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casapi

Stateless HTTP API for remote Claude Code execution powered by Claude Agent SDK.

CI

Each request is one ephemeral claude_agent_sdk.query() run. There are no sessions, no resume, and no server-side conversation state. A client on another machine POSTs a prompt and receives the agent result plus the full message transcript, either as one JSON document or as a Server-Sent Events stream.

Endpoints

Method Path Auth Description
GET /health no Readiness probe: {"status": "ok"}
GET /v1/info yes Server defaults and limits
POST /v1/query yes Run one agent query, return the transcript
POST /v1/query/stream yes Same, streamed as SSE

See docs/api/rest-api.md for the full reference.

Quickstart

Server:

uv sync
export CASAPI_API_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
export CASAPI_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/srv/workspaces
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...   # or log in with `claude` as the server user
uv run uvicorn casapi.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000

Client (another machine, via TLS or a private network):

curl -sS https://casapi.example.net/v1/query \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CASAPI_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "List the files in this directory", "cwd": "myproject", "max_turns": 5}'

curl -N https://casapi.example.net/v1/query/stream \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CASAPI_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "Summarize README.md"}'

Configuration

Variable Default Description
CASAPI_API_KEY unset Bearer token clients must send
CASAPI_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED false Allow requests with no key configured (local dev only)
CASAPI_WORKSPACE_ROOT current directory All request cwd values must resolve inside this path
CASAPI_DEFAULT_MODEL unset (SDK default) Model used when a request omits model
CASAPI_PERMISSION_MODE acceptEdits Default permission mode
CASAPI_ALLOWED_TOOLS Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep Default auto-approve list (not a restriction; see below)
CASAPI_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS false Permit requests with permission_mode=bypassPermissions
CASAPI_MAX_CONCURRENCY 4 Simultaneous runs; excess requests get HTTP 429
CASAPI_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS 3600 Default and maximum run duration
CASAPI_SANDBOX_MODE off Exactly off or opt-in (case- and whitespace-sensitive; unset means off); opt-in lets requests send sandbox: true
CASAPI_SANDBOX_ALLOWED_DOMAINS GitHub, PyPI, and npm hosts (see below) Comma-separated egress allow-list for sandboxed Bash; set-but-empty means no egress

The default sandbox domains are github.com, api.github.com, codeload.github.com, uploads.github.com, raw.githubusercontent.com, objects.githubusercontent.com, release-assets.githubusercontent.com, pypi.org, files.pythonhosted.org, and registry.npmjs.org.

CASAPI_SANDBOX_MODE must be exactly off or opt-in; any other value (including an empty string, OFF, Opt-In, padded values, or required) aborts startup. Domain entries are trimmed and lowercased, and empty comma-separated entries are dropped (a.com,,b.com is two entries; a set but empty or blank list means no egress). Each entry must be an ASCII hostname with at least two DNS labels, each 1-63 characters (letters, digits, inner hyphens), and at most 253 characters in total. A single leading *. wildcard is allowed; embedded wildcards, empty labels (a..com), trailing dots, and raw Unicode names (use punycode, xn--...) abort startup. Entries are checked as ASCII before lowercasing, so look-alike characters such as the Kelvin sign are rejected.

Security model

  • The API key is a shell. Holding the key is equivalent to running a shell as the service user (with the workspace as the starting directory). Protect it accordingly; everything below is defence in depth, not a sandbox (except for runs that set sandbox: true, see "Opt-in Bash sandbox").
  • API key required by default. Without CASAPI_API_KEY (or with an empty one), execution endpoints return 503 unless CASAPI_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=true is set explicitly. Keys are compared in constant time.
  • allowed_tools is an auto-approve list, not a restriction. It names the tools a run may use without a permission decision; it does not remove other tools, and under the default acceptEdits mode file edits are approved regardless. The server-side CASAPI_ALLOWED_TOOLS is only a default — any key holder can send a different list per request.
  • The agent can read the server's secrets. A run inherits the service environment, including ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, the Claude login credentials, and CASAPI_API_KEY itself. Prompt-injected workspace content can therefore exfiltrate them; do not point the service at untrusted workspaces. The opt-in sandbox only narrows the Bash path (see below).
  • Opt-in Bash sandbox. With CASAPI_SANDBOX_MODE=opt-in, a request may set sandbox: true to run Bash and its child processes inside the CLI sandbox: writes are limited to the working directory, temp, and a dedicated cache directory; egress is limited to the allow-list; the systemd/D-Bus user bus is unreachable; common secret directories are unreadable; and the API keys are unset in the Bash environment. The sandbox is fail-closed (failIfUnavailable): if it cannot start, the run fails rather than running unsandboxed. A request cannot weaken it; with mode off, sandbox: true is rejected with 403. A sandboxed request is also rejected with 403 when its effective permission mode (request value, else CASAPI_PERMISSION_MODE) is auto or bypassPermissions, because those modes can approve hosts outside the allow-list; and when the resolved cwd is ~/.cache, an ancestor of it (including the service home directory), or inside ~/.cache outside ~/.cache/casapi-sandbox, because the CLI makes the whole working directory writable. Sandboxed runs use only the CLI bundled with the SDK (they fail closed if it is missing) and verify that the cache directory is a real directory owned by the service user, tightening it to mode 0700. Limits to be aware of: only Bash is covered, not Read/Edit/Write, Glob/Grep, WebFetch, or MCP. Because Read is auto-approved, secret files such as the service env file can still be read, and anything readable can be exfiltrated to allow-listed hosts (GitHub). The gh token stays readable so push and PR creation work; use a minimal-scope token. A required mode does not exist yet.
  • Workspace confinement. Request cwd is resolved (symlinks included) and must stay inside CASAPI_WORKSPACE_ROOT. Note this confines the agent's starting directory, not what its tools (e.g. Bash) can reach; run the server as an unprivileged user or in a container for real isolation.
  • bypassPermissions is opt-in via CASAPI_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS. It is not a meaningful boundary on its own: with Bash auto-approved, the default posture is already shell-equivalent.
  • Client disconnects. POST /v1/query promptly cancels the run and frees its concurrency slot when the client disconnects. The streaming endpoint also cancels the run when its consumer goes away.
  • Bind and TLS. Bind to loopback or a private interface and put TLS in front (reverse proxy, Tailscale, or an SSH tunnel). The API key travels in a header.
  • Statelessness. Request bodies containing resume, session_id, or any other unknown field are rejected with 422. Runs are hermetic: CLI session persistence is disabled, so no resumable transcript is written, and host and project settings are not loaded (setting_sources is empty), so hooks or MCP servers from those settings cannot leak into a run. Auto memory is disabled (CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY=1), and MCP configuration is strict and isolated. Managed policy settings and ~/.claude.json still load. The default system prompt is the Claude Code preset. What still persists after a run: files the agent creates or edits in the workspace, and ordinary CLI bookkeeping under ~/.claude.

Development

Requirements: Python 3.11–3.14 and uv.

git clone https://github.com/dceoy/casapi.git
cd casapi
uv sync
uv run uvicorn casapi.main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000

Swagger UI is at http://127.0.0.1:8000/docs.

uv run ruff format --check .
uv run ruff check .
uv run pyright .
uv run pytest
uv run mkdocs build --strict

Dependency versions are tracked in the committed uv.lock.

License

AGPL-3.0-only. See LICENSE.

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