auth51 0.1.0

auth51 client (embed mode) — in-process egress interception that gives every agent action a scoped, verifiable, DPoP-bound intent token, minted at the source and verified at the resource.

auth51 — Python client (embed mode)

The in-process enforcement point: it intercepts your agent's egress and gives every governed call a scoped, verifiable intent token — minted at the source, verified at the resource. This is the generalized, MCP-era successor to the original A-JWT client shim, with contextvar-based agent attribution (no call- stack introspection) per DESIGN §7b.

It's the durable, unbypassable path: it sees all egress in-process (native tool calls and MCP calls), and depends only on the HTTP library — not on any agent host's conventions.

Use

import auth51

auth51.configure(
    authority_url="https://authority.auth51.com",
    client_id="...", client_secret="...",
    audiences=["api.internal"],          # hosts to govern; everything else passes through
)

with auth51.agent("ReviewBot", checksum=agent_checksum, scope="read:repo"):
    httpx.get("https://api.internal/repos/...")   # ← stamped with an intent token

Config can also come from env: AUTH51_AUTHORITY_URL, AUTH51_CLIENT_ID, AUTH51_CLIENT_SECRET, AUTH51_AUDIENCES (comma-sep), AUTH51_FAIL_OPEN.

How it works

• One import installs it (idempotent; a no-op until configured + inside an agent() context).
• A framework adapter (LangChain/CrewAI — next) or the app sets the current agent via a contextvar at the tool-call boundary; the interceptor reads it.
• On governed egress: mint a scoped intent token (Hop A) → attach as a Bearer header → forward. Minting uses stdlib urllib so it never re-enters the patched HTTP client.
• fail-open by default (mint failure → forward unstamped, don't wedge the agent); set fail_open=False to fail closed.

Retained from the original A-JWT client shim

• Startup-sync (load_agents) — preload registered agents from the authority, index by checksum, detect collisions, and fail-fast on drift when the app declares expected checksums. Boot-time validation: a mis-deployed agent is caught before it runs.
• Workflow seams — with auth51.workflow(id): ... + record_step(...) track an execution; the chain + completed-steps + prev_jti ride into each intent token's delegation_context (§4.3 tamper-evident trace).
• contextvar attribution + smart caching — kept; call-stack introspection dropped.

Status

• ✅ contextvar agent attribution · httpx sync + async + requests interception · mint + attach · fail-open/closed
• ✅ load_agents() startup-sync (cache + collision + drift validation) · workflow seams (delegation_context + prev_jti chain)
• ✅ LangChain adapter (auth51.adapters.langchain.Auth51CallbackHandler) — sets agent context + records steps at tool boundaries
• ⏭️ next: PoP signing (the cnf binding) · MCP _meta injection · aiohttp · local checksum recompute (shared lib) · live e2e against the deployed authority