ARKEXA
Finds the prompt injections in your CI that an outsider can actually reach.
You wired an AI agent into GitHub Actions. It reads issue bodies. It holds a write token. ARKEXA finds the paths between those two facts, and reports only the ones a stranger with a GitHub account can actually trigger.
The same output as text
CRITICAL ARK001 untrusted-prompt-write-token reachable: external
an outsider opens an issue triage.yml:2
-> github.event.issue.body -> env.BODY triage.yml:13
-> env.BODY -> the claude command line of Ask the model to triage triage.yml:18
-> job 'triage' holds contents: write, issues: write triage.yml:10
= text an outsider controls is instruction-adjacent to an agent that can write to your
repository
fix: pass untrusted text as a file the agent reads as data, drop the job to read-only
permissions, or gate the job on author_association
The GIF is generated by python tools/make_demo.py, which runs ARKEXA against
tools/demo for real. It is not a screenshot anyone touched up, so it cannot
drift from what the tool actually prints.
Install
The first published version is a pre-release, and pip does not install pre-releases unless you ask, so name it explicitly:
pipx install "arkexa==0.1.0a1" # or: uv tool install "arkexa==0.1.0a1"
A plain pipx install arkexa will start working when 0.1.0 is released, and
will keep ignoring alphas after that, which is the behaviour you want.
To run it from source instead:
pipx install git+https://github.com/alokgorithm/ARKEXA
Use
arkexa # scan ./.github/workflows
arkexa /path/to/repo
arkexa --reachability all # include findings only a maintainer can trigger
arkexa --format json
arkexa --only ARK001,ARK002
arkexa --severity critical # only fail the build on critical findings
arkexa --explain ARK001
arkexa --list-rules
Exit code is 1 when anything is reported at or above the severity threshold,
so it works as a CI gate. 2 means ARKEXA itself had a problem.
Why not just zizmor?
Run both. They do different jobs.
| reads | knows what an agent is | |
|---|---|---|
| zizmor | workflow YAML | no |
| agent-audit | Python agent code, MCP configs | yes |
| ARKEXA | workflow YAML | yes |
zizmor reads your workflows but doesn't know what an agent is. agent-audit knows agents but doesn't read your workflows. ARKEXA reads workflows as agent attack surface.
ARKEXA deliberately does not check template injection into shell,
pull_request_target misuse, unpinned actions, credential persistence, or
excessive permissions in general. zizmor does all of those well, and in Rust.
Duplicating them would only add noise.
Reachability is the point
Most scanners report every dangerous-looking pattern. On agentic workflows that produces hundreds of findings and everyone stops reading.
ARKEXA classifies every finding by who can trigger it:
| Level | Meaning |
|---|---|
external |
any GitHub account - an issue, a comment, a fork PR |
contributor |
needs a previously merged pull request |
maintainer |
needs write access to the repository |
unreachable |
workflow_dispatch or schedule only |
Only external shows by default. An if: guard checking author_association
demotes a finding automatically, so fixing the guard makes the finding go away
- which is how a scanner should behave. The demotion is shown, not hidden:
note: author_association allowlist limits this to maintainer (triage.yml:9)
Narrowing an event helps too. issues: [labeled] is not externally reachable,
because labelling an issue takes triage access, so ARKEXA does not report it as
if a stranger could fire it.
What it finds
| ID | Rule | Severity | OWASP Agentic |
|---|---|---|---|
| ARK001 | untrusted-prompt-write-token |
critical | ASI01 |
| ARK002 | agent-output-to-shell |
critical | ASI05 |
| ARK003 | agent-output-to-path |
high | ASI05 |
| ARK004 | agent-autoapprove |
high | ASI02 |
| ARK005 | agent-writes-default-branch |
high | ASI06 |
The engine, not the rules
The rules are the easy part. These four are what make the findings accurate.
Two-hop taint. Untrusted input is almost never spelled straight into the
sink. It is laundered through env:, through $GITHUB_ENV, through step
outputs and across needs.<job>.outputs. ARKEXA follows it, and prints the
route it took.
Model provenance. When an agent reads an issue body and its answer is later
interpolated into a run: block, the chain reads all the way from the issue
body through the model to the shell - not from the model, as though the model
had invented the string on its own.
Guard detection. author_association checks, actor allowlists, label
gates, non-fork checks, narrowed permissions:. A scanner that notices you
already fixed something gets kept. One that yells anyway gets uninstalled.
Local composite actions. uses: ./.github/actions/foo is followed one
level down, carrying the values the caller passed in with:, so the chain
crosses the file boundary and each hop names the file it happened in:
-> .github/workflows/main.yml calls ./.github/actions/summarise main.yml:14
-> github.event.issue.body -> inputs.body main.yml:16
-> inputs.body -> env.TEXT actions/summarise/action.yml:10
No network, no API key
ARKEXA is deterministic static analysis. It makes no network calls, needs no credentials, and has one runtime dependency (PyYAML). There is no LLM inside the tool.
In CI
Three lines, and findings land in the Security tab as annotations:
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # so the SARIF can be uploaded
jobs:
arkexa:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: alokgorithm/ARKEXA@v0
@v0 is a moving tag. It is force-updated to the newest v0.x release,
so what runs changes underneath you when a release lands. That is convenient
and it is not immutable.
If you want immutability, pin the commit SHA — which is advice this tool gives about other people's actions, so it had better take it:
- uses: alokgorithm/ARKEXA@<sha> # v0.1.0a1
A pinned SHA fixes the scanner version as well as the wrapper, because the
Action installs from its own checkout. That cuts both ways: @v0 means you
get fixes without doing anything, and also means you get changes you did not
review. Pick deliberately. Immutable version tags — v0.1.0a1 and successors
— are also available if you want a readable pin that still never moves.
Useful inputs:
| input | default | what it does |
|---|---|---|
path |
. |
file or directory to scan |
reachability |
external |
external, contributor, maintainer, all |
severity |
critical |
fail at this severity or above |
upload |
true |
upload SARIF to code scanning |
fail-on-findings |
true |
set false to report without failing the build |
upload: true needs security-events: write, and code scanning is
unavailable on private repositories without Advanced Security — set it to
false there and the SARIF is still written for you to keep as an artifact.
The SARIF is also available on its own, for uploading yourself or feeding to something else:
arkexa . --format sarif > arkexa.sarif
Or without the action at all:
- run: pipx install "arkexa==0.1.0a1"
- run: arkexa .
Configuration
.arkexa.yml, in the root of the repository. There is a fully commented
.arkexa.yml.example to copy:
ignore:
- rule: ARK004
path: .github/workflows/nightly.yml
reason: runs in an isolated container with no token
A reason is required. An ignore without one is reported and not applied,
because an ignore nobody can explain is how a scanner quietly stops working.
Adding support for a new agent
Most contributions are one line in
src/arkexa/data/agents.yml. If your team's
agent CLI isn't recognised, add its signature and open a pull request - no
Python required.
Measured
Nobody publishes precision numbers for CI scanners. Here are ours, including the part that does not flatter us.
Prevalence — of 49 judgeable workflows hand-labelled from a random draw of a 98-workflow unbiased sweep, 18 contain an externally reachable path from attacker-controlled text to a privileged agent action: 36.7%, Wilson 95% CI 24.7–50.7%. Labelled by hand before any scanner was run.
Evaluation — a second corpus of 30 workflows, collected under queries derived and committed before the code they score, hand-labelled blind, scored once:
| tool | precision | recall | total findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| ARKEXA 0.2 | 67% | 17% | 5 |
| ARKEXA 0.1.0a1 | 100% | 17% | 2 |
| ARKEXA before the 0.2 coverage work | 100% | 8% | 1 |
| zizmor 1.30.0 | 43% | 100% | 211 |
Read all four rows. Against the released 0.1.0a1, v0.2 is not an improvement here: same recall, precision down, more findings. Against the build immediately before the coverage work it doubled recall, from a base of one. Both are true, which is why the intermediate build is in the table. v0.2 also introduced ARKEXA's first false positive on a benchmark corpus — a dispatch-only workflow promoted to externally reachable because it reads issue text at run time. It is published rather than quietly fixed, and the fix waits for a corpus of its own.
zizmor finds all twelve positives and emits 211 findings to do it. The precision case is real. The coverage case is not: ARKEXA misses ten of twelve, and five of those are workflows whose agent it does not recognise at all.
The earlier figures — 67% precision, 11% recall on the prevalence draw of 50 — are superseded by this run and kept in git history.
No rule was changed after seeing these numbers. The labels are ground truth,
and tuning against them would leave nothing worth publishing. The method, the
labelling standards, and the disclosure rules that bind all of it are in
METHODOLOGY.md; the corpus is two corpora, and
benchmark/ explains why.
Contributing
See CONTRIBUTING.md. False positives are treated as bugs of the same severity as false negatives; there are issue templates for both, and every rule ships with a safe fixture proving it stays quiet. Participation is governed by the Code of Conduct.
Changes are recorded in CHANGELOG.md, including any change that makes a rule report less - a scanner that goes quiet without saying so is worse than one that never ran.
Security
See SECURITY.md for how to report a vulnerability in ARKEXA, and for the disclosure policy that governs findings in other people's repositories.
License
MIT
Metadata
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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Total release size: 180.8 kB
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