awseal

Sign an artifact so a stranger can verify it.

awseal puts an Ed25519 signature over every byte of a directory and writes a small awseal.json beside it. The key that verifies is not the key that signs, so you can publish the public half and anyone can check your work.

pip install awseal

awseal keygen                                   # once
awseal sign ./my-adapter --subject my-adapter   # writes awseal.json
awseal pubkey                                   # publish this

# someone else, later:
awseal verify ./my-adapter --key <your-public-key>

import awseal
from pathlib import Path

seal = awseal.sign(Path("my-adapter"))
awseal.write(seal, Path("my-adapter"))

r = awseal.verify(Path("my-adapter"), expect_key=PUBLISHER_KEY)
r["ok"]             # everything held
r["signature_ok"]   # this key signed this payload
r["content_ok"]     # the files still match
r["diff"]           # exactly which files were added/removed/modified

Three rules, each learned by breaking it

1. There is no default key. awseal raises when it cannot find one. The signer this was extracted from read its secret from an environment variable with a literal fallback baked into the source — and that variable was set nowhere, so every signature it produced was forgeable by anyone who opened the file, and its verifier returned True for the forgery. A verifier that certifies forgeries is worse than no verifier: it converts unverified into verified.

2. The signature covers the content, not a summary. The original signed a payload containing len(violations) — the count of the findings, not the findings. Rewrite every entry and the signature still checks out, provided you keep the same number of them. Here the signed payload contains the full {path: sha256} map, and paths are included because a file moved into another slot is a different artifact carrying the same bytes.

3. ok is not one question. verify reports signature_ok, content_ok and a diff separately, because the interesting failure is a valid signature over a payload that no longer matches the disk — and one boolean cannot say that. "Invalid" sends a reader hunting for a key problem when the answer is usually "you added a file", which the diff names outright.

What a seal does and does not prove

Without --key, a seal proves the artifact has not changed since someone sealed it. Anyone can generate a key and sign anything, so that is a statement about tampering, not about origin. Passing the publisher's public key is what turns it into this came from them. The CLI says so on every run rather than letting a bare pass be misread.

Line endings are not normalised. They are content: a script whose CRLFs were rewritten is a different file to the shell that runs it, and a seal saying otherwise would be lying about the bytes that execute.

Licence

Apache-2.0.

The aw family

Standalone tools that share one idea: replace something you would otherwise have to trust with something you can check.

Each installs on its own, works offline, and needs no account.

awnix is the ground floor — A Linux you can hand to an agent — immutable base, capabilities included.

The Aitherium ecosystem

Every repository here is public. Each publishes an aither-manifest.json beside its page, so any surface can read every sibling's — the network is browsable from any node in it.