MODEL_PROVIDER=litellm and REDTEAM_FAST_MODEL=ollama/qwen2.5:32b (add REDTEAM_LLM_API_BASE for a non-default host); small models miss many jailbreaks, so the CLI prints a warning. REDTEAM_MODEL_PROVIDER=azure runs the judge on Azure OpenAI. Azure's default content filter blocks judge calls because the judge reads attack text, so use a custom filter policy with jailbreak detection turned off for that deployment (also when OPENAI_API_KEY is paired with REDTEAM_LLM_API_BASE pointing at Azure). If OPENAI_API_KEY is paired with REDTEAM_LLM_API_BASE pointing at Azure, set REDTEAM_FAST_MODEL and REDTEAM_STRONG_MODEL to your deployment names, because the default strong model gpt-5.6-terra is usually not deployed. Local models other than Ollama (vLLM or LM Studio via openai/... with REDTEAM_LLM_API_BASE) are billed at the most expensive known rate, so pass --per-run-cap.
Server mode talks to any server implementing the /api/v1/redteam API: set ARGUS_API_URL to it and ARGUS_API_TOKEN to a token that server issued. There is no hosted Argus instance, and the Argus repo no longer ships a server; the self-hosted stack is at tag v0.3-full. A browser_use run in server mode also needs a client_agent connected to the server's orchestrator; it connects directly, with the same AGENT_CONNECT_SECRET set on both sides.
Supported agent shapes
argus-probe init --kind <X> generates a target spec for one of:
--kind |
For |
|---|---|
openai_compat |
OpenAI Chat Completions protocol — OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Foundry, Mistral, vLLM/llama.cpp with the OpenAI shim |
anthropic_native |
Anthropic Messages API |
custom_http |
Production agents wrapping an LLM behind their own HTTP shape (Jinja2 request templates + JSONPath response selectors) |
grpc |
gRPC services with server reflection enabled |
browser_use |
Browser-using agents driving Playwright / computer-use / browser-use |
payment_agent |
Agents that spend money on a user's behalf (e.g. x402), run against a payment testbed |
mcp_agent |
Agents that connect to MCP tool servers, run against a hostile MCP testbed |
testbed_agent |
Generic form of mcp_agent / payment_agent; environment picks the testbed |
http_upload |
File-upload-and-render sinks (upload then inline-render an active payload) |
Full configuration reference: target spec cookbook.
What it does
Without --local, argus-probe is a thin client: it submits the target spec and probe selection over HTTPS to a server implementing the /api/v1/redteam API; that server runs the probes against your agent and returns the report. With --local the same engine runs in this process and calls the judge model directly with your key.
Secret references in your target spec (${OPENAI_API_KEY}, etc.) are resolved from the local shell environment at run time; they are never written back to target.json. With --local they stay in this process and go only to your agent. In server mode the resolved spec, secrets included, is sent to the server, because the server is what calls your agent; use a server you trust with those credentials.
Output formats
html— human-readable reportsarif— SARIF 2.1.0, uploads cleanly to GitHub code-scanning (Security tab)junit— JUnit XML for any CI tool that parses test results
CI integration
Use argus-probe-action. It installs argus-probe from PyPI, runs the probes in local mode, uploads the SARIF to code scanning and fails the job at fail-on:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: gy15901580825/argus-probe-action@v1
env:
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
with:
target: argus-target.json
probes: owasp_01_prompt_injection_basic,syscard_crescendo
fail-on: critical
The job needs permissions: security-events: write for the SARIF upload. argus-probe init --workflow writes a complete workflow file with that set. Pull requests from forks and Dependabot do not receive repository secrets, so ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is empty and the job fails on them.
--fail-on <severity> exits 3 when a failing finding is at or above that level; the SARIF is written first. --compare-to <base branch> makes --fail-on count only failures that are new relative to the latest run on that branch. It is server mode only, because it needs run history, so the action does not offer it; see the target-spec cookbook for a server-mode workflow. Exit codes: 0 success, 1 run or configuration error, 2 usage error, 3 threshold hit, 4 cost cap.
Cost controls
argus-probe run --target ... --per-run-cap 0.50
Runs that would exceed the cap are rejected before any LLM cost is incurred, in both server and local mode (exit code 4).
Check a skill before you install it
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
argus-probe scan-skill ./path/to/skill
argus-probe scan-skill https://github.com/someone/skills.git --path pdf-tools
argus-probe scan-skill --sample key-grab
argus-probe scan-skill <dir-or-git-url> installs a Claude Code skill in a throwaway Linux container, gives Claude Code a few ordinary tasks that use the skill, and reports what the agent did: the files it read, the commands it ran and the requests it tried to send. It needs Docker and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. The sandbox's proxy holds the real key and caps each task at --per-task-cap. The default depends on --model: about 2x one large Claude Code call (150 KB of request and 8,192 output tokens, reserved as below), at least $1.00, rounded up to $0.25. That is $1.00 for Haiku 4.5, Haiku 5.5 and Sonnet 5.5, $1.50 for Sonnet 4.6 (the default model), $2.00 for Opus 5.5 and $4.75 for Fable 5.1. Before it starts, the scan prints the cap and the most it can spend (the cap times the number of tasks): $4.50 for three tasks on Sonnet 4.6. A clean scan on Sonnet 4.6 costs about $0.30. A task's API spend cannot pass its cap, whether Claude Code or a process the skill started makes the calls, because every call is reserved at its worst case before it is sent: its max_tokens of output plus one input token for every byte of the request, priced at the dearest input rate. The proxy refuses a call if the task's spend plus its open reservations would pass the cap. A finished call is then charged what it really cost, and a call that fails or whose client drops it is charged its full reservation. The proxy also refuses any request shaped differently from Claude Code's own (fast mode, fallbacks, unknown betas, server tools, PDFs and the like). It allows only the scan's model and Claude Code's own background model, and --model takes only models the proxy has a price for. A --per-task-cap below what one 100 KB Claude Code call reserves on the model is refused, with the minimum named ($0.51 on Sonnet 4.6). A task that reaches its cap stops early. If its calls had already cost at least half the cap, the report gives it a medium finding, because Claude Code on its own stays well under the cap. Otherwise the cap was too small for one large call's worst case (a refused call costs nothing), and the report gives it a low note with the reserved, spent and cap amounts, so you can raise --per-task-cap. If a repository holds several skills, pick one with --path. To see what a finding looks like, scan one of the bundled inert samples with --sample instead of a source: key-grab, config-theft, fake-prerequisite, hidden-instruction, persistence, or the clean control benign-markdown. A clean report is not proof the skill is safe, because a skill can wait for conditions the scan did not create, and skills that only act on macOS do nothing in the Linux container. For a static review of the skill text, also run NVIDIA SkillSpector or Cisco skill-scanner. If Docker's DNS cannot resolve the Anthropic API, set ARGUS_SKILLSCAN_DNS to a DNS server that works on your network (for example ARGUS_SKILLSCAN_DNS=1.1.1.1); the image build already retries with this machine's resolver on its own.
Subcommands
argus-probe quickstart Run the MCP probes against a built-in demo agent, no key
argus-probe init Interactive target.json generator
argus-probe validate-target Sanity-check target reachability
argus-probe list-probes List probe ids (local library, or a server with --api-url)
argus-probe run Submit a run + write the report
argus-probe report Re-render a run stored on a server
argus-probe coverage Show what the probe library covers; asks the server, runs no probes
argus-probe scan-skill Run a Claude Code skill in a sandbox and report what it did
Each command's --help lists its flags.
License
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE. Copyright © 2026 Veyon Solutions.
Security
To report a vulnerability, see SECURITY.md.
Links
- Documentation: docs/onboarding
- Argus repo: https://github.com/gy15901580825/Argus
Metadata
Release files for argus-probe 0.4.0
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| argus_probe-0.4.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for argus_probe-0.4.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 929.0 kB
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