Atbash SDK — agent safety / judge HTTP client + Rust core (secp256k1 signing, GTV/GTX, redaction, memory diff).
Project description
atbash-sdk
Python SDK for Atbash — the safety layer that evaluates AI agent actions against operator-defined policies before execution.
Installation
pip install atbash-sdk
Requires Python 3.9+. Server-side only — private keys are used for local signing and must never be embedded in clients you don't control.
The PyPI distribution name is atbash-sdk; the import package is atbash:
from atbash import Atbash, generate_keypair
Quickstart
import os
from atbash import Atbash
# 1. Construct an Atbash client with the private key you saved during
# agent creation. The constructor validates the key and derives the
# matching public key for you.
client = Atbash(os.environ["ATBASH_AGENT_KEY"])
# 2. Submit an action for judgment, before executing it.
# The SDK signs the transaction locally and sends it to the judge API.
# Private key stays on your machine — never sent over HTTP.
result = client.judge_action(
"Transfer $50,000 to external wallet 0xabc",
"Outbound AML check — new recipient, over threshold",
)
# 3. Enforce the verdict
if result.verdict == "ALLOW":
# Proceed with the action
...
elif result.verdict == "HOLD":
# Held — operator must approve in the dashboard
print("Held for review:", result.tool_call_id)
elif result.verdict == "BLOCK":
# Refused — agent is jailed in Enforcement tier
raise RuntimeError(f"Blocked: {result.reason}")
Before this works, the agent must be onboarded at atbash.ai — assigned to an org, with a policy pack attached, and the org tier set to Audit+ or Enforcement.
How it works
client.judge_action() performs a two-step flow:
- Sign locally — signs the transaction using the agent's private key. The key never leaves your machine.
- Request verdict — sends the signed transaction,
tool_call_id, andagent_pubkeyto the Atbash judge API. The server broadcasts it to the Chromia blockchain and returns a verdict.
Don't have an agent yet?
There are two ways to create an agent:
-
Dashboard (recommended) — create an agent at atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents. The dashboard generates the keypair, assigns the agent to your org, and lets you attach a policy pack — all in one step.
-
Programmatic — generate a new keypair locally or bring an existing secp256k1 private key from another platform, then onboard it via the dashboard:
from atbash import generate_keypair
kp = generate_keypair()
print("Save this private key somewhere safe:", kp.priv_key)
# `kp` is a frozen typed record. `repr(kp)` redacts the private key so a
# stray print() or exception traceback can't leak it.
Note: After generating a key programmatically, you must still onboard the agent at atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents — assign it to an org and attach a policy pack before
judge_actionwill work.
Secret storage
- Load the private key from an environment variable (
ATBASH_AGENT_KEY) or a secret manager — never hardcode it. - Never commit
.envfiles containing the key. - If a key leaks, stop using it and create a new agent in the dashboard.
Typed records (no surprise private keys in logs)
All multi-field results — KeyPair, AgentAuth, RedactResult, MemoryDiffResult, etc. — are typed records with attribute access (kp.priv_key, not kp["priv_key"]). Secret-bearing records redact themselves in repr() so a stray print() or exception traceback never leaks the private key:
>>> from atbash import generate_keypair
>>> kp = generate_keypair()
>>> kp
KeyPair(priv_key='<redacted>', pub_key='02b421a3a9…')
>>> kp.priv_key # explicit access still works
'a9e794180b9472de…'
Verdicts
Every judge_action call returns one of three verdicts:
| Verdict | Meaning | What your code should do |
|---|---|---|
ALLOW |
Action is within policy | Proceed with execution |
HOLD |
Requires operator review | Pause — poll get_judgment_status until resolved |
BLOCK |
Violates a red line | Abort — agent is jailed in Enforcement tier |
NB: If your org is on the Audit tier, the judge returns
"No verdict"— actions are logged on-chain for the audit trail but not evaluated by an AI provider. Upgrade to Audit+ or Enforcement at atbash.ai/risk-engine/settings for active verdicts.
API
Judge
Atbash.judge_action(
action: str,
context: str = "",
*,
tool_name: str = "",
tool_args_json: str = "",
provider: str | None = None,
model: str | None = None,
) -> JudgeResult
Submit an action for judgment before execution. Signs the transaction locally and sends it to the judge API for a verdict.
class Atbash:
def __init__(
self,
privkey: str, # 64-char hex secp256k1 private key (0x-prefix ok)
*,
endpoint: str = "https://atbash.ai",
timeout: float = 30.0,
node_urls: Sequence[str] | None = None, # Chromia node URLs
blockchain_rid: str | None = None, # Override default chain
verify_pubkey: str | None = None, # 66-hex judge response-sign pubkey
fail_closed: bool = True, # audit_tool_call denies on error
logger: Any = None, # object with .info(...) / .warn(...)
) -> None: ...
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class JudgeResult:
verdict: str # "ALLOW", "HOLD", or "BLOCK"
action_type: str # "allow", "hold_for_user_confirm", or "block"
reason: str # Human-readable explanation
confidence: float # 0–1
provider: str # Which provider evaluated the action
latency_ms: int # Inference time
tool_call_id: str # Unique ID for this judgment
on_chain: bool # Whether the record was written on-chain
One-call guard: audit_tool_call
Atbash.audit_tool_call(input: ToolCallInput) -> Decision
Redact secrets → sign → judge → allow/deny Decision, failing closed by default (any error denies unless fail_closed=False on the client):
from atbash import Atbash, ToolCallInput
client = Atbash.from_config()
decision = client.audit_tool_call(ToolCallInput(
tool_name="shell.exec",
args={"cmd": "rm -rf /tmp/cache"},
context="cleaning build cache",
))
if not decision.allow:
raise RuntimeError(f"{decision.verdict}: {decision.reason}")
Secret-shaped values in args/context are redacted before signing, so they never reach the signed bytes, the request, the on-chain log, or the LLM prompt.
Log tool call (low-level)
Atbash.log_tool_call(
action: str,
context: str = "",
*,
tool_name: str = "",
tool_args_json: str = "",
) -> LogToolCallResult
Sign the transaction locally. Returns LogToolCallResult(success, tool_call_id, signed_hex, error). Use this if you need to separate the signing step from the verdict request.
Poll judgment status
Atbash.get_judgment_status(judgment_id: str) -> JudgmentStatus
Check whether a held action has been approved or rejected by an operator.
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class JudgmentStatus:
status: Literal["pending", "answered", "error"]
verdict: str
reason: str
judgment_id: str
on_chain: bool | None
cached: bool | None
response_time_ms: int | None
Agent identity
load_agent(privkey: str) -> AgentAuth
generate_keypair() -> KeyPair
derive_public_key(priv_key_hex: str) -> str
is_valid_private_key(hex: str) -> bool
load_agent_from_file(key_path: str | None = None) -> AgentAuth
load_agent(privkey) is the canonical loader — pass in the private key from the dashboard, get back AgentAuth(privkey, pubkey) ready for use. It accepts 0x-prefixed, padded, or mixed-case input and raises ValueError on malformed keys. Use generate_keypair() only for local development; for production, create agents in the dashboard so operators can attach policies.
load_agent_from_file(key_path) resolves the key from disk (defaults to ~/.config/atbash/guard-client-key), trimming whitespace and validating the format.
Operations
Methods that sign transactions and write to the Chromia blockchain.
| Method | Use case |
|---|---|
client.judge_action(action, context, ...) |
Sign locally + request a verdict from the judge API |
client.audit_tool_call(input) |
Redact secrets → sign → judge → fail-closed Decision |
client.log_tool_call(action, context, ...) |
Sign the transaction locally without requesting a verdict |
Queries
| Method | Use case |
|---|---|
client.check_agent_exists(pubkey=None) |
Check if an agent is onboarded before signing |
client.get_judgment_status(judgment_id) |
Poll whether a held action has been approved or rejected |
client.get_tool_calls(max_count) |
List recent tool calls across all agents |
client.get_org_tool_calls(org_name, max_count) |
List tool calls for a specific org |
client.get_agent_tool_calls(pubkey, max_count) |
List tool calls for a specific agent |
client.get_tool_call_count() |
Get total number of tool calls on-chain |
client.get_tool_call_full(tool_call_id) |
Get full details of a single tool call (verdict, context, timing) |
client.get_org_tier_info(org_name) |
Check an org's tier and whether verdicts are enabled |
client.get_agent_detail(pubkey) |
Get agent metadata (org, status, creation date) |
client.get_agent_policy(pubkey) |
Check agent's policy pack and jail status |
client.get_pending_held_actions(org_name, max_count) |
List actions waiting for operator approval |
client.get_held_action_reviews(org_name, max_count) |
List completed operator reviews |
client.get_safety_stats() |
Get chain-wide safety statistics (total judgments, verdicts, etc.) |
Configuration
You can pass configuration inline to the Atbash(...) constructor or use the built-in config module that reads from ~/.config/atbash/config.json.
Inline
from atbash import Atbash
client = Atbash(
privkey,
endpoint="https://your-instance.example.com",
timeout=30.0,
)
result = client.judge_action("Transfer $500", "finance", provider="openai", model="gpt-4o")
Persistent config
Save configuration once — the SDK resolves values with priority: flag > env var > config file.
from atbash import Atbash, save_user_config
# Save once
save_user_config({
"agentKey": "9cd07a...",
"orgName": "my_org",
"provider": "openai",
})
# Then construct from config anywhere
client = Atbash.from_config()
result = client.judge_action("Transfer $500", "finance")
Atbash.from_config() also validates the configured judge endpoint against the trusted allowlist (or your self-hosted policy) and wires the endpoint's response-signing pubkey as the default verify_pubkey.
Config file location: ~/.config/atbash/config.json
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
save_user_config(config) |
Write config to disk |
load_user_config() |
Read config from disk |
resolve(key, flag_value=None) |
Resolve a value: flag > env > file > "" |
get_config_path() |
Returns the config file path |
validate_judge_endpoint(...) |
Validate against trusted allowlist or self-hosted policy |
resolve_key_path(path=None) |
Resolve the agent key file path (default ~/.config/atbash/guard-client-key) |
| Config key | Env var |
|---|---|
agentKey |
ATBASH_AGENT_KEY |
orgName |
ATBASH_ORG_NAME |
judgeEndpoint |
ATBASH_ENDPOINT |
blockchainRid |
ATBASH_BLOCKCHAIN_RID |
provider |
ATBASH_PROVIDER |
providerModel |
ATBASH_PROVIDER_MODEL |
Advanced: The SDK connects to the default Atbash Chromia chain. To use a different chain, pass
node_urls=andblockchain_rid=to theAtbash(...)constructor.
Secret redaction
Before each audit_tool_call signs anything, the SDK scans args and context for secret-shaped values (API keys, tokens, JWTs, PEM blocks, etc.) and replaces matches with [REDACTED:<kind>]. Redaction happens before signing, so secrets never reach the signed bytes, the request body, the on-chain log, or the prompt sent to the AI provider.
When the redactor fires, you'll see a warning via the configured logger:
[atbash] redacted secrets before judge call { tool: "exec", count: 2, kinds: ["anthropic", "generic_token"] }
Common kinds:
anthropic,openai,github,google,aws_access_key,stripe,slack,jwt,private_key_pem— high-confidence vendor patterns; if you see these, a real secret was almost certainly in your inputcontext_secret— a value next to a label likeapi_key=,token:,password=, etc.generic_token— long random-looking strings (32+ alphanumeric chars). Catches unknown-vendor secrets, but can also match UUIDs, content hashes, and other opaque identifiers. The judge sees[REDACTED:generic_token]instead of the original; for verdict purposes the shape of the action matters more than the exact ID, so this is generally safe — but worth knowing if you see it unexpectedly.base64— long base64-encoded values; can match legitimate image/file data
Redaction is silent at the consumer level — the SDK's caller still has the original arguments. Only what's sent to the judge (and persisted on chain via the verdict log) is scrubbed.
You can also call the redactor directly:
from atbash import redact_secrets, contains_secret
result = redact_secrets('curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-…" https://api.example.com')
result.redacted # 'curl -H "Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED:openai]" https://api.example.com'
[(m.kind, m.length) for m in result.found] # [('openai', 51)]
contains_secret("plain string") # False
Integration patterns
Pre-execution gate
def safe_execute(client, action, context, execute):
result = client.judge_action(action, context)
if result.verdict == "BLOCK":
raise RuntimeError(f"Blocked: {result.reason}")
if result.verdict == "HOLD":
raise RuntimeError(f"Held for review: {result.tool_call_id}")
return execute()
Polling a held action
import time
def wait_for_approval(client, tool_call_id, poll_interval=5.0):
while True:
status = client.get_judgment_status(tool_call_id)
if status.status == "answered":
return status.verdict
if status.status == "error":
raise RuntimeError(status.reason)
time.sleep(poll_interval)
Checking agent jail status
policy = client.get_agent_policy(client.pubkey)
if policy.is_jailed:
raise SystemExit("Agent is jailed — unjail via dashboard before retrying.")
Error handling
The SDK raises standard Exception subclasses. Known failure modes are enriched with a pointer to the relevant dashboard page, so the error message tells you where to fix the problem:
API error 404: {"error":"Agent not registered..."}
→ Onboard the agent at https://atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents
| Error | Cause | Where to fix |
|---|---|---|
API error 404: Agent not registered |
Agent not onboarded | atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents |
API error 400: Agent has no policy |
No policy attached to agent | atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents |
Agent is jailed |
BLOCK verdict triggered auto-jail (Enforcement tier) | atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents |
Org tier does not support verdicts |
Org is on Audit tier | atbash.ai/risk-engine/settings |
API error 400: action is required |
Empty action string | Fix caller |
API error 502: Incorrect API key |
Invalid provider API key | Check saved key at atbash.ai/risk-engine/settings |
from atbash import AtbashAPIError
try:
result = client.judge_action(action, context)
except AtbashAPIError as err:
if "Agent not registered" in str(err):
# Point the user at https://atbash.ai/risk-engine/agents to onboard.
...
Dashboard
Policy authoring, operator reviews, and agent management happen at atbash.ai. The SDK is the programmatic interface; the dashboard is the operator interface.
License
Proprietary — all rights reserved. See LICENSE.
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