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The Paladin — a local encrypted password manager that lives in your terminal

Project description

The Paladin — a pixel-art knight

The Paladin

Your passwords, guarded locally. No browser, no cloud, no mercy.

A password manager that is one encrypted file on my own disk and a small terminal app in front of it. No browser, no cloud, no daemon, no ai running in the background, no company holding my secrets. One file, one master password, that's the whole thing.

(It installs as basic-password-manager because the name came after the project. It answers to paladin as is its name)

unlocking the vault

Install

From PyPI (pipx keeps CLI tools out of each other's business):

pipx install basic-password-manager    # or: pip install basic-password-manager
paladin init

From source:

git clone https://github.com/Daisentaur/password-manager && cd password-manager
pipx install .

Hacking on it: python3 -m venv venv && ./venv/bin/pip install -e .

The TUI

Run paladin with nothing after it and you get the full app: unlock, arrow around, Enter copies the selected password to your clipboard. n adds, e edits, d deletes (it asks first), q quits. Every key is listed in the bottom bar so there's nothing to memorize.

The search forgives you. Press / and type whatever fragments you remember — every word just has to appear somewhere in the entry, any field, any order. It even searches inside the passwords themselves, for the day all you remember is what you typed on that site (matches get highlighted in the theme's accent, except password matches, which quietly show the row and highlight nothing — passwords never get displayed, that's the deal).

searching the vault

The rarer stuff lives in the command palette — ctrl+p, type a few letters, done. Importing your browser's passwords and changing the master password both live there.

the command palette

And themes. t opens the picker; the bundled ones — muted-slate (default), dawn, matrix — are lifted with love from tuxedo's palettes, and all of Textual's built-ins are in there too. Your pick sticks across runs. Even the knight on the unlock screen dresses to match.

switching themes

The CLI

Same vault, no interface, for when you just want the thing:

Command What it does
paladin init create a new empty vault
paladin add github store an entry (prompts for username/password/notes)
paladin add github --gen same, but it invents a strong random password for you
paladin get github copy the password to the clipboard, show the username
paladin edit github update an entry field by field (Enter keeps what's there)
paladin passwd change the master password
paladin ls list entry names
paladin rm github delete an entry
paladin find "dt bank" search names, usernames, notes — every word must match, any order
paladin gen -l 32 just print a random password
paladin import passwords.csv import a browser CSV export (see below)
paladin about meet the knight

The vault lives at ~/.local/share/pw-manager/vault. Point the PW_VAULT environment variable somewhere else if you disagree.

The notes field takes anything you want kept secret next to the password — recovery codes, PINs, the answer to "what was your first pet".

Leaving your browser's password manager

This is why the project exists, so here's the exit route:

  1. Export: Chrome → chrome://password-manager/settings → "Export passwords". Firefox → about:logins → ⋯ menu → "Export passwords". Either way you get a CSV.
  2. paladin import passwords.csv
  3. Delete that CSV immediately — it's every password you own, in plaintext: shred -u passwords.csv
  4. Turn off password saving in the browser and delete what it stored.

How it works

Three layers, ~120 lines total, and I mean it about the reading order — this project exists because I wanted to understand this stuff, and the code is meant to be read:

1. crypto.py — password → key, key → ciphertext

An AES key must be 32 unpredictable bytes; your master password is neither. Argon2id bridges the gap: derive_key(password, salt) always returns the same 32 bytes for the same inputs — that's what makes unlocking possible at all. It's deliberately slow and memory-hungry (64 MiB per guess), so someone who steals the vault file can't brute-force short passwords on a GPU the way they could against a plain hash. The pause when you unlock? That's the lock being hard to pick. I've learned to love it.

The salt is 16 random bytes stored unencrypted in the vault file, and that's fine — it's not a secret. Its whole job is making your derived key unique so precomputed attack tables are useless. (This took me a while to truly believe. It's fine. Smarter people than me checked.)

Encryption is AES-256-GCM, which is authenticated: decrypt with the wrong key, or decrypt a file where even one bit was flipped, and it fails loudly instead of handing back plausible garbage. Every encryption uses a fresh random 12-byte nonce (also stored unencrypted, also not a secret). The one iron rule of GCM: a (key, nonce) pair must never repeat — which is why it's random every single time.

2. vault.py — the file format

[4 bytes "PWV1"][16-byte salt][12-byte nonce][ciphertext...]

The ciphertext is just your entries as JSON, encrypted. Load = read → derive key → decrypt → json.loads. Save = the same backwards, with a fresh salt and nonce, written to a temp file and atomically renamed so a crash mid-write can't destroy the vault.

Your master password is stored nowhere. Not hashed, not hidden — nowhere. "Wrong password" is just the decryption screaming, translated.

3. cli.py and tui.py — the interfaces

Both are thin skins over the two modules above. The TUI (built with Textual) holds the decrypted entries in memory for the session; the CLI re-derives the key per command.

Passwords go to the clipboard (wl-copy/xclip/xsel, whichever exists) rather than the screen, so they don't sit in your terminal scrollback. One deliberate asymmetry: CLI find does not search passwords, because a CLI argument lands in your shell history forever — the TUI search box does, because nothing you type there is logged anywhere.

Backups

Every save keeps the previous version as vault.bak next to the vault — one-step undo for when a save goes wrong or you delete the wrong entry.

That covers mistakes, not the disk dying. For that: the vault is one file, so copy it anywhere. Another disk, a USB stick, even somewhere you don't trust — it's gibberish without the master password.

cp ~/.local/share/pw-manager/vault /some/backup/location/

Moving to a new machine (or another OS)

The vault file plus the master password in your head is the complete system — the salt lives inside the file, nothing belongs to the machine. Install the package on the new system, drop your vault at ~/.local/share/pw-manager/vault (don't run init — that's for brand-new vaults only), and everything works. Dual-booting? Park the vault on a partition both systems mount and point both at it: export PW_VAULT=/mnt/shared/vault.

Troubleshooting

"I forgot the master password." The data is gone. Not "gone until support resets it" — mathematically gone. That's not a bug, that's the entire design: every "forgot password?" flow is a back door, and back doors don't check IDs. Pick a long phrase you can't forget (a sentence beats Tr0ub4dor&3), and know that backups protect you from losing the file, never from forgetting the word.

"wrong master password (or the vault file is corrupted)" — 99% of the time you typo'd it. If you're certain it's right, the file got damaged; restore the automatic backup (cp ~/.local/share/pw-manager/vault.bak ~/.local/share/pw-manager/vault) or an off-machine copy.

Deleted or overwrote an entry by mistake — the state before your last save is sitting in vault.bak; restore it as above. One generation only, so do it before the next save.

"not a vault file (bad magic bytes)" — whatever's at the vault path isn't ours (truncated, overwritten, or wrong path). Check echo $PW_VAULT and restore from a backup.

"no vault at ..." — run paladin init, or PW_VAULT points somewhere unexpected.

Password prints instead of copying — no clipboard tool found. Install one: sudo apt install wl-clipboard (Wayland) or xclip (X11).

Unlock feels slow (~1s) — that's Argon2 doing its job. The delay is the brute-force resistance. Per command, not per keystroke.

MemoryError from Argon2 — the key derivation wants 64 MiB free; something is eating your RAM.

Import brought in junk — browser CSVs export everything, including accounts from 2013. paladin rm <name> the corpses, or prune the CSV first.

Honest limitations

I'd rather you know these than find them:

  • No clipboard auto-clear yet: a copied password stays on the clipboard until you copy over it. Copy something else when you're done.
  • While a command runs, decrypted data briefly exists in process memory. Malware already on your machine could read it — true of every password manager ever made; the vault protects the file at rest, not a compromised machine.
  • Single file, no sync. Syncing is your problem for now (and honestly, cp is a fine answer).

Running the checks

./venv/bin/python test_vault.py

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