coding-tools-mcp 0.1.7

Workspace-confined coding tools exposed as an MCP server.

Coding Tools MCP

Coding Tools MCP is a model-neutral coding-agent runtime MCP server. It exposes local coding primitives to any MCP client:

inspect repo -> search/read files -> apply structured patches -> run tests/commands
-> interact with stdin sessions -> inspect git status/diff

It is not a prompt wrapper. It does not expose external agent accounts, memory, cloud tasks, web search, image generation, model routing, plugin marketplace, or subagent orchestration as MCP tools.

Documentation Map

• Quickstart
• MCP client configuration
• Remote MCP
• Tools and schemas
• Permission modes
• Exec command recipes
• Docker sandbox
• Security policy
• Security boundary
• CI and test commands
• Dogfood
• SWE-bench evaluation
• Known limitations
• Troubleshooting
• Exec troubleshooting
• Competitive analysis
• Normative MCP runtime profile: docs/profile-v0.1.md

Quickstart

Install the published command from PyPI:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xyTom/coding-tools-mcp/main/scripts/install.sh | bash

Install and start local Streamable HTTP against a workspace:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xyTom/coding-tools-mcp/main/scripts/install.sh \
  | bash -s -- --start --workspace /path/to/repo

Install and expose a read-only bearer-token tunnel:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xyTom/coding-tools-mcp/main/scripts/install.sh \
  | bash -s -- --tunnel cloudflared --auto-install-tunnel --workspace /path/to/repo

Or, from this checkout:

scripts/install.sh

Run the published package without a persistent install:

uvx coding-tools-mcp --workspace .

Use stdio for MCP clients:

uvx coding-tools-mcp --stdio --workspace /path/to/repo

If you are working from this checkout instead of a published package:

make start

Pass a different workspace, host, port, or extra server flags with Make variables:

make start MCP_WORKSPACE=/path/to/repo MCP_PORT=8000 MCP_ARGS="--permission-mode trusted"

If dependencies are missing, install the runtime in editable mode:

python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"

HTTP endpoint:

http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp

Install the optional image extra when you want view_image auto-resize support:

python -m pip install -e ".[image]"

Stdio:

coding-tools-mcp --stdio --workspace /path/to/repo

Set CODING_TOOLS_MCP_TRACE=1 to emit redacted JSON tool-call trace events to stderr for local debugging. Logs stay off stdout so stdio JSON-RPC remains clean.

By default, exec_command passes a core shell environment only. For local toolchains that depend on inherited environment variables, such as MSVC developer prompts, start with:

CODING_TOOLS_MCP_SHELL_ENV_INHERIT=all coding-tools-mcp --workspace /path/to/repo

inherit=all still filters secret-looking and loader/startup variables unless dangerous mode is also enabled. For local development with dependency downloads, shell expansion, and inline interpreter snippets, use:

coding-tools-mcp --permission-mode trusted --workspace /path/to/repo

--allow-network remains available as a compatibility flag when you only want to open network-looking commands. If your MCP client does not support permission elicitation and you explicitly want to disable exec_command permission gates inside an isolated container or VM, start with:

coding-tools-mcp --permission-mode dangerous --workspace /path/to/repo

This disables exec_command permission gates such as network-looking commands, destructive command checks, shell expansion, inline scripts, and sensitive env checks. Workspace path boundaries for direct file tools still apply. --dangerously-skip-all-permissions remains as a compatibility alias.

MCP Client Examples

Generic stdio client:

[mcp_servers.coding_tools]
command = "uvx"
args = ["coding-tools-mcp", "--stdio", "--workspace", "/path/to/repo"]

Claude Code:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "coding-tools": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["coding-tools-mcp", "--stdio", "--workspace", "/path/to/repo"]
    }
  }
}

Cursor:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "coding-tools": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["coding-tools-mcp", "--stdio", "--workspace", "/path/to/repo"]
    }
  }
}

Generic Streamable HTTP clients should use MCP protocol version 2025-06-18 and point at http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp.

Remote MCP

For remote MCP clients and local development over an HTTPS tunnel, keep the server bound to loopback and expose the tunnel URL with the safest profile your client can use. Anonymous tunnel testing should use read-only mode:

CODING_TOOLS_MCP_AUTH_MODE=noauth \
CODING_TOOLS_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE=read-only \
./scripts/tunnel.sh cloudflared /path/to/repo

Configure the remote MCP client with the HTTPS tunnel URL:

URL: https://<tunnel-host>/mcp

The tunnel scripts support cloudflared, ngrok, and Microsoft Dev Tunnel. If the selected tunnel CLI is missing, the script asks before installing it:

scripts/tunnel.sh cloudflared /path/to/repo
scripts/tunnel.sh ngrok /path/to/repo
scripts/tunnel.sh devtunnel /path/to/repo

For clients that support custom headers, use bearer-token auth with Authorization: Bearer <token>. For MCP clients that speak OAuth 2.1 Authorization Code + PKCE, use CODING_TOOLS_MCP_AUTH_MODE=oauth with scripts/tunnel.sh (or scripts/install.sh --auth-mode oauth). The server can infer its OAuth issuer from the tunnel request URL, so one-shot tunnels like cloudflared work without setting CODING_TOOLS_MCP_SERVER_URL before startup; set it only when you want to pin a stable issuer. The script prints a generated OAuth password, accepts any non-empty client_id by default, and lets you opt into CODING_TOOLS_MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID/CODING_TOOLS_MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET only when you need to lock down a confidential client. Clients that cannot send custom bearer headers and do not speak OAuth should use anonymous read-only mode only for local/testing tunnels, or be placed behind an external auth proxy for production use.

See docs/remote-mcp.md for the exact modes and security notes.

Tool Profiles

• full: exposes all tools with truthful annotations. This is the default for backward compatibility.
• read-only: recommended for remote or safe-mode clients; exposes only inspection tools, git read tools, image viewing, and default-cwd helpers.
• compat-readonly-all: exposes all tools but advertises every tool as read-only for clients that gate availability on readOnlyHint. This is not a safety mode; mutation-capable tools such as apply_patch, exec_command, write_stdin, and kill_session can still mutate local state.

Tools

P0 tools exposed by default:

• server_info
• get_default_cwd
• set_default_cwd
• read_file
• list_dir
• list_files
• search_text
• apply_patch
• exec_command
• write_stdin
• kill_session
• git_status
• git_diff
• git_log
• git_show
• git_blame
• request_permissions

Additional image tool exposed by default:

• view_image

For input/output schemas and result envelopes, see docs/tools-and-schemas.md and docs/profile-v0.1.md.

Safety Boundary

The runtime binds one workspace root per server process. Paths are workspace-relative by default. Absolute paths, .. traversal, and symlink escapes are rejected. Recursive listing/search excludes .git, .reference, node_modules, target, dist, build outputs, virtualenvs, and common caches by default.

exec_command runs under policy controls with workspace-bound cwd, configurable shell environment inheritance, timeout, output caps, sensitive-value and loader/startup environment rejection, destructive command checks, network-looking command checks, shell-expansion permission gates, indirect absolute-path checks, cancellation/kill cleanup, session deadline watchdogs, and bounded session buffers. On Linux hosts with Landlock support it also applies filesystem confinement; on Windows, macOS, or Linux hosts without Landlock, command results include a warning and external sandboxing is required before running untrusted commands. This is still not a complete OS/container sandbox; see SECURITY.md.

--permission-mode safe is the default. --permission-mode trusted opens local-development gates while keeping secret filtering and destructive-command checks. --permission-mode dangerous disables exec_command permission gates for operators who accept that risk inside an isolated runner. Do not use dangerous mode for untrusted workspaces or untrusted MCP clients.

Compliance

make compliance

Compliance and CI commands are documented in docs/ci-and-tests.md. The checked-in report files are generated artifacts; inspect their suite field before treating them as full compliance evidence.

Dogfood And Benchmark

Dogfood and SWE-bench notes live in docs/dogfood.md, docs/swe-bench.md, and BENCHMARK.md. This repository does not claim a model-generated SWE-bench leaderboard result.

Development Commands

make lint
make typecheck
make test
make compliance
make ci

See docs/ci-and-tests.md for the full test matrix.

License

This project is source-available, not open source. See LICENSE. Internal evaluation, development, testing, and security review are permitted; redistribution, hosted third-party service use, and production commercial use require prior written permission.