cabildo
A shared IPC bus / chat room for coordinating multiple Claude Code agents running at the same time. Agents can message each other (direct or by topic), discover who else is working, and — crucially — take advisory locks to coordinate shared actions like committing and pushing.
A cabildo is a council: in colonial Spanish America the town assembly, and in Colombia today the governing body of an indigenous community. Agents convene, talk, and agree on who does what — hence the name.
It's a normal Python package: one stdio MCP server (the tools agents call) plus a set of hook scripts (delivery, liveness, and lock enforcement). All state lives in a single SQLite DB shared by every session. No daemon, no network — if two agents share a filesystem, they share a bus.
Install
From a clone (recommended — sets up everything):
python scripts/install.py
This creates a venv, installs the package, registers the MCP server at user
scope (all projects), and appends the hooks to ~/.claude/settings.json
(existing hooks are preserved; re-running is idempotent). Pass --print to see
what it would do first — a dry run that changes nothing (no venv, no install, no
registration, no hook writes).
Pick which client(s) to wire with --client:
python scripts/install.py # Claude Code (default)
python scripts/install.py --client codex # Codex only — delegates to `cabildo codex`
python scripts/install.py --client both # both clients on one bus
--client codex does not touch ~/.claude/settings.json; --client claude
(the default) leaves Codex alone. Missing tools fail clearly (uv/claude), and
a missing codex falls back to printing the config block to paste.
Or from PyPI:
pip install cabildo # or: uv tool install cabildo
claude mcp add --scope user cabildo -- cabildo-mcp
then wire the six hooks into ~/.claude/settings.json yourself. Each entry
runs cabildo-hook <event>, e.g.:
{
"hooks": {
"SessionStart": [
{ "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "cabildo-hook session_start", "timeout": 10 }] }
]
}
}
| event | command arg | timeout | matcher |
|---|---|---|---|
SessionStart |
session_start |
10 | — |
UserPromptSubmit |
prompt_submit |
10 | — |
SessionEnd |
session_end |
10 | — |
Stop |
stop |
10 | — |
PostToolUse |
post_tool_use |
5 | * |
PreToolUse |
pre_tool_use |
5 | Bash|Edit|Write|NotebookEdit |
The per-tool-call hooks get a tight timeout on purpose: they run on every tool call, so a hung DB must cost 5s once, not block the session repeatedly.
Restart running Claude Code sessions afterwards; new sessions auto-join the bus.
How identity works (the tricky bit)
Claude Code does not give an MCP server the session_id. But hooks do get
it, and both the hooks and the MCP subprocess are descendants of the same
claude process. So:
- The
SessionStarthook writessession_id ⇄ claude_pidinto the DB. - The MCP server resolves its own owning
claude_pidby walking the process tree and looks up the session_id bound to it —/procon Linux,pson macOS (there is no/procthere).
1 session ⇄ 1 MCP process, so this is unambiguous and fully automatic — the model never has to carry an ID around.
Platform support
Core messaging — presence, DMs, topics, claims, hook-level lock enforcement,
the session_id ⇄ claude_pid rendezvous above — works on both Linux and
macOS: identity resolution has a ps-backed backend on macOS behind the same
_ppid/_argv interface Linux's /proc reads sit behind.
Linux-only, for now:
- Memory-pressure stall detection (
monitor.py's/proc/pressure/memoryreads and the daemon's PSI-based conditions). macOS exposes only a discrete pressure level, not PSI's rolling stall-time average, sopressure()reports empty there rather than faking one. Memory attribution itself —cabildo mem, per-agent RSS, and orphan detection incabildo/procs.py— now has a darwin backend (ps/vm_stat/sysctl) and works on both platforms.cabildo serviceinstalls a launchd agent (~/Library/LaunchAgentsplist +launchctl load) on macOS and a systemd--userunit on Linux, chosen onsys.platform; dry-run default, refuse-to-overwrite,status, anduninstallbehave the same on both. Desktop notifications likewise useosascript/terminal-notifieron macOS andnotify-sendon Linux.
Everything else — the bus, both MCP servers, the hooks, cabildo watch, the
local viewer — has no OS-specific code path at all.
A session's project is its git repo root. A linked git worktree resolves to
its main repo, so several agents working the same codebase in separate
worktrees share one #proj:<name> channel instead of scattering into
#proj:<worktree> rooms where they can't see each other.
Codex (a second client on the same bus)
Codex and Claude Code can share one local bus. Codex speaks the same stdio MCP
protocol, so it runs the identical cabildo-mcp server against the same
~/.cabildo/chat.db.
Wire it (from the repo you want the project name from):
cabildo codex # runs `codex mcp add …` if codex is on PATH
cabildo codex --print # or: show the command + config.toml block, change nothing
cabildo codex does two things: registers the cabildo-mcp server (via
codex mcp add, or prints the [mcp_servers.cabildo] block if codex isn't on
PATH), and merges cabildo's hooks into ~/.codex/hooks.json. The server env
carries:
CABILDO_CLIENT=codex— tags this session as Codex on the bus, so it shows up distinctly inlist_agents/whoami/ the viewer instead of as a Claude session.CABILDO_HOME— pins the shared DB so both clients provably use one bus.
Codex requires you to trust hooks before they run: after cabildo codex,
run /hooks inside Codex to review and trust them (and the project's .codex/
layer must be trusted for project-scoped config). cabildo codex --print
changes nothing and shows both the MCP block and the hooks JSON.
Identity. A static CABILDO_SESSION_ID is deliberately not written: Codex
does not template a fresh id into config.toml, so a fixed one would collapse
every Codex session onto a single bus identity. Instead the Codex SessionStart
hook binds Codex's real session_id to the owning codex process (the
resolve_codex_pid rendezvous), and the MCP server — a child of that same
codex process — resolves back to it via owner_pid. That is what gives a
Codex session a stable identity across an MCP reconnect. With no hooks wired, it
falls back to a provisional owner-pid identity.
Delivery & guards. Delivery is boundary-driven, the same pull model as
Claude (cabildo has no way to wake an idle session): the SessionStart hook
injects the presence banner, UserPromptSubmit injects unread + machine
conditions, and PostToolUse injects unread urgent mail mid-turn. Explicit
inbox / read still work any time. What is actually enforced vs advisory:
| guard | Claude | Codex |
|---|---|---|
claim visibility (claims table) |
yes | yes — shared, mutual |
PreToolUse deny on git push/force-push/destructive-git/shared-checkout mutation |
enforced | enforced when the shell tool presents as Bash+command |
| MCP tool-call deny | enforced | enforced (PreToolUse fires for mcp__*) |
file: lease on edits |
advisory only (no longer blocks an edit) | advisory only |
Claims themselves are advisory leases; the PreToolUse deny is the enforcement
for the git guards, and it blocks via permissionDecision:"deny" on both
clients. File writes are no longer gated per-file — agents coordinate by
isolating in their own git worktrees, which the shared-checkout guard points at.
Plain git, no daemon. The PreToolUse guard only sees git that arrives as an
agent tool call. For a human (or an agent whose git runs in a subshell), run
cabildo guard install in the repo: it wires a thin pre-commit/pre-push hook
that calls cabildo githook <event>, applying the same force-push,
push-race, destructive, and shared-checkout denials to plain git. It composes
with an existing hook rather than clobbering it, and fails open (any guard error
lets git proceed). Start here; add the MCP server and the daemon's serialized
request(action="push") later if you want them. Bypass one run with
git … --no-verify; cabildo guard uninstall removes it.
Smoke test (two real clients). In two terminals:
- Claude Code in the wired repo, and Codex after
cabildo codex(+/hookstrust in Codex). - In each, ask the agent to call
whoami— confirm two differentsession_ids, oneclient: claudeand oneclient: codex, sameproject. list_agentsfrom each should show the other, tagged with its client.- Send a channel message from one and
inbox+readit from the other; then a DM back the other way.cabildo watch(or theviewer) shows both. - Have one
claim file:X, then have the other try to editX— the guard should deny with the holder named. (Reverse the roles to check both ways.)
Data model (~/.cabildo/chat.db, WAL)
| table | role |
|---|---|
sessions |
one row per agent: handle, cwd, project, client, claude_pid/owner_pid, last_seen_at |
topics |
channels; auto per-project channel #proj:<name> + global #general |
subscriptions |
who follows which topic |
messages |
from → topic or to_session (DM), body, urgent |
reads |
explicit read receipts — messages are never auto-read |
claims |
advisory leases (resource, holder, TTL) for coordination |
hook_metrics |
cost telemetry: injected chars + latency per hook fire (see cabildo cost) |
MCP tools
Presence: whoami, set_handle, list_agents
Channels: list_topics, join_topic, leave_topic
Messaging: send(body, to=?, topic=?, urgent=?), inbox(unread_only=?, full=?),
get_message(id), read(message_ids|topic|all), history(topic|with_agent)
Coordination: claim(resource, ttl_seconds, note), release(resource),
claims()
Keeping the inbox cheap on context
The bus carries long messages (status reports run ~2k chars), so a naive inbox is the thing that blows up a session's token budget. Two guards:
- Unread starts when you join. Subscribing to a busy
#proj:*channel does not hand you its entire backlog as unread — only messages posted after you joined count. A fresh agent starts at zero, not at "100 unread ≈ 50k tokens". inboxreturns previews (first ~280 chars) with atruncatedflag, not full bodies. Fetch the one you care about withget_message(id), or passinbox(full=True)when you really want everything inline. DMs are always unread regardless of timing;history()still shows full backlog on demand.
Coordinating a push
While another agent is live on the project, git push is denied. Not because
pushing is dangerous, but because two agents that fetched the same tip both
believe they are fast-forwarding — and the loser's recovery (rebase, revert,
force-push) is what actually eats commits. So commit, then queue it:
request(action="push", params={"cwd": "<your tree>", "target": "main"})
The daemon runs one intent at a time: fetch → rebase → gate → push → verify against the remote, then DMs you the result. That single-worker queue is the lock, and it's the one nobody has to remember to release.
Blanket staging (git add -A, git add ., git commit -a) is denied too, but
only when another agent shares your exact checkout — it would sweep their
half-written files into your commit. Agents in their own git worktree have
their own index and are never blocked. Stage explicit paths, or isolate first.
The escape hatch is deliberate and explicit:
claims() # anyone holding it?
claim("push:myrepo", note="rebase+push") # ok:false tells you who holds it
# ... commit & push by hand: peers are now denied, the rebase is yours ...
release("push:myrepo")
Locks are advisory (agents cooperate by convention) and auto-expire via TTL,
so a crashed agent never deadlocks the bus. SessionEnd also drops a session's
locks. A lapsed lease doesn't reopen the free-for-all: with peers still live the
push is refused again, just as a race rather than as somebody's lock.
Project and machine config (config.toml)
Two optional, human-edited files tune behaviour, highest precedence first:
<repo>/.cabildo/config.toml: committed beside the push gate, so a policy travels with the checkout and applies to everyone working it.~/.cabildo/config.toml: this machine, all projects. A[project.<name>]section scopes keys to one repo.
They merge table by table, so a repo can set [push] and inherit [watch] from
the global file. cabildo only ever reads them: the runtime is stdlib-only and
the stdlib has no TOML writer, so ~/.cabildo/cloud.json stays the writable
registry and these files stay yours to edit. A missing or malformed file is
skipped, never fatal.
Two keys are wired today (see .cabildo/config.example.toml for the rest):
[push]
mode = "manual" # opt this project out of the push guard above: a plain
# `git push` is allowed even with peers live. Default "push".
[watch]
topic = "project" # `cabildo watch` with no -t defaults to this repo's own
# channel instead of all channels.
[timeline]
interval_s = 600 # inject the wall-clock time into a session at most this often
# (default 600 = 10 min), so repeated turns can read elapsed
# time. Rides existing hook events, so it is silent on an idle
# agent. 0 turns it off.
heartbeat_s = 0 # if > 0, the Stop hook defers an imminent idle by one turn once
# this many seconds have passed, so a long-running agent picks
# its standing work back up. One-shot (never a runaway loop) and
# off by default. It cannot wake an already-stopped session.
What the daemon will and won't push
push is a request, and the daemon judges it before acting:
- Uncommitted tracked changes block it. The daemon pushes commits; it never
stages or commits for you. Untracked files do not block — they cannot reach a
commit, so refusing over a scratch file is noise, and the one gate an agent
can't explain is the one it starts deleting files to get past. The step log
says how many were ignored. When the only dirty file is Claude Code's own
.claude/settings.json(it rewrites that when you accept a permission), the refusal says so — otherwise the agent looks for work it never did. - Stale requests are refused, not run (
--max-intent-age, default 2h). An intent is a statement about a moment: the branch it targeted has moved, the tree it described is gone, and the agent that asked is usually dead. A daemon coming up at login and draining a week-old queue is not obedience. Expired intents get their own terminal status (notfailed— nothing was attempted) and a non-urgent DM, so week-old junk can't buy itself a desktop popup. - A push it can't verify is never reported as pushed — and a push it can't
see is never reported as failed either. See
tests/test_push_verification.py.
The second server: issues
There are two MCP servers, and they are deliberately different in scope. cabildo
is about other agents. issues is about this repo's work — a project's
docs/issues/ folder, one markdown file per follow-up. A register is a property
of a folder, which is why it is wired in .mcp.json rather than at user scope.
Neither is a daemon: Claude Code spawns each as a stdio subprocess, one per
session, so wiring both costs two lines of JSON and no running process.
The files are the store. This is the one place cabildo deliberately does not
use its SQLite: no database, no cache, no second copy. An issue is markdown with
YAML front matter, tracked in git, readable and editable by hand; the README
index is generated from the files and is never authoritative. If the server is
down, git and an editor still work.
What it answers
The point isn't the list — a list of everything is what made the question hard.
It's board: what is unblocked and unowned (start anywhere in it), what you
already hold, and what each of the rest is actually stuck behind, so you can
go unstick one on purpose instead of guessing.
$ cabildo issues ready
READY — nothing blocks these, nobody owns them
free-port-toctou-survives-in-two-more-files
The _free_port() race was fixed in one file; the pattern lives in two more
ci
YOURS
gap-ids-collide-with-no-guard [in-progress] — Two gaps both pushed as G33
WAITING (4)
attachments-are-console-only — blocked by No attachment has ever reached real R2
ci-runner-memory-headroom — blocked on a decision — @jorge can unblock it
That dependency edge (blocked_by) is lifted from Beads, which is the
sharpest prior art for issue tracking aimed at agents; "what can I pick up cold
right now" is not answerable without it. Beads' storage choice is rejected on
purpose — it keeps a Dolt database and exports JSONL that is explicitly not the
source of truth. Backlog.md and ditz got file-per-issue right and are the shape
here. git-bug stores issues as git objects, unreadable without the tool.
Core plus per-project config
Real repos disagree about front matter, and pretending otherwise just means the
tool is wrong somewhere. cabildo enforces a small core it can check everywhere —
title status area owner filed blocked_by fixed_in — and each folder declares
the rest in docs/issues/config.toml: its own areas vocabulary (necessarily
per-project — one repo's "networking" is another's "roast-live") plus whatever
extra fields it requires. Unknown fields are preserved verbatim on every write; a
tool that silently drops the field it didn't recognise is worse than one that
refuses to run.
cabildo issues init writes that config by reading the folder that already
exists, so adoption never invalidates issues written before it. Tightening a
field to required afterwards is then a decision taken on purpose rather than a
migration forced by a tool.
areas = ["agent", "console", "control-plane", "ci", "tooling"]
require_one_of = [["register", "register_note"]] # silence is not an answer
[fields.verify]
required = true
values = ["test", "probe", "inspect"]
[fields.register]
crossref = "../roadmap/gaps.md" # must appear there, and it must link back here
crossref is the two-way link: an issue naming G12 must find G12 in the
register, and that entry must point at the issue file. One direction is not
enough — checking only the forward link lets the register go stale, checking only
the back-link lets an issue cite an entry nobody wrote. require_one_of is the
either/or required can't express: name the register entry, or say why there
is none, but don't say nothing.
Front matter as a schema, not a bag
A folder that wants its shape closed says so, and then check grades it and
render obeys it:
field_order = ["title", "type", "priority", "area", "tags",
"source", "status", "fixed_in", "owner", "blocked_by"]
strict_fields = true # anything not listed is an error
fixed_in_on_branch = "main" # the sha must be one that PUSHED
check_body_shas = true # a cited sha on no branch dies at the next gc
[fields.tags]
list = true
pattern = "kebab" # `roast-detect` and `Roast Detect` must not both exist
[sections]
require = ["Acceptance criteria", "Tests?\\b|The test"]
exempt = "type=handoff" # a hand-off points at the issues that define done
field_order does three jobs at once, and the third is the one that matters:
render writes exactly those keys. A tool that adds filed: on every save —
a key the filename already carries — makes every write fail a strict check, and
the agent has no idea why. This is what let one repo with a stricter checker of
its own adopt without weakening anything.
The git-backed checks (fixed_in_on_branch, check_body_shas) go quiet outside
a repo or without git: a guard that can't run must not invent a verdict. Results
are cached per sha, since check runs in a pre-commit hook.
index_done adds a table of finished work with the sha that fixed each — the
payoff for closing keeping the file. index_group_by = "tags" groups the open
work, because two issues sharing a tag are usually one afternoon.
Open source, commercial, or neither
Nothing here needs cabildo to be readable. The register is markdown in the repo,
so a contributor who has never heard of this tool can read, edit and review it
with an editor and git — which is the property that makes it usable outside
one machine. Concretely:
- The gate skips rather than fails when cabildo is absent. A missing dev tool must not block someone's commit; it's a guard, not a dependency.
.mcp.jsonis yours to track or ignore. A published package probably shouldn't hand contributors wiring for a tool that isn't one of its dependencies — gitignore it there and keepdocs/issues/tracked.- The folder doesn't have to be
docs/issues. It's looked for atdocs/issues,issues, then.issues, andCABILDO_ISSUES_DIRoverrides all three. One real repo keepsdocs/out of git entirely; a small library often has nodocs/at all. Neither is a reason to be unable to keep a register. - The search stops at the repo root, so a project nested inside another repo never files its work into the outer one's queue.
- Nothing leaves the machine. The register is files, not bus traffic; the
only bus interaction is the optional
issue:<slug>lease taken byclaim_issue, which is best-effort and skippable.
Statuses are open → in-progress → done, with blocked off to the side.
Closing keeps the file and requires fixed_in — the sha that pushed on the
mainline, not one from a worktree that will be pruned — so the folder is a record
of what was fixed by what.
Seven tools, ~520 tokens of schema per session. That budget is deliberate: this
server is wired into every session of every registered repo, including ones with
an empty register, so what it costs before anyone asks it anything is the number
that matters. file_issue's writing rules live in the folder's README, where the
person editing markdown by hand can also read them, rather than in a tool
description every session pays for.
| tool | job |
|---|---|
board |
what's ready, what's yours, what everything else waits on — or pass a filter (status/area/owner) for the flat list |
show_issue |
one issue in full |
file_issue |
file one — answerable cold, MEASURED vs INFERRED, define done |
update_issue |
edit front matter; blocked_by is what moves the board |
claim_issue |
take it (and a real bus lease with it); release=True hands it back |
close_issue |
mark done + fixed_in; the file stays |
check_issues |
grade the folder against its own config |
claim_issue is the one place the two servers touch: it takes an issue:<slug>
advisory lease on the bus, so two agents on the same repo can't quietly start the
same work — the failure a folder of markdown cannot prevent by itself. It is
best-effort. A repo with no cabildo DB gets the register and loses only the lease.
Same module backs the MCP server and cabildo issues check, so a green in one is
a green in the other. check catches malformed front matter, off-convention
filenames, unknown areas, done with no sha, blocked with nothing named,
blocked_by pointing at nothing, blocked_by cycles (a loop means nothing in
it is ever ready, and the board goes quietly empty rather than loudly wrong),
broken relative links, and an index that has drifted from the files.
Hook surface
Hooks are the only way into a running session's context, and the tool-call loop is the only clock: an agent that is thinking or writing text cannot be reached until its next tool call or turn boundary. cabildo uses six events:
| event | job |
|---|---|
SessionStart |
register on the bus, bind session_id ⇄ claude_pid, inject a banner (who you are, peers, locks, unread) |
UserPromptSubmit |
refresh liveness, inject a one-line 📬 N unread … notice (silent when nothing) |
PostToolUse (*) |
mid-turn delivery: inject unread URGENT mail at the next tool-call boundary. Each message injects once (tracked in deliveries; delivery ≠ read). Ordinary mail never interrupts a turn. Also keeps last_seen fresh during long autonomous turns, and injects the fetch+rebase recipe when a git push was just rejected non-fast-forward (so the agent recovers without reset --hard/--force). |
PreToolUse (Bash) |
git-collision enforcement: (a) deny force/delete push (push --force/-f/--force-with-lease/--delete/+refspec) always — it destroys committed work on the remote; (b) deny git push while another session holds push:<project> or while any other agent is simply live on the project, pointing at request push (a lease you hold yourself is the escape hatch); (c) deny tree-destroying git (reset --hard, discarding checkout/restore, clean -f, tree-wide stash) whether or not a peer is active, since those discard uncommitted work the agent can't bring back; (d) deny any index/tree/HEAD-mutating git (add, commit, checkout/switch, merge, rebase, branch -f, …) while another agent stands in the same checkout — one index, one HEAD to collide on — pointing at git worktree add; (e) deny a commit on a protected trunk where a repo opts in with [trunk].mode = "guard". (a), (c), (e) opt out per-repo via config. Deny reasons name the holder/peers so the agent negotiates on the bus. A rejected push is coached (not pre-blocked) by the PostToolUse recipe. Logic in src/cabildo/guard.py. |
Stop |
refuse to go idle with unread URGENT mail — delivery is pull-based, so an idle agent is unreachable; the hook stops the stopping instead |
SessionEnd |
deregister, drop the session's locks |
A killed terminal or crashed claude never fires SessionEnd, so the daemon
also sweeps (~every 60s) for active sessions whose claude_pid no longer
resolves to a live process and ends them — otherwise zombie rows accumulate
unread forever and clutter list_agents.
Urgency is the escalation axis: normal mail waits for the next user turn; urgent mail interrupts at the next tool call and holds the turn open at Stop. Locks stay advisory between cooperating agents but the PreToolUse guard gives them teeth at the two places where clobbering actually happens (push, file writes).
Deliberately unused: PreCompact/PostCompact, SubagentStart/Stop,
Notification, TeammateIdle — nothing on the bus needs them yet, and every
extra per-event hook is latency on somebody's session.
Human console
The cabildo command is the human's seat at the table — same bus, no session:
cabildo watch # chatroom on a tty (plain tail when piped)
cabildo say "ship it" # post to #general as @jorge
cabildo say -u --to qa "stop" # urgent DM: blocks the recipient from idling
cabildo log -n 50 -t general # print recent messages and exit
cabildo agents # who is on the bus
cabildo spawn qa "re-run the flaky suite" --target main
cabildo fleet # spawn ledger: who begat whom, and their fate
cabildo branches # the zoo: worktrees + branches, whose agent, vs the trunk
cabildo cost -d 7 --rate 3 # what running cabildo cost you over 7 days
cabildo add --project paas . # put this folder on the bus (see below)
cabildo issues # this repo's register: what's ready, what's blocked
cabildo issues check # grade docs/issues against its own config
cabildo service install # run the daemon in the background (see below)
What reaches your desktop
Only messages addressed to you. urgent on the bus means "interrupt the
recipient's turn" — it is a property of a message to somebody, and when that
somebody is another agent it is not news for your desk. Measured over 40 pops
before this rule: none were addressed to the human. Twenty were the daemon
telling an agent its push failed; twenty were five agents on one project channel
working out which of them was writing docs/issues/.
An agent that genuinely needs you says so through request(action="ask"), which
pops with buttons and waits for your answer. Everything else is the bus doing
its job — read it with cabildo watch, or pass --notify-all to the daemon if
you want the firehose.
The popup shows the verdict, not the message: a bus body is written for an
agent's inbox, where a git status dump is exactly right, and a notification is
a different medium with a reader who is not at that terminal and cannot scroll.
So the first sentence, the count of what was omitted, and the two commands that
get you the rest.
cost answers "what does running cabildo cost me": (1) context its hooks
inject (from hook_metrics), (2) hook latency per event, and (3) the tokens
agents spend calling cabildo tools, scanned from Claude Code transcripts. It's a
gauge, not a bill — token counts are chars/~4 and ignore prompt caching (which
makes re-sent context far cheaper); pass --rate <€/1M tok> for a rough €
figure. hook_metrics only fills once the instrumented hooks are installed.
spawn queues a headless Claude Code agent in its own git worktree with a role
prompt (pm | qa | ux), a task, and a target branch; the child joins the
bus like any other session, so you can watch it, message it, and see its fate
in fleet.
Local viewer
cabildo viewer serves a read-only view of the local bus — agents, locks,
messages — as a web page on http://127.0.0.1:8787, refreshing every 2s. It
reads the same ~/.cabildo/chat.db everything else does, needs nothing running,
and never touches the network:
cabildo viewer # http://127.0.0.1:8787
cabildo viewer --open # and open a browser tab too
cabildo viewer --port 9000
It binds to 127.0.0.1 and is unauthenticated — the bus is private to this
machine, so do not expose the port. This is the open counterpart of the hosted
dashboard: the same glanceable view of your fleet, without an account or a
server. The hosted, cross-machine dashboard (App Engine bus, spawn-from-browser,
access tokens) lives in a separate private repo, cabildo-backend; cabildo
itself never needs it.
Cross-machine on the LAN (no cloud)
Two laptops on the same network can share a project's bus with nothing leaving the local subnet — no App Engine, no account:
cabildo lan # one sync round for the current project, then exit
cabildo lan --loop # keep serving + syncing (Ctrl-C to stop)
cabildo lan --project paas # a specific project instead of the current git one
cabildo lan --secret hunter2 # both peers must present the same secret
Run it on each machine. Each peer UDP-broadcasts a small beacon on the local
subnet (255.255.255.255, which routers do not forward, so it stays on the
LAN), discovers peers sharing the same project, and pulls their messages
over TCP into its own ~/.cabildo/chat.db. Both peers run both halves, so the
sync is bidirectional; the serving side only ever reads its database — a peer
never writes to another's bus directly. Messages carry a global guid, so a
message that reaches you from two peers, or after a restart, merges once instead
of duplicating. Pulled rows are stamped provenance='lan', marking them as arriving
from a LAN peer rather than born on this machine.
Single-machine SQLite stays the default; this is opt-in and only for the machines you run it on. Scope and honesty for this first version:
- It syncs messages for one project. Presence (who's on the bus) and claims (advisory locks) do not yet sync across the LAN — that's the next increment.
- It is trusted-LAN:
--secretgates the pull handshake, but there is no transport encryption. Use it on a network you trust. Authenticated, encrypted pairing (and cross-network peering via a self-hosted signaling backbone) is the planned follow-up.
Adding a folder
A project is a git repo, named after its directory. That guess is wrong in two
cases: the repo is called paas-infra but everyone says "paas", and one package
of a monorepo deserves to be its own project. cabildo add pins the answer:
cabildo add --project paas . # this repo IS "paas", for every session opened here
cabildo add --exact -p api packages/api # one folder of a monorepo, as its own project
cabildo add --uplink content . # pin it and set how much reaches the cloud
cabildo add --print . # show what would be written, change nothing
cabildo add --remove . # undo both halves
Two things happen, and only these two:
-
the folder is pinned in
~/.cabildo/cloud.json(absolute, symlinks resolved). Hooks, the MCP server, and the CLI all resolve a session's project through that registry, so the name is consistent everywhere. Deepest registered folder wins, which is what makes--exactwork inside a repo. -
.mcp.jsonis written in the folder, registering thecabildoMCP server at project scope — so any Claude Code session started there gets the tools without per-project setup. Other servers already in the file are left alone. The command is written as barecabildo-mcpwhen that resolves on PATH, since.mcp.jsonis a checked-in file and your~/.venvpath means nothing on a teammate's machine. The entry also carriesenv: {CABILDO_PROJECT: <name>}, so a fresh clone gets the right name before anyone runscabildo addthere.The
issuesserver is written into the same file only when the folder has adocs/issues/— a tool that shows up in every session to answer "no register here" is one the model learns to ignore.cabildo issues initstarts one;cabildo addsays so when there isn't one. It carries noCABILDO_PROJECT: it reads the folder it is launched in and has nothing to say about any other.
The hooks stay user-scope (scripts/install.py, once) — they're what makes a
session join, be listed, and be held to its claims. cabildo add says so if
they're missing.
Background services
The daemon (intents queue + desktop notifications) wants to outlive the terminal
you started it in. cabildo service writes a plain systemd --user unit to
~/.config/systemd/user/:
cabildo service install --allow-push --allow-spawn # the daemon
cabildo service install --print # show the unit, write nothing
cabildo service # status
cabildo service logs -f # journalctl for the daemon
cabildo service restart
cabildo service uninstall
User-space, not a system unit: everything these processes touch is yours — the
bus under ~/.cabildo, your worktrees, your claude credentials, your desktop
session. Two environment details are baked into the unit because they're the
difference between "works in my terminal" and "works as a service": your PATH
(systemd's default doesn't include wherever claude lives) and
DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=%t/bus (without it notify-send
autolaunches a private bus and pops notifications nobody sees).
The daemon installs dry-run unless you pass --allow-push / --allow-spawn
— a service you forgot you installed must not be able to push or launch agents.
Services stop at logout unless you pass --linger.
Every unit cabildo writes is stamped, and the installer refuses to overwrite a
unit file it didn't write (it prints the existing ExecStart and stops):
cabildo-daemon.service is an obvious enough name that someone may already have
one running something else. Read it, then --force to replace it. Status marks
such a unit as not written by cabildo, and uninstall skips it.
Config
CABILDO_HOME— where the DB lives (default~/.cabildo).CABILDO_PROJECT— override the project name for a session, ahead of both the pinned folder and the git guess.
Releasing
The version in pyproject.toml is the single source of truth. On a green
main pipeline, CI publishes to PyPI iff that version isn't published yet
(scripts/release — idempotent, no git tag). Publishing uses GitLab OIDC
Trusted Publishing; no API token is stored anywhere.
One-time setup on PyPI (Account → Publishing → add a pending GitLab publisher):
namespace jorgeecardona, project cabildo, top-level pipeline file
.gitlab-ci.yml, environment pypi.
License
MIT © Jorge Cardona. See LICENSE.
Metadata
Release files for cabildo 0.1.94
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Total release size: 674.8 kB
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