boring-ssl2
BoringSSL as the engine behind ssl2: one shared library with brotli inside, built from a pinned commit with two small patches and bound with ctypes. A ClientHello model goes out byte for byte or is refused with the reason, over TCP or, for a QUIC stack, through the handshake and packet protection of RFC 9001. Requires Python 3.14 and ssl2.
uv add boring-ssl2
HTTPS over the system trust store
from boring_ssl2 import ClientContext
from ssl2 import NextProtocol, TLSClientConfiguration
client = ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration(inner_protocols=(NextProtocol.HTTP1,)))
connection = client.connect(("www.python.org", 443), timeout=10)
connection.send(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
print(connection.recv(4096).split(b"\r\n", 1)[0]) # b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK'
print(connection.negotiated_tls_version, connection.cipher(), connection.negotiated_protocol()) # TLSVersion.TLSv1_3 CipherSuite.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 NextProtocol.HTTP1
connection.close()
A ClientHello, byte for byte
from boring_ssl2 import ClientContext
from ssl2 import (
JA4,
CertificateCompressionAlgorithm,
CipherSuite,
ClientHelloBuilder,
ClientHelloParser,
ECPointFormat,
ExtensionType,
NamedGroup,
NextProtocol,
ProtocolVersion,
PskKeyExchangeMode,
SignatureScheme,
TLSClientConfiguration,
WantReadError,
)
profile = (
ClientHelloBuilder()
.supported_versions(ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_3, ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_2)
.cipher_suites(
CipherSuite.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
)
.extensions(
ExtensionType.server_name,
ExtensionType.extended_main_secret,
ExtensionType.renegotiation_info,
ExtensionType.supported_groups,
ExtensionType.ec_point_formats,
ExtensionType.session_ticket,
ExtensionType.application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
ExtensionType.status_request,
ExtensionType.signature_algorithms,
ExtensionType.signed_certificate_timestamp,
ExtensionType.key_share,
ExtensionType.psk_key_exchange_modes,
ExtensionType.supported_versions,
ExtensionType.compress_certificate,
ExtensionType.application_settings,
ExtensionType.encrypted_client_hello,
)
.supported_groups(NamedGroup.X25519MLKEM768, NamedGroup.x25519, NamedGroup.secp256r1, NamedGroup.secp384r1)
.key_shares(NamedGroup.X25519MLKEM768, NamedGroup.x25519)
.ec_point_formats(ECPointFormat.uncompressed)
.signature_algorithms(
SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
)
.application_protocols(NextProtocol.H2, NextProtocol.HTTP1)
.application_settings(NextProtocol.H2)
.certificate_compression(CertificateCompressionAlgorithm.brotli)
.psk_key_exchange_modes(PskKeyExchangeMode.psk_dhe_ke)
.build()
)
client = ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration(client_hello=profile))
buffer = client.create_buffer("tls.peet.ws")
try:
buffer.do_handshake()
except WantReadError:
pass
print(ClientHelloParser.parse(buffer.process_outgoing(65536)) == profile) # True
print(JA4.of(profile).text) # t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_d8a2da3f94cd, what tls.peet.ws reports for this connection
connection = client.connect(("tls.peet.ws", 443), timeout=10) # or proxy=Proxy.parse("socks5h://user:secret@127.0.0.1:1080")
print(connection.negotiated_protocol()) # NextProtocol.H2
connection.close()
grease=True and permute_extensions=True on the model give Chrome's randomized order. What BoringSSL cannot send is refused when the context is built, with the reason:
from dataclasses import replace
from ssl2 import ConfigurationError, NamedGroup
try:
ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration(client_hello=replace(profile, supported_groups=(NamedGroup.ffdhe2048, *profile.supported_groups))))
except ConfigurationError as refusal:
print(refusal) # BoringSSL does not support the group ffdhe2048
An older client
Clients built on BoringSSL before August 2026, Android among them, pad a ClientHello of 256 to 511 bytes up to 512 with the padding extension. The second patch keeps that behaviour available: list padding last and set legacy_padding, and the padding comes and goes with the size of the hello, as it did on those clients.
from boring_ssl2 import ClientContext
from ssl2 import CipherSuite, ClientHelloBuilder, ClientHelloParser, ECPointFormat, ExtensionType, NamedGroup, NextProtocol, ProtocolVersion, SignatureScheme, TLSClientConfiguration, WantReadError
android = (
ClientHelloBuilder()
.supported_versions(ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_2)
.cipher_suites(
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
)
.extensions(
ExtensionType.server_name,
ExtensionType.extended_main_secret,
ExtensionType.renegotiation_info,
ExtensionType.supported_groups,
ExtensionType.ec_point_formats,
ExtensionType.signature_algorithms,
ExtensionType.application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
ExtensionType.padding,
)
.supported_groups(NamedGroup.x25519, NamedGroup.secp256r1, NamedGroup.secp384r1)
.ec_point_formats(ECPointFormat.uncompressed)
.signature_algorithms(
SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
)
.application_protocols(NextProtocol.H2, NextProtocol.HTTP1)
.legacy_padding()
.build()
)
client = ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration(client_hello=android))
for host in ("www.example.com", "a-longer-server-name-with-many-labels.in-the-middle-of-a-domain-that-goes-on.and-another-label-to-pass-the-size.example.org"):
buffer = client.create_buffer(host)
try:
buffer.do_handshake()
except WantReadError:
pass
record = buffer.process_outgoing(65536)
print(len(record) - 5, ExtensionType.padding in ClientHelloParser.parse(record).extensions) # 162 False, then 512 True
asyncio
import asyncio
from boring_ssl2 import ClientContext
from ssl2 import NextProtocol, TLSClientConfiguration, TLSStream
async def main() -> None:
client = ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration(inner_protocols=(NextProtocol.HTTP1,)))
async with asyncio.timeout(10):
stream = await TLSStream.connect(client, ("www.python.org", 443))
await stream.write(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
print((await stream.read(4096)).split(b"\r\n", 1)[0]) # b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK'
await stream.close()
asyncio.run(main())
Session resumption
from boring_ssl2 import ClientContext
from ssl2 import NextProtocol, SessionCache, TLSClientConfiguration
cache = SessionCache()
client = ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration(inner_protocols=(NextProtocol.HTTP1,)), session_cache=cache)
for _ in range(2):
connection = client.connect(("www.python.org", 443), timeout=10)
connection.send(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
connection.recv(4096)
print(connection.buffer.session_reused) # False, then True
connection.close()
A model that lists pre_shared_key last needs a session_cache; the first hello goes out without it and the resumed hello equals the model. key_log="keys.txt" on ClientContext appends every secret of its TCP and QUIC handshakes in the NSS key log format, which Wireshark reads.
Server
from boring_ssl2 import ServerContext
from ssl2 import Certificate, PrivateKey, SigningChain, TLSServerConfiguration
chain = SigningChain((Certificate.from_file("server.pem"), PrivateKey.from_file("server.key")))
server = ServerContext(TLSServerConfiguration(certificate_chain=(chain,)))
listener = server.connect(("127.0.0.1", 8443))
listener.listen(5)
connection, peer = listener.accept()
connection.send(b"echo: " + connection.recv(1024))
connection.close()
Several chains in certificate_chain are picked by SNI. A trust_store on the server configuration demands a client certificate, which the client passes as certificate_chain. The server offers brotli, zstd and zlib certificate compression to clients that ask for it.
Sans-IO
import socket
from boring_ssl2 import ClientContext
from ssl2 import TLSClientConfiguration, WantReadError
client = ClientContext(TLSClientConfiguration())
tcp = socket.create_connection(("www.python.org", 443))
buffer = client.create_buffer("www.python.org")
while True:
try:
buffer.do_handshake()
break
except WantReadError:
tcp.sendall(buffer.process_outgoing(65536))
buffer.process_incoming(tcp.recv(65536))
print(buffer.negotiated_tls_version, buffer.cipher()) # TLSVersion.TLSv1_3 CipherSuite.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Your own BoringSSL
The wheel carries a build of the pinned commit. A build of your own, another commit or a patched checkout, is a path:
from boring_ssl2 import Library
library = Library() # the bundled build; Library(path="/opt/tls/libboring_ssl2.so") is yours
print(library.source_revision) # ed9209cff8b5a2fbc6c10050f29b3355048bda85
ClientContext(configuration, library=library) and ServerContext(configuration, library=library) use it. Functions bind when first called, so a build that lacks one fails at the feature that needs it and names the symbol, not at import.
The same CMakeLists.txt builds any version. The commit, its archive hash and the patch directory are cache variables; a checkout on disk skips the download and the patches:
cmake -S . -B build -G Ninja -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build --target boring_ssl2
cmake --install build --prefix src # writes src/boring_ssl2/libboring_ssl2.so, .dylib or .dll
cmake -S . -B build -DBORINGSSL_REVISION=<commit> -DBORINGSSL_ARCHIVE_SHA256=<sha256 of the GitHub archive>
cmake -S . -B build -DBORINGSSL_SOURCE_DIR=/path/to/boringssl
The patches in patches/boringssl add SSL_CTX_set1_extension_order for the model's extension order and SSL_CTX_set_legacy_padding for the padding of older clients. They come from commits on a checkout and apply to the download in file name order; a build without them lacks those two features and nothing else.
The wheels on PyPI carry the library for Linux (glibc 2.28, x86_64 and aarch64), macOS 11 (arm64 and x86_64) and Windows x64, with the licenses of BoringSSL and brotli next to it in boring_ssl2/licenses. On Termux, pkg install cmake ninja clang git and the three cmake commands above build it on the device, after which uv pip install . packages what was built. For an iOS app the publish workflow leaves the arm64 device and simulator builds as artifacts; the app bundles one as a framework and passes its path to Library.
Metadata
Release files for boring-ssl2 2.0.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Built distributions (wheels)
| File | Actions Reset | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-win_amd64.whl | Python 3 | none | Windows x86-64 | Details for boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-win_amd64.whl |
| boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_26_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl | Python 3 | none | Linux glibc 2.28+ x86-64, Linux glibc 2.26+ x86-64 | Details for boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_26_x86_64.manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl |
| boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_26_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl | Python 3 | none | Linux glibc 2.26+ ARM64, Linux glibc 2.28+ ARM64 | Details for boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_26_aarch64.manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl |
| boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-macosx_11_0_x86_64.whl | Python 3 | none | macOS 11.0+ x86-64 | Details for boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-macosx_11_0_x86_64.whl |
| boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl | Python 3 | none | macOS 11.0+ ARM64 | Details for boring_ssl2-2.0.1-py3-none-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl |
Total release size: 31.0 MB
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