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ciris-server — the fabric node

The node of the CIRIS Epistemic Web (CEWP). One Rust crate that composes the federation's cores — ciris-persist (corpus + admission), ciris-edge (transport + replication), ciris-verify (hybrid post-quantum crypto) — into a runnable federation node, shipped as the headless ciris-server binary and the PyO3 abi3 wheel a CIRISAgent embeds. The defining identity: agent = fabric node + brain — the same composition folds into an agent; packaged alone it attests, stores, replicates, scores, and serves, but it does not reason, decide, or act. Infrastructure must not have agency.

Server is built on two disciplines: the API never touches the runtime — it writes CEG, and the runtime is CEG-driven (every control surface authors a signed claim; controller loops converge the live node to the corpus, hot, no restart), and zero environment variables — a node's entire configuration is signed config:* CEG resolved at boot (--home + key identity, nothing else). The fabric IS the config, the same way the agent IS its graph.

🌐 Rendered: cirisai.github.io/CIRISServer · siblings: CIRISPersist · CIRISEdge

📖 The model: FSD/CEG_REPLICATION_MODEL.md — the 3-gate replication model, the 14 EnvelopeKinds carrying all 95 CC-3.1 claim families, and the classical-edge audit. The per-family card/vocabulary manifest lives in FSD/NAMESPACE_SUPERSETS.md (versioned; regenerated against pinned constitution + registry revs). Start there.

What ciris-server does

rich clients (KMP app · CIRISAgent · status)          ┌─ owner ops: claim (NodeCode+PIN),
    │ consume the control surface                     │  consent grants, config:*, trust roots
    ▼                                                 │
ciris-server ── writes CEG ── controller loops ───────┤  reconcile: consent topology → live
    │  compose · identity · owner-binding · scorer    │  replication peers (4 planes/peer),
    ▼  safety (age·moderation·watchlist) · genesis    │  config re-resolve, announce rooting
ciris-edge ──── anti-entropy over Reticulum/HTTPS ────┘
    ▼
ciris-persist ── keys · attestations · trace · admission (Registry-of-Record)

One identity per node, by construction — cfg.key_id derives from the engine's own signing identity, so every plane (claim, NodeCode, owned-nodes, self-publish, edge signer) agrees on who this node is. Library composition, not sidecars: the agent links the same wheel instead of assembling cores itself.

What this is, relative to its siblings

The three cores are libraries that decide. Server is the node that answers for those decisions to a person.

Decides Has an operator?
ciris-verify whether evidence about a machine, build or key is worth believing no — embedded
ciris-persist which claims are allowed to become state no — embedded
ciris-edge who is allowed to learn a claim exists no — embedded
ciris-server nothing, on its own — it composes the three, runs the loops, and exposes every decision to a human who is accountable for it yes

That last row is the whole job. A library refuses; a node has to say why, keep running afterwards, and give somebody a way to respond. Everything distinctive here follows from having an operator: the graded ladder instead of a boolean, the surfaces that state what an op does not reach, the insistence that a zero name its cause. Persist can return Err; a node has to render that to a tired human at 2am who then does something irreversible.

What we uniquely claim to solve

The siblings do nothing on their own. They are libraries: verify decides whether evidence is believable, persist decides what becomes state, edge decides who may learn a claim exists — and none of them runs, holds a corpus, or answers to anyone. Server makes the net-claims for the mesh. It is the thing with an operator, a running loop, and a row it will defend.

So the claim is not "signed claims" or "post-quantum" or "consent-based routing". Those have prior art and the section below says so. It is this:

A decentralized mesh that is manageable and moderatable at scale, with no privileged party anywhere in the path. We posit that the ALM tree plus a CEG-native operator surface is what makes those two compatible.

Pick any two of {scale, decentralization, moderation} and there is prior art. All three is the open problem:

  • A CDN scales and is moderatable — because it is privileged. Someone owns the middle, sees the traffic, and can be compelled. That is the property being refused here.
  • A flat P2P mesh is decentralized but does not scale. Everyone-to-everyone at 720p30 caps around 13 participants on a home uplink; the bandwidth is N², and no amount of protocol fixes that.
  • Most decentralized systems that do scale gave up moderation to get there, and then discovered the commons was the product.

ALM is the scale half. One sealed copy enters a tree of relays; per-node fan-out is bounded by measured uplink, depth is O(log_f N). At f≈12 and N=2,000 that is four tiers — 2000 → 167 → 14 → 2 → root — deterministic, leaderless, primary plus two backup parents, healing when a subtree goes dark. Each hop opens the inbound per-link AEAD and re-seals for its downstream link without ever touching the epoch DEK, so a relay carries payload it cannot read. That last part is not a design intention: tests/alm_chain.rs recovers the publisher's plaintext byte-identical at the viewer after an arbitrary number of relay hops, and it is a gate.

The operator surfaces are the moderation half. Because no relay is privileged, every hop is just another node — with an owner, a consent edge, and the same graded ladder as any peer. Moderation is not applied to the tree from outside it; it is available at every point in it, by authoring claims other nodes may fold. That is why the ladder states what each op does not reach, and why the commons resolves by reverse quorum rather than by an admin: there is no seat to appeal to, so the mechanism has to work without one.

The honest status: the E2E-through-N-hops property is proven and gated; the 2,000-participant topology is modelled from measured per-core egress and is not yet run at that size; and the claim that this composition solves manageable-and-moderatable-at-scale is a posit we are building to, not a result we are reporting.

Near peers, and where the resemblance stops

Server is a federated node you run and are responsible for, so its nearest relatives are the other things shaped like that. Each gets one honest sentence and one real difference.

  • Matrix homeserver (Synapse/Dendrite) — the closest operational analogue: you run one, identities belong to it, it federates with peers you do not control. The difference is where authority lives. Matrix federates events and trusts servers; CIRIS federates claims whose admission is decided per-row from the signature and the consent edge, so a server has no authority its rows do not carry. A compromised homeserver speaks for its users; a compromised CIRIS node can only replay rows that already verify.
  • Bluesky PDS — closest on "your data lives on a host you can leave", and the account-portability instinct is the same one. But a PDS is a repo host whose network authority sits downstream in relays and AppViews; here the admission decision is in the node, and there is no privileged aggregator to be the exception.
  • Nostr relay — closest on "store and forward signed events, verify the signature, hold no opinion". That last part is the split: a relay's virtue is having no policy, and a CIRIS node's entire contribution is typed refusal — a put that says which delegated scope was missing, so the emitter can fix it.
  • Certificate Transparency log — closest on append-only, self-proving state, and the lineage is real. CT proves inclusion; CIRIS additionally has to prove authority to include, which is why admission is the API rather than a layer above it.
  • Syncthing / IPFS — closest on replication driven by a topology rather than a server. They move bytes because someone asked; CIRIS moves a row because a consent edge says a peer may hold it, and revoking the consent stops the flow with no other coordination. Consent is not a permission check in front of replication — it is the routing table.
  • Tor directory authority / CA quorum — closest on multi-party control of a root. Ours is deliberately a keyless family: one holder roots only to itself, a quorum roots to humanity-accord, and every attestation carries its own m-of-n into the graph, so a replicated row proves its quorum rather than deferring to the bundle it arrived in.

The through-line: most of these move content and add authority as a layer. This moves claims, where the authority is part of the record and the routing is the consent graph. That is also why the operator surfaces exist — when authority is in the data, governing the mesh means authoring claims, not flipping flags, and a human needs somewhere to do that.

Joining the mesh — the two rules

Anyone can stand up a server and contribute capability. Two rules govern what you get back. Both are worth reading before you deploy.

1. Announce, or you get nothing

A node that does not announce gets no service access on the mesh and no agent services. This is not a throttle or a penalty tier — it is the floor.

The reason is the kill switch. The accord's halt is only meaningful against a node it can reach; an unreachable node cannot be stopped, so it is never served in the first place. Every canonical record carries both halves for exactly this reason: its trust (the canonical role) and its reachability (the signed envelope transport hint). Baking canonical records was gated on the kill switch being enforceable first.

So reachability is not an operational detail here. It is the price of admission, and it is charged up front.

2. There are TWO consents, and they are different edges

grant what it permits
send traces consent:replication:v1 a peer may hold your traces
be scored consent:state:granted:v1, scope analyze a peer may score them

Authoring one implies nothing about the other. They are distinct CEG objects on opposite edge directions, separately withdrawable. capacity:* claims about you are refused unless a live analyze consent from you covers the attester, in that attester's own corpus (CIRISConstitution#46).

You may send traces without consenting to be analyzed. That is a legitimate choice and traces will flow. What it costs:

  1. You build no reputation. Every capacity:* claim about you is refused, so none can ever exist.
  2. You cannot use streams or services that require third-party capability attestations — you will not have any.
  3. Some peers may refuse to interact with you at all.

Being scored is normally why the traces are sent. If that is your intent, both grants are required — say so explicitly, because neither is implied.

Measured on the production canonical, 2026-08-01: 240 replication grants replicated in from 240 distinct peers, and zero analyze grants mesh-wide. Until 0.5.151 the in-fold consent path could not author the second grant under any argument, so every one of those nodes reached rule 2's degraded state by silence rather than by choice.

Read in this order

  1. MISSION.md — the WHY. M-1 (sustainable adaptive coherence), the fabric-node discipline, de-singletonized infrastructure, the stewardship covenant ("the work belongs to whoever keeps it running").
  2. FSD/CEG_REPLICATION_MODEL.md — how state moves: every flow gated by a verified signed claim; no copies, no outboxes.
  3. FSD/THREAT_MODEL.md — "ingest is open and cheap; admission is the gate." FSD/TRUST_ROOT_CAPABILITY_GATE.md — how infra:serve / infra:attest are conferred and why no root ⇒ no capability.
  4. FSD/SERVER_1.0_PLAN.md — the build plan on the agent train (0.5 config-as-CEG → 0.6 +registry → 1.0 +node consensus).

The shape of the node (one-paragraph tour)

A node boots from the baked genesis — the canonical seed minted in a human co-scrub ceremony ships inside persist, so a fresh node starts already rooted to a real trust root — and resolves its config from signed config:* claims. An owner claims it (NodeCode + one-time PIN); ownership is an owner-binding (delegates_to + identity occurrence + cohort scope), never an auth role. The owner authors consent:replication:v1 grants through the API — and those consent objects ARE the replication topology: a reconciler loop converges the live runtime to them (four anti-entropy planes per consented peer — Attestation, Key, IdentityOccurrence, TransportDestination), adds becoming active initiators at runtime, revocations stopping cold, no restart. Payloads follow the consent edge: promotion inherits the grant's full audience (tier and cohort scope). Serving is capability-gated — a canonical is, by definition, a node whose record carries accord-conferred infra:serve+infra:attest roles rooted to a root this node trusts: being a server IS the consent to serve. Consumer policy stays constitutional at runtime too (CC 4.1.4: a consent peer that turns withdraws-arbitrager is refused per-tick, and re-admitted when it mends). The scorer folds inbound traces into capacity:* attestations; the safety surfaces (age assurance, moderation, watchlist) emit their own signed, federation-visible claims. All of it hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, and the replication/serve policy manifests are drift-witnessed — hash-pinned by gate tests that fail the build if policy moves without a deliberate cut.

Governing the node (the operator surfaces)

A mesh you cannot see is a mesh you cannot run, and a control you cannot reach is not a control. Four signed surfaces make the node legible and steerable, and all four are CEG all the way down — every act authors a claim:

Surface What it answers
/v1/node/state Is this node alive, and is anything arriving? Trace-plane liveness banded green/yellow/red, refusal rate read as its own condition, edge carriage and receive folded in
/v1/admin/* The graded enforcement ladder — annotate, throttle, quarantine, descend, de-admit, plus tier S (shed / stop accepting / declare legal compulsion: the only rung that works under partition) and tier R (this reader's own accept-or-decline policy)
/v1/commons/* Reverse quorum: one objection raises a brake, m-of-n lifts it, and silence past the steward deadline escalates to a quorum of respondents rather than roster — which is what lets a quiet community still resolve
/v1/mesh-config What a subscribed trust root has set, folded most-restrictive across roots, with a TTL that expires without anyone filing anything

Two rules run through all of it. An op says what it does not reach, in the response, before you commit: quarantine is a marker and deletes nothing; de-admission is evidence a reader folds, not a door that slams; descent is irreversible and never terminates at zero. And a zero always names its cause — "we could not ask", "we asked and there is nothing", and "nothing has ever been recorded" are three different facts, and collapsing them is how a trace plane stayed dark for two days with every layer individually correct (FSD/RCA_INGEST_REJECTION_2026-08-05.md).

That second rule is the discipline this repo contributes to the triple. Persist has admission gates, edge has fail-secure routing, verify has attestation chains; server's is that an instrument must be shown able to fail, and a reading must name what it could not see. Every gate here is mutation-verified — broken deliberately, observed red, restored — because a check that has never failed is not evidence, and this codebase has now found checks that could not fail, that failed correctly and unread, that were never run on the broken tree, that fired when nothing was wrong, and that reported success without running.

A node and a client

ciris-server renders no UI; it exposes the full control surface, and rich clients consume it. The vendored client/ — the same Kotlin-Multiplatform app as CIRISAgent's, minus the agent (brain) cards — mints hardware-rooted federation IDs (YubiKey / TPM / Secure Enclave, software fallback), claims nodes, manages trust roots and consent objects, and renders every surface above: node liveness, the enforcement ladder, tiers S and R, the commons, and the mesh-config plane, in 29 languages.

The client renders the distinctions, not just the values. An unreadable reading prints no instant and no row count, because both would be inventions. An unrecognised token from a newer server reads "uncomputed", never green. Raising a brake is one button; lifting one is a ceremony whose submit stays disabled until a dry run has produced the bytes co-signatures must cover — the UI shape mirrors the substrate's asymmetry rather than flattening it into a vote. Declining to honour a judgement renders as the ordinary outcome it is. Headless works too:

pip install ciris-server        # the abi3 wheel (or: cargo build --release)
ciris-server                    # boots a zero-setup node; unclaimed → prints NodeCode + claim PIN
ciris-server identity create --backend pkcs11   # YubiKey-backed CIRIS-V3- fedcode

Data under $CIRIS_HOME, SQLite corpus (Postgres via config), Reticulum transport up by default. The same wheel is CIRISAgent's substrate: one PyO3 registry, one shared engine, one edge runtime.

Status

v0.5.x — the CEG-native node, rooted, and carrying live traffic. Config-as-CEG shipped (zero env vars, owner-authored, hot-reconciled). The federation trace arc is proven end to end across the substrate triple — seal → consent → converge → bootstrap → root → heal → publish → transfer → admit → attribute → serve — with each gate named, logged, and regression-pinned (the #315 saga). One-node-identity closed by construction (0.5.138).

Traces are flowing on the production mesh (2026-07-31). A real agent's signed traces now reach the canonical over Reticulum and materialize into its corpus — sealed on one node, consented, replicated, attributed, and admitted on another, with no HTTP anywhere in the path. The trace is a CEG object that replicates because consent and trust say it may; nothing pushes it.

Both trace paths are proven, and scoring closed the loop. HTTP ingest and the peer anti-entropy round each carry trace:* end to end, gated separately so the working half can never vouch for the other. The scorer folds inbound traces into capacity:* with day-bucket coalescing — measured in production at 900 rows/day down to 21, holding — and refuses to score a subject that has not granted analyze, which is a different edge from the grant that lets a peer merely hold the trace.

The production trust root is minted and baked (2026-07-31). A hardware ceremony on three YubiKeys produced the genesis bundle persist now ships as canonical_seed.json, so every node boots rooted with no operator step. The root is the keyless family, not a seat: one holder alone roots only to itself, while a quorum roots to humanity-accord. The charter is 2-of-2 over a 3-seat roster, and every genesis attestation carries its quorum into the graph — a replicated row proves its own m-of-n rather than deferring to the bundle it arrived in. Two humans to halt, two to legitimize.

Substrate pins: persist v42.1.0 / edge v21.1.0 / verify v15.0.0 — hybrid PQ throughout, Registry-of-Record admission, drift-witnessed policy hashes. Edge v15.7.x adds the realtime A/V spine (MLS X-Wing epoch keys, signed Welcome, fragment ARQ); the server exercises publisher → relay → subscriber glass-to-glass against the public API from outside the crate, so the surface is proven consumable rather than only internally green.

ciris-lens-core is absorbed in-tree (crates/ciris-lens-core); the standalone lens deployment is retired — a central dashboard the whole federation reads is itself the singleton this architecture forbids.

Roadmap (the CIRISAgent train): 0.5 config-as-CEG (here) → 0.6 +registry authority → 1.0 +node consensus, the complete fabric node.

Sister repos

  • CIRISConstitution — the canonical CEG spec; Part 3's namespace registry is vendored and hash-pinned into persist.
  • CIRISPersist (site) — substrate: keys, attestations, trace, admission; ships the baked genesis seed. Decides which claims become state.
  • CIRISEdge (site) — transport + replication: the 14 kinds over Reticulum/HTTPS/packet-radio; consent is routing. Decides who may learn a claim exists.
  • CIRISVerify — hybrid crypto primitives (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, X-Wing), consumed via persist. Decides whether evidence about a machine, build or key is worth believing.
  • CIRISAgent — the brain; embeds this node via the one wheel and emits the signed traces it federates.

License

AGPL-3.0-or-later — matching the CIRIS ecosystem.

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Release files / ciris_server-0.5.204-cp310-abi3-android_24_arm64_v8a.whl

Download URL ciris_server-0.5.204-cp310-abi3-android_24_arm64_v8a.whl
Size 29.7 MB
Tags Android API level 24+ ARM64 v8a CPython 3.10 abi3
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