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cc-peer

Message a Claude Code session on another machine over SSH, without the message leaving your network.

$ cc-peer list --host build-server
Sessions on build-server:
NAME             PID    STATUS  CWD
api-worker       4011   idle    /srv/api
migration-watch  4614   busy    /srv/api

$ cc-peer send --host build-server --to api-worker "Schema migration landed; rebase is safe now."
Posted to api-worker's inbox on build-server (44 chars).

Use the official feature first

Claude Code has cross-session messaging built in, and it already covers most cases:

Target How the official feature delivers it
Same machine Per-session Unix socket. Never touches Anthropic's servers.
Another machine Through Anthropic's servers, over Remote Control.
Claude on the web Through Anthropic's servers.

If Remote Control works for you, use it — it needs no scripts and it gives the receiving Claude a reply address.

cc-peer is for the cases where it isn't available:

  • Bedrock / Vertex / Foundry — Remote Control is disabled on those providers.
  • API-key auth — finding sessions beyond this machine needs a claude.ai sign-in.
  • Air-gapped or compliance-bound networks — where relaying through a third party is the problem.
  • Unattended workers — a headless box nobody is around to connect to Remote Control.

If none of those describe you, you probably don't need this.

How it works

Claude Code binds a Unix domain socket per session as that session's inbox, and documents it under The session's inbox socket — explicitly "when you want a script or hook to post into a session". Posting is one JSON line:

{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":"your message"}}

That socket is local to its machine, and forwarding it doesn't help: Claude Code verifies the peer process and uid on the connection, so ssh -L gets refused as "an endpoint that isn't the expected process".

So cc-peer doesn't forward the socket. It runs the same write inside a remote shell, where the connection is local again. --host pipes this script over SSH to python3 -, so nothing needs to be installed on the remote machine.

Read the socket path; never guess it

Session records live in ~/.claude/sessions/<pid>.json and carry the socket path. It is not always /tmp/cc-socks/ — on two Ubuntu hosts running the same Claude Code build, one bound under /tmp/cc-socks/ and the other under /run/user/1001/cc-socks/. Claude Code also falls back to a private per-user directory when it rejects the one it would have used. cc-peer reads messagingSocketPath out of the record and treats a live PID with no bound socket as unreachable.

Install

Python 3.9+, standard library only.

pip (recommended)

pip install cc-peer

install.sh

For air-gapped hosts or remote deployment over SSH:

git clone https://github.com/abruption/cc-peer && cd cc-peer

./install.sh                          # this machine
./install.sh --host build-server      # a remote machine, over SSH
./install.sh --host web-01 --host db  # several at once

That drops cc_peer.py and its Claude Code skill into ~/.claude/skills/cc-peer/, and links ~/.local/bin/cc-peer. Nothing else is touched. Remove it with ./install.sh --uninstall [--host ...].

cc-peer update refreshes this machine from the latest GitHub release. For another machine, ./install.sh --host <host> pushes this copy over SSH — deliberately, since a target with no route to GitHub is one of the cases this tool exists for. cc-peer update --host reports what that machine has rather than trying to make it fetch.

Remote installs push the files over the SSH connection itself, so the target needs no internet access — which matters, since air-gapped hosts are one of the reasons this exists. It needs python3 and your SSH access, nothing more.

Or skip the installer entirely and copy the one file:

curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/abruption/cc-peer/main/cc_peer.py
chmod +x cc_peer.py

The skill

Installing puts a skill next to the script, so Claude picks the target session and writes the message itself when you ask it to reach a session on another box. The script keeps the deterministic part — resolving a session, writing the socket — and the skill only decides what to send where. Discovery leans on a session-record schema that isn't part of Claude Code's documented interface, so it is described in prose the agent can adapt rather than hardcoded logic that silently breaks.

Usage

cc-peer list                                  # sessions on this machine
cc-peer list --host web-01                    # sessions over there
cc-peer list --host web-01 --all              # include stale records / no inbox

cc-peer send --to api-worker "message"        # local session
cc-peer send --host web-01 --to api-worker "message"
cc-peer send --host web-01 --to 4011 "message"          # address by pid
git log --oneline -5 | cc-peer send --host web-01 --to api-worker -   # stdin

cc-peer send --host web-01 --to api-worker --dry-run "x"   # resolve only
cc-peer list --host web-01 --json             # machine-readable

# Versions. list --host reports what that machine has installed and flags a
# mismatch, since a host left behind by a release won't say so on its own.
cc-peer update --check                        # is there a newer release?
cc-peer update                                # replace this installation
cc-peer update --host web-01                  # report what's over there
cc-peer send --host web-01 --ssh-opt=-p --ssh-opt=2222 --to api-worker "..."   # note the '='

# Envelope. Sends carry who they're from and how to answer, both resolved from
# the session cc-peer is running inside.
cc-peer send --host web-01 --to api-worker --no-reply-to "..."         # no return address
cc-peer send --host web-01 --to api-worker --no-from "..."             # no From: header
cc-peer send --host web-01 --to api-worker --reply-to 100.64.0.5 "..." # state the address

Exit codes: 0 posted, 1 error, 2 no such session.

The receiving side decides what happens next

"Posted" is not "delivered." Writing to the socket succeeds; whether Claude ever reads the message is up to that session's inbound controls.

The default that surprises people: a session running with --dangerously-skip-permissions holds every incoming message for its user's approval, unless the sender identifies itself as also bypassing. A script can't make that claim, so on an unattended bypass-mode worker your message sits in an approval dialog and expires after dialogExpiry (5 minutes by default).

For a worker meant to take messages unattended, set this in its settings:

{ "crossSessionInbound": "accept" }

Or start it with --settings '{"crossSessionInbound":"accept"}'. Do this deliberately: it means anything that can write to that socket can start a turn on that machine.

Two things worth knowing before you set it:

  • It applies to sessions that are already running. No restart needed. Measured on two sessions up for 144h and 4h that predated the setting entirely — both took a posted message ~3s later with no approval dialog, while still showing ⏵⏵ bypass permissions on.
  • User settings are per OS user, not per session. Putting accept in ~/.claude/settings.json opens every session that user runs, not just the worker you meant. Scope it with project settings or --settings if you want one session to accept and the rest to keep asking.

Why not tmux send-keys?

ssh host 'tmux send-keys -t sess "msg" Enter' needs no script, and for a quick nudge it's fine. It breaks down as soon as timing or payload get interesting:

tmux send-keys inbox socket
Session is mid-tool-call Keystrokes land wherever focus is — possibly a subprocess's stdin Queued, read at a turn boundary
Quotes, backticks, $, newlines, emoji Shell and terminal both get a say Delivered byte-for-byte in JSON
Rapid sends Races Native queue, burst limits, duplicate drop
Attribution Looks like the user typed it Arrives marked as another session, and can't approve permissions

That last row matters: a message posted to the inbox cannot answer a permission prompt or change configuration. Text typed via send-keys is indistinguishable from you.

Limits

  • The receiver is told who sent the message. Claude Code records a socket-posted message with from: "unknown" — it has a field for the sender and nothing to put in it. Sends therefore open with From: <user>@<host> (<session>). What Claude Code already supplies, cc-peer does not repeat: it prefaces peer messages and appends its own guidance about what a peer may ask for, so duplicating either would compound with every hop.
  • Replies depend on SSH working the other way. Sends append a Reply: line naming this machine's tailnet address and this session, so the receiver can answer — but only if that machine can SSH back. When it can't, neither side is told. The line grants nothing on its own: anyone who can reply could already have sent unprompted. What it adds is knowing that.
  • No discovery across a bastion. --host is a single SSH hop; chain it yourself with an SSH config ProxyJump.
  • Same OS user. The socket is restricted to the user that owns the session, so cc-peer gives you nothing you couldn't already do with your own shell on that host. It is not a privilege-escalation path — but it does mean anyone with that shell can start a turn.
  • --host and --ssh-opt are as trusted as your ssh config. They are handed to ssh, so whoever controls them controls where you connect. Values that would make ssh run a local command (ProxyCommand and friends) are refused, and a --host starting with - is rejected outright — but if you allowlist cc-peer for an agent, treat it as granting SSH, not just messaging. Message bodies and session names carry no such risk: they are quoted before they reach any shell.
  • Linux and macOS only. Native Windows uses named pipes with a mandatory auth line; unsupported here.

Tests

python3 -m unittest test_cc_peer -v

No network, no SSH, no Claude Code — standard library only. CI runs them on Ubuntu and macOS against Python 3.9 and 3.13, plus shellcheck on the installer.

The cases cover what has actually been wrong here: the argument quoting that stops --to reaching a remote shell, the caps that weren't enforced under --dry-run, and the reply line's user and absolute path. A regression in any of those is silent otherwise.

Verified

Claude Code v2.1.263 across four machines over Tailscale SSH — two macOS 26 (Apple silicon) and two Ubuntu 24.04 (arm64, Oracle Ampere A1 in separate regions). What was actually exercised:

  • Posting from macOS to Linux sessions in two regions; each landed in the receiving transcript as type: user with origin.kind: "peer".
  • Payload integrity — quotes, backticks, $HOME, and emoji arrive byte-for-byte.
  • The held path: a bypass-mode session raised an approval dialog, then logged Released 1 held cross-session message once approved.
  • Both socket layouts in the wild: /tmp/cc-socks/ on one Ubuntu host, /run/user/1001/cc-socks/ on another running the same build.

The session record schema (~/.claude/sessions/*.json) is not part of Claude Code's documented interface and can change between releases. The socket protocol is documented; discovery is inference. If a release moves things, cc-peer list --all is the first thing to run.

License

MIT

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