ciris-edge
The transport and replication layer of the CIRIS Epistemic Web (CEWP). A single Rust crate that moves the 14 signed envelope kinds of the CEG grammar between federation peers over any medium — Reticulum mesh, HTTPS, packet radio — decides who is allowed to learn a claim exists, and attributes every inbound byte to a cryptographic identity before any handler sees it.
Edge is the operational realization of Constitution Part 5 — Transport & Substrate, built on two disciplines: fail-secure (a missing key or unresolved consent resolves to less access, never a silent downgrade) and integrity through structure (privacy and authenticity are properties the wire format cannot violate, not promises an operator makes). Its design thesis, from contextual integrity: "the strongest flow rule is one the network cannot express breaking."
📖 The protocol spec:
FSD/CIRIS_EDGE_TRANSPORT.md— the 14 EnvelopeKinds, the cohort/namespace projections, the anti-entropy state machine, the transport attribution pipeline, the serve/consent gates, and the CEG-vs-OSI layering, with diagrams and code anchors. Start there.
What edge does
host application code
│ registers handlers ┌─ Reticulum mesh (TCP / LoRa / serial / I²P)
▼ │
ciris-edge ──── anti-entropy replication ───┼─ HTTPS (bearer / mTLS)
│ attribute at the wire · serve by consent │
▼ └─ packet radio
ciris-persist ──── keys · attestations · trace · admission
One shape, many peers. Library, not sidecar. Verify happens at the wire,
before any handler sees a byte. Key seeds never cross the FFI boundary. Every
transport is a projection of one Transport trait; Reticulum is canonical, HTTPS
is the production fallback so cloud deployments participate today.
Read in this order
MISSION.md— the WHY. Mission-Driven Development alignment to CIRIS Accord Meta-Goal M-1; per-module missions; anti-patterns; failure modes.FSD/CIRIS_EDGE_TRANSPORT.md— the protocol. State machines, the 14 kinds, namespaces, attribution, consent-routing, CEG↔OSI.FSD/CIRIS_EDGE.md— the architecture spec, crate shape, public API surface, verify-via-persist contract, test categories.
The shape of the protocol (one-paragraph tour)
Every claim is one of 14 signed EnvelopeKinds,
each its own anti-entropy stream. A claim's cohort_scope (self → family
→ community → affiliations → species → biosphere → federation) resolves
to a projection — SelfOwn (publish-your-own, structurally invisible — no
directory advertisement), Cohort (roster hold-and-forward), or Global
(commons + anti-rollback tombstones). Peers reconcile per (peer, kind) via a
bidirectional Summary → Diff → Deliver round. Every inbound frame is
attributed at ingest to a Rooted ∧ owns_key federation identity (a fresh
peer bootstraps via a narrow, self-authenticating {Key, IdentityOccurrence, TransportDestination} carve-out); an unattributable frame is dropped before any
serve gate is consulted. Only the Attestation plane is consent-gated — a
consentable claim flows to a peer only if the producer's consent grant includes
it, the recipient holds infra:serve, and it satisfies any recipient_capability
restriction. The recipient axis cannot exceed the transmission principle,
by construction.
Status
v14.x — production CEG-native transport. Reticulum + HTTPS + packet-radio
transports; the anti-entropy replication engine; the #393 two-item attribution
gate (Rooted∧owns_key + hybrid transport binding); the #402 bootstrap carve-out;
the #396 consent-resolved fan-out + serve gates; hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65
throughout; PyO3 + UniFFI mobile surfaces. Pinned in lockstep to ciris-persist
(Registry-of-Record admission) via drift-witnessed policy hashes.
Sister repos
CIRISConstitution— the canonical CEG spec (Part 5 is edge's transport substrate; Part 2 the grammar; Part 3 the namespace).CIRISPersist— substrate: federation keys, attestations, trace storage, admission (theput_*surface edge replicates onto).CIRISVerify— hybrid crypto primitives (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, X-Wing), consumed transitively via persist.CIRISAgent— reasoning loop; emits signed traces edge replicates.CIRISRegistry·CIRISLens— identity/build directory · analytical observatory; federation peers.
License
AGPL-3.0, matching the CIRIS stack. License-locked mission preservation per
MISSION.md §6.
Metadata
Release files for ciris-edge 15.0.0
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