The official Python client for the Axorum agent plane.
Project description
axorum-client
The official Python client for the Axorum agent plane — the wire an autonomous agent speaks to submit intents to a deontic financial-control ledger and read what the ledger did about them.
pip install axorum-client # or: uv add axorum-client
Requires Python 3.11+. The only runtime dependency is httpx.
The one rule: a refusal is a value, not an exception
Axorum's job is to judge an intent against the policy in force. When the policy
forbids the action, the intent still reaches the commit point, is still
judged, and the refusal is still recorded — and that record is the
product. It comes back as a 200, as an ordinary AgentOutcome with
posted == False.
So this client returns it. It does not raise.
outcome = client.submit_pinned(draft)
if outcome.posted:
print("permitted, and the entries posted")
else:
# NOT a failure. The ledger recorded a refusal, which is what you asked it to do.
print(f"refused, and the refusal is on the ledger: {outcome.verdict}")
An exception from this client means the ledger never got to answer at all: the caller was not who they claimed, the pin did not hold, the cluster could not confirm, the wire broke. A client that raised on a refusal would be throwing away the very artifact the ledger exists to produce.
Quickstart
from axorum import ActionTerm, Amount, AxorumClient, Entry, IntentDraft
draft = IntentDraft(
agent="agent://example.com/agent/clerk_01h455vb4pex5vsknk084sn02q",
attestation=paseto_token, # the PASETO v4.public capability attestation
action=ActionTerm("post"),
entries=[
Entry.debit(cash_account, Amount(minor=1000, currency="USD")),
Entry.credit(revenue_account, Amount(minor=1000, currency="USD")),
],
justification="settling invoice 42",
)
with AxorumClient("http://127.0.0.1:8080", attestation=paseto_token) as client:
outcome = client.submit_pinned(draft)
print(outcome.verdict) # Verdict.PERMITTED
print(outcome.posted) # True
print(outcome.policy) # the policy it was judged under
print(outcome.transaction) # the id you minted, echoed back
…and the same call, refused
Point the same draft at a ledger whose policy forbids post, and nothing about
your code changes. You do not catch anything. You read the outcome:
with AxorumClient("http://127.0.0.1:8080") as client:
outcome = client.submit_intent(draft.pin(policy_id))
assert outcome.posted is False
assert outcome.verdict is Verdict.FORBIDDEN_REJECTED
# The refusal is on the ledger, and reads back like any other record.
record = client.transaction(outcome.transaction)
Async
The same client, awaited. Same method names, same arguments, same semantics.
from axorum import AsyncAxorumClient
async with AsyncAxorumClient("http://127.0.0.1:8080", attestation=paseto_token) as client:
outcome = await client.submit_pinned(draft)
if not outcome.posted:
print(f"recorded as refused: {outcome.verdict}")
Writes carry their credential; so do reads
An intent authenticates inside the envelope: the draft names the agent:// URI
and the PASETO attestation, and the service verifies both before it proposes
anything. Reads are credentialed with the same token — there is no second
credential to obtain. They present it as Authorization: Bearer …, and the service
takes the reader's identity from that token's verified agent_uri claim and answers
only within the party it is bound to.
So a client that reads holds the attestation:
with AxorumClient("http://127.0.0.1:8080", attestation=paseto_token) as client:
owed = client.obligations() # your party's duties
record = client.transaction(txn_id) # your party's record
net = client.balance(account_id)
| Method | Attestation | How |
|---|---|---|
active_policy() |
not needed | a public read: it discloses no party's data |
submit_intent() / submit_pinned() / submit_pinned_from() |
not on the transport | the envelope already carries it |
transaction(id) |
required | Authorization: Bearer … |
obligations(actor=None) |
required | Authorization: Bearer … |
balance(account) |
required | Authorization: Bearer … |
usage(usage) |
required | Authorization: Bearer … |
The attestation is optional on the client: one that only submits needs none. A
party-scoped read on a client that holds none raises MissingAttestationError
locally, before anything reaches the wire — naming the read you attempted,
rather than spending a round trip to be told 401 about a credential that was
never sent.
obligations(actor) is an assertion, not a selector
?actor= used to select whose duties came back, so any party's duties were
enumerable by anyone who could guess a name, with no credential at all. It does not
select any more. Omit it and you are answered for the party your token names.
Supply it — a party id (party_…) or a DSL party name — and the service checks
that it resolves to that same party, answering 403 if it does not. It is there so a
caller can be explicit about who it believes it is, and be told when it is wrong.
Rotating an expiring token
Attestations expire. with_attestation() hands back a client that reads as the
bearer of a different one and shares the connection pool — rotating a token costs
a string, not a reconnect. It is also how one process acts for several agents: each
view sees only its own party's data.
fresh = client.with_attestation(reissued_token) # same pool, new credential
Policy pinning, and why submit_pinned exists
Every intent names the policy the agent believes is in force. If that pin is
stale, the service refuses with a 409 and nothing is written. The recovery
is always the same: re-pin against the policy now in force and submit again.
That is the loop every correct agent writes, so it ships here instead:
submit_pinned(draft)— readGET /policies/active, stamp the pin, submit, and on a409re-pin against the policy the rejection itself named and go again. Bounded at 3 pin attempts.submit_pinned_from(draft, policy_id)— the same, but starting from a policy you already believe is in force. This is what a long-running agent wants: hold the last policy you saw, submit straight against it, and let the409tell you when your belief went stale.submit_intent(envelope)— no recovery, no re-reads. You pinned it; you own it.
Retrying is safe for one specific reason: the transaction id is minted once, on
the draft, before the first attempt, and it is the substrate's idempotency key.
Every re-pinned attempt carries the same id, so an attempt that in fact landed
replays its stored outcome. The loop cannot double-post. (IntentDraft mints one
for you from a UUID v4; supply your own if you have one.)
The exception taxonomy
Everything below inherits from AxorumError. None of them is a refusal.
| Exception | Status / code | What it means, and what to do |
|---|---|---|
StalePolicyError |
409 stale_policy / policy_pin_mismatch |
The pin did not hold and nothing was written. Carries .pinned and .active — re-pin against .active. submit_pinned does this for you. .requires_repin is True. |
NoActivePolicyError |
409 no_active_policy |
No policy is in force at all. Re-pinning cannot help; an operator has to activate one. |
UnknownAgentError |
401 unknown_agent |
The agent:// URI is not bound to a party. Carries .uri. |
AttestationError |
403 attestation |
The PASETO attestation was rejected — bad signature, expired, wrong audience, untrusted issuer. |
NotPrimaryError |
421 not_primary |
A cluster mutation reached a follower. Nothing was written. Carries .primary_client_addr (which may be None). |
CommitUnavailableError |
503 commit_unavailable |
The commit could not be confirmed. It may or may not have landed. .is_retriable is True — retrying the same transaction id is safe, or read it back with client.transaction(id). |
ApiError |
any documented code | A documented error with no distinct recovery: unknown_account, unknown_transaction, unknown_usage, substrate_rejected, capability_mapping, … Carries .status, .code, and the full .body. |
MissingAttestationError |
— | A party-scoped read on a client that holds no attestation. Raised before any request is sent; carries .operation. Build the client with attestation=…, or rotate one in with with_attestation(). |
TransportError |
— | The service could not be reached. .is_retriable is True. |
UnexpectedResponseError |
any | A non-2xx whose body is not an agent-plane error body — a proxy, a load balancer. The bytes are kept verbatim in .body. |
DecodeError |
any | The service and this client disagree about the wire. Bytes kept verbatim. |
ConfigError |
— | The client could not be built: a malformed base URL, an empty attestation. |
Two convenience properties on every error say what to do next:
try:
outcome = client.submit_intent(envelope)
except AxorumError as failure:
if failure.requires_repin:
... # re-pin against failure.active and resubmit
elif failure.is_retriable:
... # re-send the IDENTICAL request — safe, the txn id is the idempotency key
else:
raise
This client never auto-follows a 421
In cluster mode, a mutation that reaches a non-primary replica is refused 421 not_primary, with the primary's address in the body. This client will not
silently re-send there. It raises NotPrimaryError and hands you
.primary_client_addr.
That is deliberate. Following the redirect is an operational decision: a client that auto-follows hides a topology change from the operator who most needs to see it — a follower answering your writes means something moved, and you should learn that from your client, not from a graph three days later. If you want to follow it, follow it on purpose:
try:
outcome = client.submit_intent(envelope)
except NotPrimaryError as failure:
if failure.primary_client_addr is None:
raise # the follower doesn't know either
with AxorumClient(f"http://{failure.primary_client_addr}") as primary:
outcome = primary.submit_intent(envelope) # same txn id — cannot double-post
API surface
AxorumClient(base_url, *, attestation=None, timeout=10.0, transport=None)
AsyncAxorumClient(base_url, *, attestation=None, timeout=10.0, transport=None)
client.with_attestation(attestation) -> a new client, sharing the pool
client.active_policy() -> str | None # no attestation
client.submit_intent(envelope) -> AgentOutcome # token in the envelope
client.submit_pinned(draft) -> AgentOutcome # token in the envelope
client.submit_pinned_from(draft, policy_id) -> AgentOutcome # token in the envelope
client.transaction(txn_id) -> TransactionRecord # attested; opaque JSON
client.obligations(actor=None) -> ObligationsResponse # attested
client.balance(account_id) -> BalanceResponse # attested
active_policy() returning None is not an error — "no policy is in force"
is a true and useful fact about a ledger, not a failure to report one.
Metered spend is one intent
An agent that consumes a metered resource carries the usage moves on the same
draft as the journal legs. They are judged in the same commit, under the
usage-balance conservation law 0 ≤ billed ≤ metered ≤ consumed:
draft = IntentDraft(
agent=agent_uri,
attestation=token,
action=ActionTerm("post"),
entries=[Entry.debit(cash, Amount(1000, "USD")),
Entry.credit(revenue, Amount(1000, "USD"))],
justification="one metered API call, billed on the spot",
consume_usage=UsageMove(usage, Amount(1000, "USD")), # you used it
meter_usage=UsageMove(usage, Amount(1000, "USD")), # it was measured
bill_usage=UsageMove(usage, Amount(1000, "USD")), # it was billed
)
outcome = client.submit_pinned(draft)
report = client.usage(usage)
print(report.text) # the balance in compliance English, with exact figures
All three at once is the lawful case, not an edge case: the moves of one intent
are validated together against the combined post-state. Any subset is fine too,
and an absent move is omitted from the wire entirely, never sent as null.
Metering more than was consumed is phantom usage; billing more than was metered
is billing with no meter basis. The ledger refuses both with a 422 substrate_rejected
whose message is the compliance-English refusal with exact figures — and nothing
posts, not even the journal legs that rode with the bad move. Under-recognition
(billed < metered < consumed) is a lawful transient, not a fault to correct.
Usage reads are owner-scoped and fail-closed: a balance owned by another party,
one opened with no owner, and one that never existed all answer the same
404 unknown_usage. The cases are deliberately indistinguishable, so that a usage id
is never an existence oracle across a tenant boundary.
A usage balance is opened on the admin plane, which this SDK does not speak — an agent receives a usage id, it does not mint one.
Every request carries an auto-generated x-request-id (UUID v4) so you can find
it in the service's logs. Pass your own through if you are already carrying a
correlation id.
Pure protocol core
axorum.protocol holds every request builder, every response decoder, the read
credentialer (authorize), the error mapper (error_from(status, body)), and the
policy-pin loop (pin_flow) — all
pure functions of their inputs, with no I/O anywhere. The sync and async clients
are thin shells over them, which is why they cannot drift, and why the protocol
is exhaustively testable without a socket.
Development
uv sync
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy --strict src/
uv run pytest # unit tests
uv run pytest -m conformance # against a real axorum-serve
License
Apache-2.0
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