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CollieAi guardrail for LiteLLM

PyPI CI License: MIT

A LiteLLM proxy guardrail that checks each eligible chat call against your CollieAi policy, before and after the model call. It runs in Monitor mode: it never changes or blocks a call, and never delays one beyond its own deadline. What CollieAi found goes into LiteLLM's guardrail log and CollieAi's audit. This release is a beta and only observes.

You need a CollieAi project and its API key (clai_…). This beta runs only the project's dictionary rules: read Your project's policy before you start.

  • Tested with: LiteLLM proxy 1.102.4, Python ≥ 3.11. Use 1.102.2 or later: 1.102.0 and 1.102.1 carry the critical advisory GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45. Other LiteLLM versions are untested.
  • Depends on: httpx, which LiteLLM already has. Nothing else.

Install

Into the LiteLLM proxy's Python environment (or its image):

pip install collieai-litellm-guardrail

Configure

In the proxy's config.yaml:

guardrails:
  - guardrail_name: collieai-monitor
    litellm_params:
      guardrail: collieai_guardrail.guardrail.CollieAIGuardrail
      mode: [pre_call, post_call]
      default_on: true
      api_base: https://app.collieai.io/v1/integrations/litellm
      api_key: os.environ/COLLIEAI_API_KEY
Setting Default Meaning
api_base — CollieAi's LiteLLM integration base URL. The adapter posts to <api_base>/beta/litellm_basic_guardrail_api
api_key — Your CollieAi project key, clai_…
deadline_ms 2500 Each phase's whole deadline: connection, send, reply and parse
network_margin_ms 500 The part of the deadline kept for the network. CollieAi gets the rest as its budget
max_body_bytes 458752 (448 KiB) A larger request is not sent and counts as bypass limit. The default matches CollieAi's narrow profile
forward_conversation_id false Forward the caller's x-collieai-conversation-id header, and only that header
summary_interval_s 60 How often each worker logs its counts
synthetic_interval_s 300 How often each worker runs the synthetic check; it also runs at start. 0 turns it off

Keep mode: [pre_call, post_call] and default_on: true. Otherwise one phase, or the calls that don't name the guardrail, are not observed. The adapter warns about both at start.

A setting the adapter can't run with stops the proxy at start. The error names the setting, never its value. Such settings:

  • an unset COLLIEAI_API_KEY;
  • a key that isn't clai_…;
  • an api_base that isn't an http(s) URL with a host;
  • an api_base on http:// anywhere but this machine (127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost): the key and the caller's text would cross the network unencrypted;
  • a mode with anything but pre_call and post_call, also under LITELLM_STRICT_GUARDRAIL_MODES=false;
  • a number out of range.

LiteLLM's own handling of a guardrail's bad setting is different: it logs one ERROR, Skipping guardrail …, and starts the proxy without the guardrail. The adapter's error is not of the kind LiteLLM skips, so the start stops instead of running unobserved. Two cases stay LiteLLM's:

  • an entry without mode is skipped that way before the adapter is built;
  • a misspelled setting is passed on like any other key, so the adapter doesn't see it and uses the default.

Your project's policy

This beta runs two of CollieAi's rule types: dictionary matching (aho_corasick) and normalization. Each phase runs the policy's rules for its direction: Input rules for pre-call, Output rules for post-call. If one of them is outside what the beta runs, the phase is refused as a whole. The call goes on unchanged, and the phase is a bypass capability. That happens with:

  • a rule of any other type: regex, structured IDs, URL rules, LLM detection and so on;
  • more than 16 rules for one direction, or more than 8 dictionary rules;
  • a dictionary rule on a dictionary group, a dictionary over 256 KiB, or a match mode other than substring with whole_word on;
  • a normalization rule with trim_punctuation.

CollieAi's Logs show such a check with the error capability:<what>, for example capability:rule_type. The synthetic check at start meets the same refusal and logs bypass:capability.

Set the policy up before you connect the proxy. A new CollieAi project starts with the Starter Monitor policy, which has rules of other types, so a new project alone still gives bypass:capability:

  1. Give the guardrail's project a policy that holds only aho_corasick rules and normalization rules without trim_punctuation, within the limits above. Create one, or delete or disable every other Input and Output rule in a policy no other project uses.
  2. Send a test request through the proxy. The next summary must show completed for both phases. bypass:capability means a rule is still outside what the beta runs.

What it checks

It checks foreground, non-streaming Chat Completions text with one choice. Every other call passes through unchanged, is not sent, and is counted as outside the supported profile under one reason:

Reason The call
call_type Is not a Chat Completion (Responses, embeddings, …), or its type is unknown
streaming Streams
multiple_choices Has n > 1, or a response has several choices
tool_definitions, tool_calls, tool_message Carries tools
non_text_input, non_text_output Carries images, audio or other non-text parts
reasoning Has the model's reasoning in the request or the response (reasoning_content, thinking_blocks, reasoning_items, reasoning), which the adapter does not send
content_missing Has no content: null, no parts, no choice. An empty string is content and is checked
malformed Is not shaped like a chat call

Each phase of an eligible call makes one POST to CollieAi:

  • no retries and no redirects;
  • the reply is read within deadline_ms;
  • the call itself goes on unchanged whatever happens.

The phase ends one of two ways:

  • completed: CollieAi checked every item;
  • bypass: no check. The reason is CollieAi's typed error (auth, not_found, capability, limit, shape, busy, deadline, …) or the adapter's own: timeout, transport, protocol, adapter_error, or cancelled when the caller's call was cancelled.

A bypass is never counted as a check.

Added latency. Pre-call runs before the model call and post-call after it, each with its own deadline. A call waits at most two deadlines: 5 s with the defaults.

LiteLLM's guardrail log

Each phase adds a StandardLoggingGuardrailInformation record with guardrail_provider: collieai.

guardrail_status:

Status When
success The check found nothing
guardrail_flagged The check found something Enforce would mask or block. The call still went through unchanged
guardrail_failed_to_respond Bypass: no check
not_run Outside the supported profile

guardrail_response carries:

  • result and effective, which is always allow;
  • for a completed check: would (CollieAi's would.outcome), degraded, and CollieAi's diagnostics: evaluation ID, coverage, rule IDs and types, timings;
  • for a bypass or a call outside the supported profile: reason, detail and http_status;
  • operation_id, the same for both phases of a call. Pre-call puts it in the request's metadata as collieai_operation_id, with a tag only this worker process can make, collieai_operation_tag. Post-call and the summary's count take it back only with that tag, so an ID the caller writes there is never used.

It never carries text. LiteLLM's credential masker hides policy_fingerprint. Use evaluation_id or operation_id to find the check in CollieAi's audit.

LiteLLM's own request and response logging is separate from this adapter: review what it keeps on its own.

Logs

The adapter logs under the logger collieai_guardrail. It logs counts, phases, reason codes and HTTP statuses. It never logs a text, the key or a call's identifiers.

Line Level
… observation bypassed (<reason>, detail=…, http_status=…) WARNING for a call, at most once a minute per phase and reason, with the number held back. Not for the synthetic check, which has its own line
collieai guardrail summary {json} INFO, every summary_interval_s
… LiteLLM logged N eligible calls and the hook has never run … WARNING: the guardrail is not wired for that phase
collieai guardrail synthetic check: … INFO when both phases completed, or when CollieAi answered busy and the check will be repeated; WARNING with each phase's reason otherwise
… LiteLLM no longer has this instance among its callbacks … INFO: the guardrail was deleted or rebuilt; see Turning it off

httpx logs each request's URL at INFO under its own logger. It carries no key or content.

A stock proxy gives handlers only to LiteLLM's own loggers, and the INFO lines above would show nowhere. So the adapter sets up its logger itself:

  • if you haven't set a level for collieai_guardrail, it logs from INFO;
  • if no handler up its chain takes INFO, it adds its own, on stderr, for the levels those handlers drop. Each line still goes out once.

With json_logs: true under litellm_settings, its lines go to LiteLLM's JSON handler. With only the JSON_LOGS variable, they stay plain text among the JSON lines.

The summary

The summary holds one object per phase. Its counts cover the interval, per worker process:

  • hook_calls: the hook ran;
  • eligible: the call is in the supported profile;
  • attempted: a POST started;
  • completed: checks;
  • bypass: no check, by reason;
  • outside: outside the supported profile, by reason;
  • logged_calls, logged_eligible, logged_outside: what LiteLLM's success and failure log events counted, apart from the hooks, one per call. The router logs every attempt of a call it retries, each with the request's metadata and the operation_id pre-call put there; the further attempts count as logged_repeats. litellm_call_id can't tell calls apart: LiteLLM takes it from the caller's x-litellm-call-id header, and a client may send one for a whole session. A call pre-call never saw has no operation_id, so each of its attempts counts as a call: a hook that does not run still shows. logged_outside has the reasons above and two of its own:
    • rejected: the proxy itself refused the call: a bad key, a limit, a budget, or another guardrail's block, before the model or after it;
    • malformed also counts LiteLLM's background health checks of a model, which carry no messages.

Derived values:

  • coverage: of the checks that ended in the interval, the share that completed: completed / (completed + bypass). A check can start in one interval and end in the next, so it is not taken of eligible, which counts starts. null when no check ended;

  • outside_share: calls outside the supported profile out of all the hook saw. Read it next to coverage, so excluded traffic doesn't hide behind a good one;

  • logged_unseen: eligible calls LiteLLM logged, less those a hook saw in the same interval. It is approximate:

    • a call that crosses the interval's end moves it by one;
    • a call the hook saw and another guardrail then blocked takes one off.

    A value that keeps growing means some calls skip the hook.

The not-wired WARNING needs two things: the phase's hook has never run in this worker, and LiteLLM logged eligible calls in the interval. A hook that ran in one minute for a call LiteLLM logs in the next does not trigger it.

synthetic holds the last synthetic check's result per phase.

Checking it works

  1. Within 3 s of start, the synthetic check posts a fixed text through the same client, key and deadline. It is not counted with your calls' traffic. Each worker waits a random part of those 3 s, so workers that start together seldom meet at CollieAi. If they do and CollieAi answers busy, the adapter logs it at INFO and repeats the check 1.5–3 s later, up to twice. A WARNING names what failed: bypass:auth for a wrong key, bypass:not_found when the route is off, bypass:capability when the project's policy has a rule this beta doesn't run, bypass:transport when the server can't be reached, bypass:busy when CollieAi had no free slot three times in a row.
  2. Within a minute of start, each worker writes a collieai guardrail summary line. If there is none, the adapter is not loaded. Look for LiteLLM's ERROR Skipping guardrail (an entry without mode), or check whether something set the collieai_guardrail logger above INFO.
  3. After a test request through the proxy, the summary shows completed for both phases.
  4. In operation, compare eligible with logged_eligible. coverage shows how many checks completed.

Known limits

  • The model's reasoning is not checked. A phase that carries reasoning is outside the supported profile (outside.reasoning). A reply with reasoning makes post-call outside; pre-call is still checked, unless the request sends earlier replies' reasoning back. If your model always returns reasoning, post-call checks nothing, and its coverage is null.
  • A phase holds at most 32 texts, 4,096 characters each and 16,384 in all. Pre-call sends the text of every message, the history included, so a long conversation is bypassed as limit. These are the limits of the narrow profile, which app.collieai.io runs, and the default max_body_bytes matches them. A self-hosted CollieAi on the wide profile takes 64 texts and 131,072 characters; set max_body_bytes: 3211264 there.
  • Counts are per worker process, and they reset when the worker restarts.
  • A burst beyond CollieAi's capacity is busy. Each CollieAi API process checks one call at a time and answers the next busy. The adapter counts it as a bypass, and the call goes on unchanged. If the summary shows a lasting busy share, tell CollieAi support.

Turning it off

Remove the guardrail entry and reload the proxy. Calls then go on as before.

You can also delete or change the guardrail through LiteLLM's API, without a reload. A change builds a new instance. The old instance then retires within summary_interval_s, even if it was deleted right after it was added:

  • it logs one INFO line;
  • it stops its summary and synthetic check;
  • one deadline later, it closes its connections.

License

MIT

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