Chirograph
Portable, content-addressed manifests for scientific datasets.
A chirograph was a medieval document written in duplicate with a word inscribed across the join, then cut through that word so that authenticity could be proven by matching the two halves — content-addressed verification, centuries early. A Chirograph manifest does the same for data: it records a dataset's files, their checksums, and their provenance, so that any copy can be verified against it, and any drift from it detected.
What it's for
Many scientific data repositories don't expose retrievable per-file checksums, and some (e.g. GEO) don't version their records at all — a stable accession can mutate in place. Chirograph adds the missing rigor as a thin layer on top of whichever repository the data must live in:
- Retrievable checksums where the repository withholds them.
- Immutable, content-addressed references (
chiro://<hash>) where the source offers no versioning — the manifest freezes a snapshot even if the upstream mutates. - Provenance distinguishing "this is what I published" (
self-deposited) from "this is what I downloaded, on this date" (observed-download).
The core is the reference implementation of a file format, with zero required dependencies: a consumer of a checksum-verification library has the best possible reason to want its supply chain to be nothing.
Install
pip install chirograph # core (zero dependencies)
pip install chirograph[dvc] # + reading .dvc / dvc.lock
pip install chirograph[schema] # + JSON Schema validation
Until the first PyPI release, install from a tag instead:
pip install "chirograph @ git+https://github.com/Swarbricklab/chirograph@v0.2.1"
For development, environment.yaml builds a conda environment with the extras and
tooling (conda env create -f environment.yaml); then pytest && ruff check . && mypy.
Use
Describe a directory before you deposit it. The manifest is named after its own
whole-file hash (spec §1.1), so the filename is the chiro:// reference:
chiro write ./deposit --accession GSE000000 -o .chiro/manifests
Check bytes against a manifest, or just the manifest's own integrity:
chiro verify .chiro/manifests/<digest>.chiro.json --root ./deposit --source-layout
chiro validate .chiro/manifests/<digest>.chiro.json # reads no data — a registry's Tier-1 gate
Detect that an upstream record changed under a stable accession — each observation gets its own digest name, so they coexist and can be diffed:
chiro capture ./deposit --source-url geo://GSE000000 -o .chiro/manifests
chiro diff .chiro/manifests/<first>.chiro.json .chiro/manifests/<second>.chiro.json
chiro --help lists the rest (capture, info, ls, ref, remap, dvc-dir,
schema, test-vectors); the how-tos below walk the full workflows, including
reorganising a flat deposit into a tidy workspace tree and transcribing what DVC has
already hashed. Exit codes are part of the contract, so this runs as a CI gate:
0 success, 1 a finding (bytes or manifest disagree), 2 the tool could not run.
As a library
import chirograph
manifest = chirograph.load(manifest_path) # validates schema + body integrity
for item in manifest.fetch_plan(): # fetch item.url → item.relpath, check item.md5
...
report = chirograph.verify_tree(manifest, "deposit/", use_source_layout=True)
assert report.ok, report.explain()
fetch_plan() is the intended integration point for a data-access layer such as
archivefs, so it need not re-derive the
two-path model (or rediscover the urljoin trailing-slash trap).
The .chiro.json format
A manifest mirrors DVC's .dir format (relpath / md5 / size entries) with a
header adding provenance, a two-path model (where a file lives at the source vs. where
it materialises in your workspace), and a body-integrity hash for standalone use. The
per-file digest is md5 or sha256 (one hash_algorithm per manifest), so an
archive that publishes only sha256 — a git-lfs source, say — is pinned as faithfully as
an md5 one. Schema 2.0 adds an optional containers block for member-granular
provenance of archive files (ZIP / tar). See
docs/chiro-format-spec.md.
Canonicalisation is the fragility point — a reimplementation that canonicalises almost identically produces non-matching hashes silently — so it is frozen and pinned by published conformance vectors that ship in the package. Each vector carries the exact canonical string, not just its hash, so a mismatch can be diffed:
chiro test-vectors --check # check an implementation against the freeze
chiro test-vectors # the vectors themselves, for a reimplementation
Status
Format frozen; reference library and CLI implemented, through schema 2.0. All
three schema versions are read and written — 1.0 (core), 1.1 (staleness fields),
and 2.0 (the container block, shipped in v0.2.0) — with md5 and sha256 digests. What
remains deferred is the registry layer (network resolution of a chiro://
reference): an in-repo manifest already does most of the job, so the registry is an
optimisation over that baseline, not a prerequisite.
How-to
- Include public reference data in a project
- Include data you are depositing — and check the deposit matches your workspace
- Pull tracked data, and verify it — including what a failure means
- Publish data and code together
- Detect that upstream data has changed
- Adopt Chirograph in a repo that already uses DVC
Reference
- Format spec (normative):
docs/chiro-format-spec.md - Why the format is this way:
docs/chiro-format-rationale.md - Container model (ZIP/tar members, schema 2.0):
docs/container-model.md(format implemented in 0.2.0) chiro://resolution and config:docs/resolution-and-config.md(design; mostly aspirational)- Updatability &
dvc update:docs/updatability-and-dvc-update.md(design, with measured findings) - Drift-check & update design:
docs/design-check-and-update.md(design, unbuilt) - Manifest registry design:
docs/manifest-registry-design.md(design, deferred) - Decisions taken while implementing:
docs/decisions.md— dated record; its spec section numbers refer to spec v0.3, before the split - Implementation plan / status:
docs/design/plan.md - Ideas & extensions (not built):
docs/design/ideas.md
Two claims in the spec about DVC
.direquivalence were disproved by checking them against a real DVC installation, and are corrected in spec v0.3.body_hashis not a DVC.dirhash; the equivalence is a separately derived value (chiro dvc-dir), tested byte-for-byte against realdvc addoutput. See decisions D-01 and D-02.
Related projects
- archivefs — read-only fsspec
filesystems for scientific data archives (EGA, Zenodo, Mendeley Data, cBioPortal, GEO,
BioImage Archive), consumable by DVC. It optionally reads Chirograph manifests to
gain download-free checksums and a friendly workspace layout, but works without them,
and is the intended caller of
fetch_plan(). Its sha256-based backends (Mendeley, cBioPortal) pin to asha256manifest; nothing in Chirograph is archive-specific — theconceptCURIE is a free-form string (mendeley:…,cbioportal:…,doi:…,geo:…), so a new archive needs no change here.
Metadata
Release files for chirograph 0.2.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| chirograph-0.2.1.tar.gz | 149.8 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| chirograph-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 267.3 kB
Release files / chirograph-0.2.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | chirograph-0.2.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 149.8 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 26, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / chirograph-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | chirograph-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 117.5 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
fb837c7b9008608ebc5c3edef657f44c23fdc55701f44251e99ffe3da402eb7b
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
267b041836f504201fe1c86cb98bbbf3c83d25e8b6918c75aa7fa5e72351ed3f
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 26, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for chirograph 0.2.1
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for chirograph-0.2.1.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 26, 2026.
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