causal-certificate
A small, numeric strict-causality certificate for PyTorch sequence models.
One forward pass + T−1 vector-Jacobian products tells you whether any output at
position t depends on an input at position s > t — the silent bug that
manufactures phantom autoregressive results.
from causal_certificate import certify, assert_strictly_causal
report = certify(my_mixer, x) # x: (B, T, D) float; my_mixer: x -> y
print(report.summary())
# CausalCertificate(T=128, exhaustive cuts)
# temporal : leak=0.000e+00 frac=0.000e+00 -> STRICTLY CAUSAL
# cross-batch: leak=0.000e+00 frac=0.000e+00 -> BATCH-INDEPENDENT
assert_strictly_causal(my_mixer, x) # drop into a pytest
Why
A "blockwise causal" Walsh–Hadamard token mixer once produced a 7.21× lower BPB
than a matched transformer — a number that reached a provisional patent application
before it was found to be a within-block future-token leak. Standard sanity checks
passed because they probed across-block causality; the violation lived inside
blocks. This tool is the check that would have caught it in CI. (Case study &
full write-up: papers/causality_leaks/.)
What it catches (three leak classes)
| Class | Example | Caught by |
|---|---|---|
| Temporal (position) leak | block-WHT / FFT / butterfly mixing; off-by-one causal masks; KV/RoPE drift | exhaustive-cut temporal certificate |
| Pooled/block readout | a block statistic broadcast back to every position | temporal certificate |
| Batch/sequence-statistic coupling | batchnorm-style couplings across the batch | cross-batch certificate (per-example probes are blind to it) |
Genuinely-causal ops certify at exactly 0.0 (structural autograd zeros) — in fp32 as well as fp64 — so there is no per-model threshold tuning. Validated on external attention/conv models it never saw: causal MHA and causal conv → 0.0; an injected off-by-one mask and a batchnorm coupling → flagged.
Modes
certify(fn, x, cuts="all")— the certificate (exhaustive cuts, complete).certify(fn, x, cuts="rand", K=8)— a cheap always-on training monitor; a single-pair leak is caught with probability1 − (1 − 1/(T−1))^K.batch_check=True(default whenB>1) — adds the cross-batch certificate.
Scope & honest attribution
This is a numeric certificate on a given architecture/config (generic inputs and
random cotangents), not a symbolic proof; detection is almost-sure, not worst-case
adversarial; it assumes equal input/output sequence length. The method is not
novel — it packages known probes: Karpathy's 2019 backprop-from-t temporal
check, the per-cut VJP gradient energy of Effective Context in Neural Speech
Models (arXiv:2505.22487), and Krokotsch's 2020 batch-independence unit test. The
contribution is the packaging: exhaustive-cut completeness + the cross-batch
extension, as a single drop-in certificate for sequence-model CI.
Install & test
pip install -e . # editable install (src layout)
pytest # or: python tests/test_external_models.py
The generalization test certifies external causal attention / conv at exactly 0.0, and fires on an injected off-by-one mask and a batch-statistic coupling.
Metadata
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