attackmap-analyzer-iac
Infrastructure-as-Code analyzer plugin for AttackMap.
Covers the class of files that live outside application source but drive the actual runtime posture:
- Dockerfile (also
Dockerfile.*,Dockerfile-*,*.Dockerfile,*.dockerfile,Containerfile*): non-root user and healthcheck, both checked on the final build stage, including what it inherits from an earlier stage it is builtFROM; exposed ports;RUN curl | bash;ADD <url>; base-image pinning, one hint per unpinned image, skippingscratchand stage aliases; literal secrets inENV/ARG - docker-compose (
docker-compose*.y[a]ml,compose*.y[a]ml, so overrides likedocker-compose.override.ymltoo): service list (feeds the topology graph),env_filereferences, host-mount volumes, privileged containers, Docker socket mounts,cap_add: SYS_ADMIN/ALL,pid: host,seccomp:unconfined, published ports that bind all interfaces (explicit0.0.0.0, or short syntax with no host IP such as"5432:5432"),network_mode: host, and literal secrets inenvironment: - GitHub Actions workflows —
pull_request_targetwith checkout, third-party actions pinned by tag vs SHA, secret exposure to fork PRs, step-levelpermissions: .envtemplates (.env.example,sample.env) — secret inventory (the shape, not the value)- Shell installers —
curl | bashpatterns,sudoscope, TLS material handling - Kubernetes manifests (any
.yaml/.ymlwith top-levelapiVersion:andkind:) — workloads (Pod,Deployment,StatefulSet,DaemonSet,ReplicaSet,Job,CronJob,ReplicationController):privileged,allowPrivilegeEscalation: true,runAsUser: 0, missingrunAsNonRoot/allowPrivilegeEscalation: false,hostPathvolumes (high for the runtime socket,/,/etc,/proc,/sys,/dev,/var/lib/kubelet…),hostNetwork/hostPID/hostIPC, dangerous capabilities,Unconfinedseccomp/AppArmor,:latest/untagged images; RBAC roles with*on core/RBAC/apps groups,escalate/bind/impersonate,pods/exec, Secret reads; bindings tocluster-adminorsystem:authenticated/unauthenticated/anonymous;LoadBalancer/NodePortServices withoutloadBalancerSourceRanges(entrypoints too; internal load balancers skipped);Ingresshost/path rules (routes); literalSecretvalues - Helm charts — templates under
templates/next to aChart.yamlare read without rendering:{{ }}actions are stripped (line numbers kept) and a templated value is never reported, because the chart's values decide it. A setting inside{{ if }}/{{ with }}is reported with low confidence (it may be off by default).values.yamldefaults (privileged,hostNetwork/hostPID/hostIPC,allowPrivilegeEscalation,runAsUser: 0, capabilities) are reported with confidence 0.5
Emits routes for exposed ports, external calls for third-party actions and curl fetches, SecretHint for env-template inventory, service-topology hints for compose services: — feeding the same pipeline as the source-code analyzers.
Misconfigurations and posture signals
Every signal carries file, line and evidence_text. Signals about something missing (no USER, no HEALTHCHECK, no permissions:) point at the final FROM line or line 1.
Container and cluster misconfigurations are CloudMisconfig records (cloud_misconfigs, iac#1), which AttackMap core turns into findings with CWE/OWASP ids. Each names the resource (Deployment/web container app, service agent), a per-instance severity and confidence, and an escalation_path (e.g. container runtime socket → start a privileged container → root on the node):
| Kind | Dockerfile / compose | Kubernetes / Helm |
|---|---|---|
container_runs_as_root |
no USER in the final stage (low), USER root (medium) |
runAsUser: 0 |
privileged_container |
privileged: true |
securityContext.privileged: true |
host_path_mount |
runtime socket and /etc, /proc, … bind mounts (/srv/data is not reported) |
hostPath volumes |
host_namespace_shared |
pid: host, ipc: host, network_mode: host |
hostPID, hostNetwork, hostIPC |
dangerous_capability |
cap_add |
capabilities.add (SYS_ADMIN, ALL, SYS_MODULE, SYS_PTRACE, … high; NET_ADMIN medium) |
security_profile_disabled |
seccomp:unconfined, apparmor:unconfined |
seccompProfile/appArmorProfile Unconfined |
unpinned_container_image |
FROM image:latest or untagged |
image: :latest or untagged |
dockerfile_remote_add / dockerfile_curl_pipe_shell |
ADD <url> without --checksum, RUN curl | sh |
|
privilege_escalation_allowed, missing_security_context (low) |
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true; no runAsNonRoot / allowPrivilegeEscalation: false |
|
rbac_wildcard, rbac_escalation, rbac_secret_access, cluster_admin_binding, exposed_service |
RBAC and Services |
No AuthHints are emitted: core reads those as auth signals, and one in a Dockerfile counted as an auth control for its EXPOSE route. With an AttackMap core older than the CloudMisconfig record, the old AuthHints (dockerfile_no_user_directive, dockerfile_user_root, compose_privileged_container, compose_docker_socket_mount, compose_cap_add_sys_admin, compose_pid_host, compose_seccomp_unconfined) are emitted instead. The other signals are split by meaning (AttackMap#258):
| Signal list | Hints |
|---|---|
entrypoint_hints (network exposure) |
compose_port_binding_all_interfaces:<binding>, compose_network_mode_host, k8s_service_loadbalancer:<name>, k8s_service_nodeport:<name>, k8s_ingress:<host> |
framework_hints (build, supply-chain, CI and deployment config) |
dockerfile_no_healthcheck, dockerfile_run_curl_pipe, dockerfile_add_remote, dockerfile_base_image_unpinned:<image>, compose_env_file_reference, compose_host_mount:<host path>, gha_third_party_action_tag_pinned:<owner/repo>, gha_pull_request_target_with_checkout, gha_no_top_level_permissions, shell_curl_pipe_installer, shell_sudo_used, shell_permissive_chmod |
service_hints |
service_name:<compose service> |
The Dockerfile user check looks at the final stage's effective user (the last USER, inherited through FROM <stage>). A USER nobody in a builder stage doesn't hide a root final image, and USER root followed by USER app isn't flagged. A final base tagged :nonroot counts as setting a user.
Secret-shaped ENV/ARG names (*SECRET*, *TOKEN*, *PASSWORD*, *_KEY, …) and environment: entries with a literal value become SecretHint(kind="hardcoded"). *_FILE paths, ${VAR} references, booleans and ARG without a default are not flagged.
Bluesky FINDINGS §2 documented this as the biggest coverage gap: bluesky-social/pds (a deployment repo) was 95% invisible to AttackMap because every non-JS file was outside the analyzer model. This plugin closes that gap.
Install
uv tool install attackmap --with attackmap-analyzer-iac # from PyPI
# or: pip install attackmap-analyzer-iac (installs attackmap too)
# or from source:
pip install git+https://github.com/mlaify/attackmap-analyzer-iac.git
# or as part of the bundle
pip install "attackmap[all]"
Usage
Runs automatically via the attackmap.analyzers entry-point group once installed:
attackmap analyze /path/to/deployment-repo --output reports
Contract
Implements AnalyzerProtocol from attackmap.sdk. See the external-analyzer guide.
Scope
In: patterns any competent operator recognizes on inspection — the docker-compose service graph, pull_request_target combined with untrusted checkout, non-root User directive presence, curl-piped installer scripts.
Out: deep semantic analysis of container image contents, live registry scanning, executed-runtime introspection. Those belong in other tools; AttackMap's differentiator is narrative attack-path reasoning over the code you can see.
Metadata
Release files for attackmap-analyzer-iac 0.2.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1.tar.gz | 46.8 kB | With provenance | Details for attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 79.5 kB
Release files / attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 46.8 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
13b81e7c4ff11297b07c0065ebf993316b14ff66ada58712c2c4b58f951319d1
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BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 32.8 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
8a364c760d8129fa4881460484a77f8a18793c9526d47585c458b121f47d65f2
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BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
ee8fb3352dee6813e2f5ad13e9e735f370232d4d1ff394790c67970050606b26
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| Upload date | |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
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Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for attackmap-analyzer-iac 0.2.1
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
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Attestation for attackmap_analyzer_iac-0.2.1.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.
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