awstorage

Docs · Source · pip install awstorage · The Aither World

The Aither World is an operating system for agents — a Linux you can hand to one, the runtimes it works in, and the tools it works with. awnix is the Linux underneath it; awstorage is one of its 65 bricks — each installs on its own, runs offline, and needs no account.

Start here: Scan one drive and read a ranked inventory of what fills it, with each tree marked re-fetchable or not.

Every drive on every node, indexed, classified and diffed -- so you can see what you own before you delete it.

pip install git+https://github.com/Aitherium/awstorage.git
awstorage scan E:/ --depth 3 --catalog inventory.db
awstorage inventory --catalog inventory.db
awstorage propose --catalog inventory.db --snapshot 1
awstorage apply   --catalog inventory.db --proposal 3 --root E:/        # dry run
awstorage apply   --catalog inventory.db --proposal 3 --root E:/ --yes  # quarantine it
awstorage revert  E:/.awstorage-quarantine/3-20260901T230000            # changed your mind

Stdlib only. Works alone, offline, on the box whose disk is full.

What it does

1. Scan a root into a snapshot: every directory tree to a bounded depth with its bytes, file count and newest mtime, plus the largest files. Bounded by a time budget; a scan that runs out marks the snapshot TRUNCATED instead of printing a total that looks complete and is not.
2. Classify each tree: package-cache, build-temp, model-weights, container-store, dataset, backup, repo, logs, service-state, media, vm-disk, unknown -- and whether it is re-fetchable. Heuristics offline; plug any complete(prompt) -> str model callable into LLMClassifier and every verdict records whether a rule or a model made it, so a wrong call is auditable.
3. Catalog snapshots in SQLite and diff them: what appeared, vanished, grew and shrank since last time. "What filled the disk?" becomes a query.
4. Propose actions under a written policy. Rules pre-approve only re-fetchable classes past a size and an age; service-state, dataset, vm-disk, backup and unknown are never auto. Everything else is proposed for a human to approve.
5. Apply -- dry run by default. A delete is a quarantine: the tree is renamed onto the same volume under <root>/.awstorage-quarantine/, revert puts it back byte-for-byte, and only quarantine --purge-older-than N --yes reclaims the bytes. apply refuses anything outside the declared roots, anything that changed since the scan, and anything neither pre-approved nor approved. Every outcome is ledgered.
6. Sweep -- named retention rules, unattended: live guard, harvest-first (verified, secrets withheld), link-safe removal, a receipt on every exit path. See below.
7. Index files (awstorage files ...): one row per file in files.db (the catalog's sibling), searchable by file name (SQLite FTS5, trigram), rolled up by directory, with duplicates found by size bucket, then a head+tail partial hash, then a full sha256 -- hard links collapse, and actionable_bytes counts only copies a manage action could really reclaim. Rescans are incremental: only files whose size, mtime or hash changed are written (each takes a new seq); files a COMPLETED walk no longer sees become tombstones; a truncated walk deletes nothing. Credential-shaped files (.ssh, .env*, *.pem, ...) are indexed but flagged and redacted for any non-platform reader (awstorage.guards).

awstorage whoami                                  # AWSTORAGE_NODE > ~/.aither/node-id > hostname
awstorage files scan E:/ D:/Media --hash auto     # index + hash only possible dupes
awstorage files scan --all-volumes                # every fixed volume minus the never set
awstorage files find quarterly report --ext pdf   # every word, substring of the name
awstorage files dupes --min-bytes 1048576         # most waste first
awstorage files tree E:/ --depth 2                # sizes by path, from the rollup
awstorage files nodes                             # what is indexed, and how stale
awstorage files push                              # DELTA since the fleet's last seq
awstorage manage shares                           # python -m awstorage.manage

find|dupes|tree read the FLEET index when a session bearer exists (--remote; --local reads this node's files.db).

Python

import awstorage
from pathlib import Path

snap = awstorage.classify_snapshot(awstorage.scan(Path("E:/"), max_depth=3))
cat = awstorage.Catalog("inventory.db")
sid = cat.put_snapshot(snap)
for row in awstorage.rank(snap)[:10]:
    print(row["exclusive_bytes"], row["cls"], row["refetchable"], row["path"])
props = awstorage.propose(snap, awstorage.default_policy(), snapshot_id=sid)
awstorage.apply(props[0], roots=[Path("E:/")], dry_run=True)

Sweep agent scratch automatically

scan -> propose -> apply wants a person between the steps. The thing that filled drive C: on 2026-09-27 (122 MB free, a WSL root fs corrupted mid-boot) did not: 173 GB of per-session agent scratchpads under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\claude\<project>\<session>\ that nothing reaped -- one dead session held 106 GB -- plus ~19k stale Temp entries. sweep is the unattended half:

awstorage sweep --rules agent-scratch,temp-toplevel                  # dry run: the full plan
awstorage sweep --rules agent-scratch,temp-toplevel --yes \
    --harvest-to E:\AitherOS-Data\harvest --emergency-free-gb 40 \
    --receipt ~/.aither/awstorage/last_sweep.json

Schedule it with awrise:

awrise add --name awstorage-sweep --every 3h --detach --timeout 3600 -- awstorage sweep --rules agent-scratch,temp-toplevel --yes --harvest-to E:\AitherOS-Data\harvest --emergency-free-gb 40 --receipt ~/.aither/awstorage/last_sweep.json
awrise set --name awstorage-sweep receipt=~/.aither/awstorage/last_sweep.json

One pass: expand rules -> measure -> guard -> harvest -> remove -> ledger -> receipt.

• Rules are data, and opt-in by name. Shipped presets: agent-scratch (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\claude\*\* on Windows, $TMPDIR/claude/*/* elsewhere; idle 12h) and temp-toplevel (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\* minus the claude dir; idle 3d). Nothing is swept without a rule naming it. Your own rules go in a JSON --policy file:

  {"retention": [{"name": "build-scratch", "paths": ["~/scratch/*"], "class": "build-temp",
                  "max_idle": "2d", "action": "quarantine", "purge_after": "3d",
                  "exclude": ["~/scratch/keep-*"], "live_guard": {"window": "2h"},
                  "harvest": {"include": ["**/*.md"], "max_file_kb": 256},
                  "snapshot": false}]}
  

  One glob match = one item. class may not be a never-auto class (service-state, dataset, vm-disk, backup, unknown).
• Age is the newest file inside the item, never the item's own mtime.
• Live guard. An item that changed inside live_guard.window (default 2h), or whose name is registered live, is skipped and reported skipped-live. An agent runtime registers its session scratch through AWSTORAGE_LIVE_IDS (comma/space separated) or a --live-ids file (one id per line, # comments); an id matches the item's basename. An id containing a path separator is a PATH id: it keeps that exact dir, everything under it and every ancestor -- how a runtime marks a session dir with a generic name (scratchpad, tmp) live without shielding every dir of that name. An unreadable --live-ids file stops the sweep (exit 2) -- "nobody is live" is never a guess.
• Harvest first. Small text files matching the include globs (default **/*.md, **/*.json, **/*report*, **/*eval*/**, **/results/**; 512 KB/file, 20 MB/item; NUL in the first 8 KB = binary) are copied to <shelf>/<rule>/<YYYY-MM-DD>/<item>/ with a manifest.json (item, bytes, file count, top-20 subdirs, every copy's sha256, every skip's reason). Every copy is re-read and checked (size + sha256) before the item may go; any failure keeps the item and exits 1. A file matching a credential pattern (sk-, ghp_, AKIA, xoxb-, private-key blocks, password=<value>, ...) is withheld: listed by name, never copied, the match never written. --harvest-offdrive refuses a shelf on the item's own drive.
• Links are never followed. A symlink or Windows junction inside an item is unlinked; its target is untouched (removal, quarantine, purge and scan all ask the same is_link(), which sees junctions on every Python).
• Quarantine by default. Items move to <base>/.awstorage-quarantine/sweep-<rule>-* (awstorage revert works on them) and are purged after the rule's purge_after. action: delete deletes outright -- only with --yes, like everything else.
• Emergency. --emergency-free-gb N: when an item's drive has less than N GB free, that rule's max_idle (and purge_after) halve for the pass; harvest still runs first. A rule with emergency_delete: true (the two presets; regenerable classes only) DELETES instead of quarantining there -- only after the item's harvest verified -- because a same-drive quarantine frees nothing until purge_after (the first real run removed 1130 items and freed 0 bytes). Receipt: emergency_deleted, bytes_emergency_deleted; audit/ledger action deleted-emergency.
• Purge every pass. Each rule purges its expired quarantine BEFORE its items, so a pass the time budget cuts still frees bytes (bytes_purged, counted in bytes_freed).
• Per-item measure cap. --measure-cap-s (default 120): an item whose age walk runs past it is judged by its top-level mtime + its first 2000 files; all old -> eligible (size unknown (capped), listed in the receipt's capped), any fresh -> live, skipped. One 106 GB dead session otherwise eats a whole pass just being measured.
• Bounded. --time-budget SECONDS (default 3000, inside awrise's 3600 s timeout) stops the pass cleanly and marks the receipt truncated; a fresh item's walk stops at its first too-new file instead of measuring 100 GB it will not touch. The next pass resumes, starting with the item the budget cut (resume_first in the receipt) -- a killed sweep would have left no receipt at all.
• Receipt on every exit path: {exit_code, started, finished, items_seen, items_removed, bytes_freed, bytes_quarantined, bytes_harvested, skipped_live, errors, free_before, free_after, ...}. bytes_freed counts only bytes actually gone (deleted or purged); a quarantine is reported separately. Exit 0 clean, 1 an item failed (kept, reported), 2 could not judge (bad rule, unreadable root; nothing removed). Every decision is a ledger row in the catalog (--catalog, default ~/.aither/awstorage/catalog.db).

import awstorage
receipt = awstorage.sweep(["agent-scratch"], dry_run=False,
                          harvest_to="E:/AitherOS-Data/harvest", emergency_free_gb=40,
                          receipt="~/.aither/awstorage/last_sweep.json",
                          live_ids=["<my-session-id>"])

Agents suggest deletions

Dead agent sessions held 106 GB on 2026-09-28 until a person found them by hand -- and the agents that made them knew they were dead. suggest lets any agent say so, and gives it no power beyond saying so:

awstorage suggest C:/Users/me/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/proj/4f2e... \
    --reason "my session ended 2 days ago" --by lyra \
    --evidence '{"bytes": 113800000000, "idle_hours": 48}'
awstorage suggestions                       # every suggestion, newest first
awstorage suggestion approve 42 --card card.json   # a decision card, never a bare yes
awstorage suggestion reject 42
awstorage apply-suggestions                 # dry run: the plan
awstorage apply-suggestions --yes           # re-verify, harvest, quarantine, ledger
awstorage suggestion revert 42              # put it back (and the agent's trust pays)
awstorage trust                             # the per-agent ledger

r = awstorage.suggest(path, reason="session ended", suggested_by="lyra",
                      action="quarantine", evidence={"bytes": n, "idle_hours": 48})
# {"id": 42, "status": "auto-approved"|"pending-card"|"refused"|"duplicate",
#  "why": "...", "class": "build-temp", "size": 113800000000, "checks": [...]}
awstorage.suggestions(status="pending-card")
awstorage.resolve_suggestion(42, "approve", card=card)
awstorage.apply_suggestions(dry_run=False, harvest_to="E:/AitherOS-Data/harvest")

• Validated twice -- at suggest time and again at apply time; each step is a named entry in checks. Refused: a path that does not exist or is a link; under the never / sensitive / OS set, a quarantine, a volume root, the home dir or a path awstorage depends on; inside a git work tree that is dirty, has commits no remote holds, or that git cannot judge (walks up for .git; git status --porcelain, git rev-list @{u}.. and HEAD --not --remotes, each with a timeout); any file changed within the live window (2 h) or a path segment registered live (AWSTORAGE_LIVE_IDS); evidence that contradicts the measurement. A second open suggestion for the same path is a duplicate of the first.
• Two lanes. auto-approved only when ALL hold: a regenerable class (build-temp, package-cache; agent scratch and temp resolve to build-temp through the sweep presets, but a tree that names itself dataset/repo/... keeps that class), action quarantine (never delete, never archive), the evidence verifies (at least one of bytes, files, idle_hours, cls checked and none contradicted), no nested work tree is dirty or unjudged, the agent's IDENTITY is verified (below), and its trust clears the threshold. Everything else is pending-card: a decision card is raised through awstorage.suggest.set_card_hook (none by default: it waits in suggestions). Approving one needs a card that passes awstorage.manage.verify_card -- a SIGNED answer receipt (see "Signed answer receipts") -- the same check manage applies. Rejecting needs no card.
• Apply trusts no status. catalog.db is a file any local process can edit, so an approved row is re-verified: the card recorded at resolve (or the live card through set_card_reader(fn)) must pass manage.verify_card again, be the card the row names, carry the receipt whose digest was recorded at resolve, and carry a content_sha256 fact equal to the digest of the row as it stands now (path, action, node, class, size, ...). An auto-approved row re-judges every lane condition from disk and the verifier (class re-classified, quarantine only, evidence re-checked, identity re-verified against the proof stored at suggest time -- so a proof must be JSON-serialisable -- and trust). Anything that does not verify is refused; a status alone never deletes.
• Apply re-validates. Re-validation refused, or size / file count / newest mtime moved since the suggestion -> drifted, nothing touched. An auto approval whose agent's trust has since fallen goes back to pending-card. Then harvest first (the sweep's verified harvest), then a quarantine under <parent>/.awstorage-quarantine/suggest-<id>-* (awstorage revert works; purged after 72 h) -- or, card-approved only, a delete or an archive through set_archive_hook. Every step is a ledger row; the outcome is recorded on the suggestion.
• Trust is derived from the suggestion rows, never a separate counter: trust = (applied - 3*reverted + 1) / (applied + rejected + 2) (Laplace-smoothed). A new agent scores 0.50, under the default threshold 0.6 (AWSTORAGE_TRUST_THRESHOLD, clamped to at least 0.51), so its first suggestions go to cards; one revert of an applied suggestion costs three applications.
• Identity (0.4.1). suggested_by is declared by the caller and every caller is in-process, so the brick cannot tell an agent from something typing its name. The auto lane therefore needs a VERIFIED identity: a verifier installed with awstorage.set_identity_verifier(fn) (fn(suggested_by, proof) -> True) accepted the identity_proof passed to suggest. Without one every suggestion records identity: unverified and goes to a card, whatever its trust. The owner may opt in to trusting in-process callers with AWSTORAGE_TRUST_INPROCESS=1 (recorded as inprocess-trusted and re-checked at apply: unset it and those approvals are withdrawn). Transports stamp what they know -- AitherOS MCP mcp-session:<uid>, awdk agent:<name> -- neither is proof.

Signed answer receipts (0.4.1)

A decision card's answered_by, answered_via and answer_attested live in files an agent on the same host can edit, so none of them approves anything. The platform's answering surface signs a receipt with an Ed25519 key that exists only in its vault and stores it on the card as answer_receipt ({alg, kid, receipt, sig}; the receipt is {v, card_id, choice, answered_by, answered_at, nonce, surface, auth_method, auth_time, facts_sha256}). awstorage.attest.verify_receipt -- called by manage.verify_card and so by manage apply, node orders and suggestion approvals -- refuses unless:

• awseal is installed (pip install awstorage[attest]; it carries the verifier) and a public key is provisioned in a FILE: AWSTORAGE_ATTEST_PUBKEY_FILE=<path> (AWSTORAGE_ATTEST_PUBKEY is accepted as a path too; a raw 64-hex key in either env var is REFUSED -- whoever starts the verifier sets its env). The FILE must be provisioned by root / the owner OUTSIDE ~/.aither (e.g. /etc/aither/attest.pub, or a %ProgramData% path whose ACL agents cannot write): a path under ~/.aither, or (POSIX) a world-writable file or directory, is refused -- whoever can swap the key can sign approvals;
• the signature verifies, and the receipt names this card, this answer and this card's facts (a fact edited after the answer is refused);
• auth_method is webauthn or totp_2fa and the sign-in was at most 15 min before the answer (AWSTORAGE_ATTEST_MAX_AUTH_AGE_S, clamped 60..3600) -- password, device flow (every agent bearer), PAT, API key, OIDC access token, magic link and internal mints never count;
• answered_by is an owner principal (AWSTORAGE_MANAGE_OWNERS);
• answered_at is inside the card's window and within 5 min of the store's own;
• the receipt is at most 7 days old by the REAL clock (AWSTORAGE_ATTEST_MAX_RECEIPT_AGE_S, clamped 1 h..30 d; verify_receipt(now=) is ignored -- an injectable clock is an injectable bypass);
• the nonce is new: the catalog table attest_nonces binds each nonce to one card and each card to one receipt (re-verifying the SAME receipt is fine).

Every card also carries content_sha256: <hex> -- the digest of WHAT is approved (manage: node, action, path, bytes, tenant, owner, params and every member's path + sha256 + bytes; suggestions: see above). manage._authorize and suggestion resolve/apply recompute it from the row and refuse a mismatch or a card without it.

manage.STORE_ATTESTS_ANSWERER is now only the master switch (True; False refuses every answer). A card without a valid receipt is refused either way.

Threat model -- what an approval does and does not prove

On a single-user host agents run as the owner's OS user. They can delete files directly, read the browser's localStorage session and, with podman exec, service state. A verified receipt therefore proves "an owner passkey/TOTP session existed within 15 minutes of this answer" -- not "the owner saw this card and chose this". Approvals are a governance gate and a tamper-evident audit trail for agents that use the tools, NOT a security boundary against a hostile local agent. That boundary needs OS isolation: agents under a separate OS user, or in a container without podman or vault access, and the verifier key provisioned where they cannot write it.

Follow-up that closes the remaining gap (review 2, a2/c3): a per-answer WebAuthn step-up whose assertion signs the digest of the RENDERED card, verified here instead of (or beside) the session-age check.

Keep drives above their floors

awstorage watch --floors C:=40,D:=60,E:=30 --once --receipt ~/.aither/awstorage/watch.json
awstorage watch --floors C:=40,D:=60,E:=30 --once --yes      # let the emergency sweep act
awrise add --name awstorage-watch --every 5m --timeout 300 -- awstorage watch --floors C:=40,D:=60,E:=30 --once --yes --receipt ~/.aither/awstorage/watch.json

The 3-hourly sweep is too slow for a drive that falls 124 -> 18 GB in an hour. watch is one disk_usage per floored drive: with every drive above its floor it walks no tree and finishes in milliseconds. Under a floor it runs the emergency sweep of the presets (--rules, default agent-scratch,temp-toplevel) on THAT drive only -- a plan unless --yes -- appends an alert to ~/.aither/awstorage/alerts.jsonl, and runs $AWSTORAGE_ALERT_CMD with the alert JSON as its last argument (a JSON list such as ["awrelay", "send", "#agents"], or a shell-like string; never run through a shell), so awrelay / Pulse plug in without being imported. Exit 0 all above, 1 a drive still under its floor, 2 could not judge. $AWSTORAGE_FLOORS holds the same spelling.

Before moving data between drives

awstorage place --size 90GB --from C:/data/models --floors C:=40,D:=60,E:=30
awstorage place --size 90GB --to C: --floors C:=40      # exit 1: refused

place ranks every drive by its free space AFTER the move and refuses any that would end under its floor (unlisted drives: --default-floor-gb, 20). Run it before moving data -- on 2026-09-28 a peer moved 89 GB onto a nearly-full C:. Python: awstorage.place("90GB", {"C:": 40, "E:": 30}, source="D:/models").

Shelf safety

The harvest shelf is a drive too (E: sat at 99 %). With floors set (--floors on sweep, $AWSTORAGE_FLOORS for apply-suggestions), an item whose harvest would be written onto a shelf drive under its floor is KEPT (harvest-skipped: shelf drive low) -- never removed without its harvest. The one exception: an act that deletes the item from the shelf's own drive (a delete rule or an emergency delete) repays the copy at once, so the emergency on a full C: with the shelf on C: still frees space. Rotate the shelf with awstorage shelf prune --older-than 30d [--yes] (the date in the day dir's name decides, not its mtime).

Agent worktrees

{"retention": [{"name": "agent-worktrees", "paths": ["C:/.worktrees/*", "C:/wt/*"]}]}

awstorage sweep --rules agent-worktrees --policy wt.json --yes: idle 7 d, quarantine, purge after 7 d. Opt-in twice -- named, and its paths come from the policy. Every item must be a git work tree ROOT whose status is clean and whose commits a remote holds; dirty, ahead, not a repo, or unjudgeable -> skipped-git, kept. git's own worktree registry must then be pruned by the tool that owns it (git worktree prune); never git worktree remove, which follows junctions (it deleted a shared node_modules on 2026-09-22).

The three rules

• Measure before you delete. A du answers one question once.
• Re-fetchable is a property, not a guess. The classifier says why.
• Deleting is a policy, not a mood. Dry run, roots, fingerprints, quarantine, ledger.

Composes with

Every coupling is optional and imported lazily (pip install awstorage[harvest] for awseal + awdit + awshare); without the package the sweep says "unavailable" in its receipt rather than pretending.

• awdit -- every sweep decision (harvested, withheld-secret, skipped-live, quarantined, deleted, purged, failed) is appended to a hash-chained, truncation-evident log (--audit-log, default ~/.aither/awstorage/audit.log); the intent is recorded BEFORE a removal. awstorage audit verify checks it. --require-audit refuses to remove anything (exit 2) when awdit is absent or an append fails.
• awseal -- each harvested item dir is sealed (awseal.json, Ed25519) after its copies verify, with --seal-key or awseal's own default key. An explicit key that cannot seal keeps the item. awstorage harvest verify <shelf> reports sealed / tampered / unsealed.
• awshare -- awstorage harvest publish <shelf>/<rule>/<day> --to <dir> (or sweep --publish-to <dir>) bundles a day's harvest; fetch it back with awshare.fetch(<dir>/<name>.awshare.json, dest), which verifies the digest before a byte lands.
• awm -- sweep --land-to-awm tenant:user:project lands ONE memory per harvested item (storage.harvest.<item>: what was kept and where) through MemoryStore.remember, never SQL; an older-schema awm file is reported as a compat problem, never migrated.
• awrecover -- a rule with "snapshot": true snapshots each item before removal (--snapshot-store); without awrecover the item is KEPT and reported. For proposals, backup_hook=lambda p: awrecover.snapshot(p, store, label) turns backup-then-delete into a restorable snapshot first.
• AitherStrata (the platform's tiered storage service) -- --harvest-to strata:<hot|warm|cold> (default tier cold) uploads each verified harvested file plus manifest.json (and awseal.json when sealed) with POST /strata/write, then reads every object back with GET /strata/stat/<tier>/<path> and compares size (and sha256 when the server reports it) BEFORE the item may be removed; any mismatch keeps the item. stdlib urllib + ssl only. URL from AITHERSTRATA_URL (default https://127.0.0.1:8136; the service is TLS-only), CA from AITHER_CA_BUNDLE or <repo>/AitherOS/Library/Data/tls/ca-chain.pem, key from AWSTORAGE_STRATA_KEY (sent as X-Internal-Key, env var only). No CA, no key, or unreachable = "strata target unavailable": nothing removed, exit 2. There is no unverified-TLS mode.
• awdk -- calls awstorage.sweep(...) (returns the receipt dict) and registers its running sessions through AWSTORAGE_LIVE_IDS.
• awrise -- schedules the sweep and reads its receipt (see above).
• awdk / awnode / awsh -- run the scanner where the disk is, post snapshots to a shared catalog, render proposals in a shell or a desktop panel.
• awgraph -- awstorage graph emits nodes and typed edges (contains, duplicate_of) any graph store can ingest.

awstorage --self-test (or python -m awstorage --self-test) proves the refusals still refuse, the quarantine still reverts, and each sweep guard is seen firing: harvest-before-delete, secret withheld, live guard, junction not followed, emergency halving, emergency delete (only for a flagged rule, never without a verified harvest), the per-item measure cap both ways, receipt on failure.

Apache-2.0.

The aw family

Standalone tools that share one idea: replace something you would otherwise have to trust with something you can check.

Each installs on its own, works offline, and needs no account.

	instead of trusting	you check
awdk	a framework's idea of how your agents should run	one loop you can read, pointed at a backend you already pay for
awskills	that an agent knows your procedure	the procedure written down, versioned, and loadable by any agent
awpack	that the pack you want shipped inside somebody's SDK, under whatever licence that SDK happens to carry	the pack as its own versioned artifact, with its own licence, that any agent runtime can install
awm	that memory stayed in its lane	tenant:user:project scopes, so a write cannot cross a boundary
awdesk	that the agent is somewhere behind a browser tab	a tray icon, a face on your desktop, and the decision card that pops when it needs you
awnode	a vendor's cloud with every prompt	a local gateway routing to backends you chose
awgraph	that grep found everything	an AST + tree-sitter call graph an agent can traverse
awgit	that no one else is editing this file	a lease, refused at commit time if you do not hold it
awdelphi	one agent's confident take on a decision	the round trace, the anonymity, and who dissents
awclassify	a filename, a folder, or whoever last touched it	doc_type, visibility, audience and topics, with the evidence lines that decided each
awtoll	that your tooling is saving you context	the measured token cost of each tool call, and what the alternative cost
awseal	that the artifact came from who you think	an Ed25519 seal — the key that verifies is not the key that forges
awshare	that the download is intact	content-addressed bundles, verified on fetch
awnest	that there is a person on the other end	a verdict with evidence, where "we could not tell" is not "yes"
awrena	a leaderboard someone can edit, and votes nobody counted	a scored duel with both answers kept, and a result bound to them
awnboard	a share link anyone who sees it can use	an invitation addressed to one person, for one gate, revocable
awnix	that the box is what you left it as	an immutable image you built, with atomic rollback
awrecover	that the restore worked	a restore that fully lands or does not land at all
awstorage (you are here)	a du you ran last month, and a peers file that says 3 TB free	an inventory snapshot per node with a diff since the last one, and each tree classified re-fetchable or not
awrelay	a SaaS in the middle of your agents	findings, alerts and coordination over your own transport
awask	that anyone read the paragraph where you asked	the ask itself, with a button that steers the session that raised it
awmail	a mailbox somebody else can read	mail your agents send and receive over your own server
awswarm	that a model either fits your GPU or it doesn't run at all	a placement plan and an acquisition-probability estimate before you spend on a run
awfind	one vendor's idea of the web	results from whichever providers you configured
awbrowse	that the page said what you were told	the render, the DOM and the requests it made
awvoice	that a cloud vendor may hold your audio	a transcript and a wav from a service you host
awvision	a filename and a caption somebody wrote	what a model actually reports about the pixels
awscreen	a selector that was true when the page was written	the elements actually rendered, by what they look like
awbeads	that a layout your users built survives the next deploy	the arrangement as data you can read back, diff, and hand to another surface
awbonsai	that inference always means a request left the machine	a WebGPU model answering on the tab's own GPU, with a consent record logged before it ever loaded
gawbbonet	the model to keep a 300-message campaign coherent by itself	campaign facts recalled from scoped memory you can list and edit
aitherkvcache	a vendor's quantisation defaults	sub-byte KV cache kernels you can benchmark yourself
awrtifact	a hand-rolled split script and a hand-edited worker manifest	byte-verified parts in a release, served with Range + CORS, sizes asserted by a live gate
AitherZero	a pile of scripts nobody has numbered	numbered, discoverable automation with declarative playbooks
AitherConnect	what a page tells your browser to do	a federated search and desktop bridge you host
awreason	a confident paragraph	the phases it went through, and every tool call it made to get there
awrecurse	that everything you pasted in was actually read	which slices it opened, and what it concluded from each
awprism	the first explanation that fits	the ranked alternatives, and the observation that separates them
awrepl	what the agent believes the value is	the value, printed from the live session
awreport	that the report you pasted carried no token in it	a redacted report, and the duplicate it merged into instead of filing twice
awresearch	a summary of pages nobody opened	every claim against the source it came from
awfocus	twelve terminal tabs and a bad memory	one command that names every session, finds any transcript, and opens or steers the one you want
awgym	that a world model learned anything from the games it saw	transitions captured from real play, fed back, and the retrodiction score falling on grids it never saw
awpredict	a model because it trained without erroring	its prediction against a self-updating lookup, on the rows that are actually novel
awevolve	that your optimisation loop is finding anything	every version it kept, the score that version earned, and the edit that produced it
awsh	that you already know the name of the command	what it decided your line meant, before it acts on it
awmine	that a session's lesson survived the session	a row per outcome, a candidate per lesson, and the transcript line each one came from
awrise	that a scheduled agent ran at all, and ran exactly once	a durable record of every wake -- fired, skipped, overlapped or timed out -- each with its reason
awkno	that the docs site is up, or that you remember the family	the whole ecosystem in your terminal, with no network at all
awwall	that a service only talks to the hosts you think it talks to	an explicit egress allowlist, where a denial names the rule that denied it
awembed	a general-purpose embedder that has never seen your code	a held-out split of whole directories, scored teacher vs student vs int8
awtax	a closed tax app's sealed file you can never read again	a plain, provider-neutral schema of every figure, with the page it came from
awsettings	that you will remember to re-approve the same thing on every box you work from	one profile, unioned rather than overwritten, with the credentials left behind
awavatar	a cloud 3D vendor's opaque task id	a manifest with a sha256, a licence and a rig-audit verdict per file

awnix is the ground floor — A Linux you can hand to an agent — immutable base, capabilities included.

The Aitherium ecosystem

Every repository here is public. Each publishes an aither-manifest.json beside its page, so any surface can read every sibling's — the network is browsable from any node in it.

repo	what it is	pages
awdk	Build AI agent fleets — 3 lines, any backend, local or cloud	docs
awskills	Portable agent skills — self-contained procedures an agent loads on demand	docs
awpack	First-party agent packs — the ones we build, versioned and installable on their own	docs
awm	A portable, scoped agent memory	docs
awdesk	Aither World Desk -- the desktop body of AitherOS Online: tray, avatars, decision cards, the Living Desktop as an overlay	docs
awnode	A lightweight local gateway — bridges your apps to the AI backends you chose	docs
awrun	A priority-aware queue and dispatcher for agentic runs and ad-hoc CI builds. It also judges whether the runner pool is big enough for the queue it is draining, and can ask a host to grow it -- reserving capacity is zero-sum, so a saturated pool needs more of it, not a different share of it	docs
awgraph	A semantic code graph for agents — AST + tree-sitter, call graphs	docs
awgit	Semantic version control on top of git — edit-ops and leases	docs
awdelphi	Anonymous multi-round expert panels — a converged answer with a trace	docs
awclassify	Classify any document -- what it is, who may read it, who it is for, what it is about	—
awtoll	What every tool call costs you in context, measured from your own transcripts	docs
awseal	Sign an artifact so a stranger can verify it	docs
awshare	Publish an artifact and fetch it back verified	docs
awdit	An append-only audit trail whose gaps are DETECTABLE	docs
awbac	Role-based access control that fails closed and explains itself	docs
awiam	Who is this caller? A directory and session store that fails honestly	docs
awtunnel	Reach a service that has no public address	docs
awnest	Prove there is a human before you let them into the nest	docs
awrena	Put two agents head to head and get a verdict you can check	docs
awnboard	A front gate you can put in front of anything, and hand someone the key to	docs
awnix	A Linux you can hand to an agent — immutable base, capabilities included	docs
awrecover	Labelled snapshots with an all-or-nothing restore	docs
awstorage (you are here)	Every drive on every node, indexed, classified and diffed -- so you can see what you own before you delete it	docs
awrelay	Portable agent messaging — findings, alerts, coordination	docs
awask	Your agent asks you a question — and acts on your answer	docs
awmail	Give an agent an email address — send, and actually receive	docs
awnet	The agentic web — agents host a mesh, and agents join one	docs
awswarm	Run one model too big for any single GPU across a pool of small ones	—
awfind	A portable search client — query, results, ranking	docs
awbrowse	A portable browser client — navigate, console, network, DOM, screenshot	docs
awvoice	Hear and speak — transcribe audio, synthesize a voice	docs
awvision	See an image — describe it, ask it a question, compare two	docs
awscreen	See this machine — what is on screen, and where to click it	docs
awkit	Render an agent panel from a tool result — one component, any React app	—
awbeads	A spatial canvas for a page — arrange things, connect them, and keep the arrangement	—
awbonsai	Run a real model in the visitor's own browser — no server round trip, no upload	—
awknowledge	How to run a coding agent so the result survives — the laws, with evidence	docs
awbrain	Your history as a wiki of linked markdown — claims pinned to the evidence	—
gawbbonet	GobboNet campaigns with a real agent brain — scoped memory, graph recall	docs
aitherkvcache	Near-optimal KV cache quantization for LLM inference — sub-byte compression	docs
awrtifact	Deliberately chunk artifacts into GitHub release assets — the productized aitherkvcache mirror lane	docs
AitherZero	PowerShell 7+ automation framework — numbered, self-describing scripts	docs
AitherConnect	Browser extension — federated AI search, page context, and the Living OS overlay	docs
awreason	A portable reasoning client — sessions, phases, thoughts, and the chain that produced the answer	docs
awrecurse	Answer a question over a context far larger than the window — recursively, with the trace kept	docs
awprism	Turn a failure into ranked hypotheses — and say what would confirm each one	docs
awrepl	A REPL an agent can actually use — state that survives between turns	docs
awreport	File a bug report that has already scrubbed your secrets and collapsed the duplicate	—
awresearch	Ask a research question, get a cited report you can check	docs
awfocus	See, search and steer every Claude session from one command	docs
awgym	An ARC training gym — a game a world model can watch, and six roles that play through it	docs
awpredict	Predict what your environment does next, and how surprised you were	docs
awevolve	Point an agent at a file and a command that scores it, and let it improve	—
awsh	Your terminal answers you -- type a question where a command would go	docs
awmine	Mine what your agents did -- outcomes, lessons and procedures out of the transcripts they left behind	—
awrise	Wake an agent on a schedule, let it do one thing, and put it back to sleep	docs
awkno	The man page for the Aither World — every brick, stack and law, offline	docs
awwall	Say what a workload may reach, and watch everything else fail closed	docs
awrouter	OpenRouter for your own fleet: pick a model backend by cost/latency/ capability, fail over, fit the context window, stream. Standalone, OpenAI-compatible, no Aither-specifics required to be valuable	—
awembed	Train an embedding model that knows your corpus, and prove it beats the big one	docs
awtax	Turn any tax PDF -- returns, W-2, 1099, statements, even scans -- into structured data you can check	docs
awflow	A deterministic workflow runtime — chain agent calls with journal replay and budget control	docs
awsettings	Your agent's permissions and config, following you to the next machine	docs
awavatar	One character spec in, a rigged, animated, multi-style avatar pack out	docs

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