coderifts-sdk

Python SDK for CodeRifts — API governance for AI agents.

v3.2.0 (ID75) closes REST method parity with @coderifts/sdk 3.3.0. Decision Spec v2 still requires top-level preflight_mode on preflight. PyPI publishes are a separate, manual flow (do not twine upload from this checkout). Offline Ed25519 verification is not in this package (requests only) — use @coderifts/sdk, coderifts-app, or receipt-verifier.

Surface vs TypeScript SDK

Installation

pip install coderifts-sdk

Requires Python 3.9+ and requests.

Quick start

from coderifts import CodeRifts, CodeRiftsError

client = CodeRifts(api_key="cr_live_...")

preflight_change_set / analyze_change_set / authorize_change_set

Two request modes

Server-derived (the production path) — the server lists the change set from the repository:

result = client.authorize_change_set(
    derivation="server",
    context={"repository": "owner/repo", "base": "main", "head": "feature", "operation": "merge"},
)

Caller-supplied artifacts — you assemble the complete base→head set yourself:

result = client.authorize_change_set(
    artifacts=[{"id": "api", "type": "openapi", "before": old_yaml, "after": new_yaml}],
    context={"operation": "merge"},
)

The two are mutually exclusive. Python cannot express that as a type-level union the way the TypeScript SDK does, so it is a runtime guard: mixing them raises a ValueError that names the rule, before any HTTP call. For an ATOMIC-profile grant, pass state_nonce= from your executor's state-challenge alongside include_execution_grant=True.

Required keyword-only preflight_mode='analyze'|'authorize' (Decision Spec v2; server returns HTTP 400 if omitted). Prefer the wrappers so the two meanings cannot be mixed.

Branch on execution_action (proceed signal, authorize). Closed set: CONTINUE | CONTINUE_WITH_MONITORING | REQUEST_APPROVAL | STOP. Unrecognised → treat as STOP. Use decision for the explanation label. Analyze is informational (risk-only), not permission.

v2 fields on authorize: receipt_kind (operation_authorization | NONE), chain_receipt, optional execution_grant, blast_radius (counts, not a score).

before = open("openapi-before.json").read()
after = open("openapi-after.json").read()
artifacts = [
    {
        "id": "spec-main",
        "type": "openapi",
        "before": before,
        "after": after,
    }
]

# Risk-only
risk = client.analyze_change_set(artifacts=artifacts)
print(risk.analysis_outcome, risk.receipt_kind)  # receipt_kind == "NONE"

# Operation-bound authorize (requires context.operation; may mint a receipt)
result = client.authorize_change_set(
    artifacts=artifacts,
    context={
        "operation": "merge",
        "environment": "staging",
    },
    include_execution_grant=True,  # opt-in cr.exec.v1 grant
)

print(result.execution_action)   # e.g. "CONTINUE"
print(result.decision)           # e.g. "ALLOW"
print(result.receipt_kind)       # "operation_authorization" | "NONE"
print(result.breaking_changes)   # integer count, not a list
print(getattr(result, "execution_grant", None))  # grant token when opted in
print(getattr(result, "blast_radius", None))

token = result.chain_receipt
decision_id = result.decision_result.decision_id

verify_receipt

A valid signature is not authorization. currently_authorized is True / False / None — None means authorization was not evaluated. Expiry uses 30s clock-skew leeway (CLOCK_SKEW_LEEWAY_MS); 0s for destructive operations in production when the intended context declares them. The SDK does not compare expiry locally — the server does.

This is a REST verify. Offline grant verification is TS/app/receipt-verifier.

# Cryptographic check only
check = client.verify_receipt(token=token)
print(check.valid, check.status)
print(check.currently_authorized)  # often None without intent context

# With intent + the body-bound decision envelope for full authorization
authz = client.verify_receipt(
    token=token,
    operation="merge",
    environment="staging",
    target_id=result.decision_result.artifact_digest,
    fingerprint=result.verdict_fingerprint,
    decision_result=result.decision_result.to_dict(),
)
print(authz.currently_authorized)  # True / False once evaluable
print(getattr(authz, "authz_status", None))

Grant helpers (no Ed25519):

from coderifts import compute_scope_hash, receipt_digest

print(receipt_digest(token))
print(compute_scope_hash("merge", "sha256:tgt", after))

get_decision_details

Look up a stored decision by decision_id or fingerprint.

stored = client.get_decision_details(decision_id=decision_id)
print(stored.execution_action)
print(stored.decision)
print(stored.meta.source)

Other REST methods (TS parity)

client.diff(before=before, after=after)
client.score_mcp(manifest={"tools": []})
client.get_ledger(repo="acme/api", from_="2026-01-01", limit=20)
client.simulate_policy(policy_yaml="rules: []", old_spec=before, new_spec=after)

Reading a decision (start here)

read_decision(payload) is the one correct entry point for turning any CodeRifts response into a go / no-go. It is fail-closed and it never lets decision drive control flow.

from coderifts import CodeRifts, read_decision

client = CodeRifts(api_key="cr_live_...")
response = client.authorize_change_set(artifacts=artifacts, context={"operation": "deploy"})

read = read_decision(response)
if read.execution_action == "CONTINUE":
    deploy()
elif read.execution_action == "CONTINUE_WITH_MONITORING":
    deploy_with_monitoring()
else:  # REQUEST_APPROVAL, STOP, or anything unreadable
    halt(read.decision, read.reason)

execution_action is the control input. decision (ALLOW / WARN / REQUIRE_APPROVAL / BLOCK) is the governance explanation label: log it, print it, put it in a PR comment — never branch on it. That is the agent-host rule not_for_control_flow_use_execution_action, and @coderifts/conformance ships a deliberately-wrong branch-on-decision subject that the suite fails.

Resolution order, and what falls closed:

read_decision never raises, so a guard may call it on any value.

What it does not do: it does not verify a receipt. A returned receipt is transported, not validated — nothing here checks a signature, a chain link or an expiry. The Python SDK has no crypto dependency; use the app or the TypeScript kernel for offline Ed25519 verification.

explain_decision / how_to_unblock are prose, not gates

Both render human-readable copy. Neither is a permission check — always gate on read_decision. Their control input is execution_action, passed either as a full payload (preferred) or as the scalar:

client.explain_decision(omega_api=0.62, decision="BLOCK", response=response).summary
client.how_to_unblock(decision="BLOCK", breaking_changes=bcs, response=response).actions

Given an unreadable or absent execution action they say the action is unrecognised and must be treated as STOP. explain_decision never reports a change as "safe to proceed", and how_to_unblock never says "no unblock needed" — that wording is reserved for a readable CONTINUE / CONTINUE_WITH_MONITORING.

Error handling

from coderifts import CodeRifts, ApiError, AuthError, RateLimitError, CodeRiftsError

try:
    client.authorize_change_set(artifacts=[...], context={"operation": "merge"})
except AuthError as e:
    print("auth", e.message)
except RateLimitError as e:
    print("rate limit", e.message)
except ApiError as e:
    print(e.status_code, e.message)
except CodeRiftsError as e:
    print(e.code, e.message)

Response access

Return values are thin wrappers around the JSON object:

result.decision                 # attribute
result["decision"]              # item
"decision" in result            # membership
result.to_dict()                # full dict
result.decision_result.decision_id  # nested dicts wrap too

License

MIT